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THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COST OF AN OUTBREAK OF FOOT 
AND MOUTH DISEASE IN AUSTRALIA 
 
PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION ACT 1998 
 
Australia is free from major exotic animal diseases such as foot and mouth disease 
(FMD). If an outbreak of FMD was to occur in Australia, there would be a major 
impact on the agricultural sector, the national economy and rural and regional 
Australia. Assessing the full extent of these consequences will provide important 
information, which will assist planning and preparedness for such an outbreak and 
also in managing a response. 
 
The Productivity Commission is requested: 
•   To consider three scenarios: 
1.  A small single point outbreak; 
2.  A medium sized outbreak which impacts on two States and which takes up to six 
months to contain and eradicate; or 
3.  A large multi-point outbreak which takes up to twelve months to control and 
eradicate. 
•   To evaluate the full economic, social and environmental impact of an outbreak 
(under each of the above scenarios), including on the agricultural sector, 
regional Australia, and the national economy, and in any other collateral 
manner. 
•   For scenarios (2) and (3) above, consideration be given to any changes to the 
impact of an outbreak if:  
a vaccination policy is in place; or 
FMD-free geographic zones are established. 
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Foreword 
The Commission has prepared this research report in response to a request from the 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer. The Council of Australian Governments 
meeting of June 2001 agreed to review and revise national whole-of-government 
frameworks for the prevention, preparedness for, and management of a major 
emergency disease outbreak, such as Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD). This report is 
intended as an input to that process. 
The report assesses the economic, social and environmental impacts of a range of 
hypothetical FMD outbreak scenarios on the agricultural sector, rural and regional 
Australia, and the national economy. It also assesses how those potential impacts 
would change if a vaccination policy were in place, or FMD-free geographic zones 
were established. 
The report has drawn on information contained in previous studies of the possible 
impact of FMD on Australia, the impacts of FMD outbreaks on other countries, and 
wide ranging consultations with government agencies, industry associations and 
academics. The Commission wishes to thank the many people who have contributed 
to the study. 
 
 
Gary Banks   
Chairman 
May 2002   
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Glossary 
AUSVETPLAN  A nationally agreed approach for responding to exotic animal 
disease emergencies developed by Commonwealth and State animal 
health authorities and the Natural Disasters Organisation, linking 
Australia’s animal disease policy, strategies, implementation, 
coordination and counter-disaster plans.  
Chief Veterinary 
Officer 
The veterinarian of each State or Territory animal health authority 
who has responsibility for animal disease control in that State or 
Territory. 
Control area  A declared area in which defined conditions apply to the movement 
of specified animals to reduce the chance of the disease spreading 
further. Conditions applying in a control area are of lesser intensity 
than those in a restricted area. 
Dangerous contact 
animal 
An animal showing no clinical signs of disease but which, by reason 
of its possible exposure to disease, will be subject to disease control 




Premises containing dangerous contact animal(s) and on which some 
or all susceptible animals may be slaughtered. 
Declared area  A defined tract of land being subject to disease control restrictions 
under exotic disease legislation. Types of declared areas include 
restricted area, control area, infected premises and dangerous contact 
premises. 
Decontamination  Includes all stages of cleaning and disinfection. 
Emergency ring 
vaccination 
This involves vaccination of all susceptible stock in a ring of fixed 




A national cost sharing agreement between Australian governments 
and livestock industries for emergency animal disease control.  
Endemic  Disease regularly occurring in a particular region, country or 
population group. 
Epidemiology  The study of the distribution and determinants of disease in 
populations.   
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Free zone   Part of a country that is free of a disease. To obtain recognition of a 
disease-free zone, countries must demonstrate that they have a 
reliable system of disease control, the disease is compulsorily 
notifiable, and that they have an effective veterinary organisation. 
Infected premises  A defined area (which may be all or part of a property) in which 
exotic disease exists, is believed to exist, or in which the infective 
agent of that exotic disease exists or is believed to exist. An infected 
premises is subject to quarantine served by notice and to eradication 
or control procedures. 
Infected zone  A zone where disease is present in an otherwise disease-free 
country. 
Infectious units (IU) Measure of the amount of virus (1 IU = 1.4 TCID50 or Tissue culture 
infectious dose) 
Local disease control 
centre 
An emergency operations centre responsible for the command and 
control of field operations in a defined area. 
Movement controls  Restrictions placed on movement of animals, people and things to 
prevent the spread of disease. 
Outbreak  Usually defined as a small epidemic — the occurrence of disease in 
a particular region, country or population group at a level clearly in 
excess of that normally expected. 
Quarantine  Legal restrictions imposed on a place or tract of land, limiting access 
or movement of specified animals, persons, vehicles or things. 
Rendering  Destruction of the crushed carcass or animal by-products by heating. 
Restricted area  A defined area around infected and dangerous contact premises, 
which will be subject to a high level of quarantine, movement 
control and surveillance. 
Serological survey  The blood testing of herds to determine the extent of antibodies 
against a specific pathogen. 
Serotype  The range of antibodies in an individual’s blood, from which one 
can infer the individual’s history of infection. 
Stamping out  Control of disease outbreaks by slaughtering infected animals and 
animals exposed to infection plus quarantine and disinfection of 
infected premises. 
Strain  A group of organisms closely related to one another and possessing 
a common characteristic.     
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Surveillance  A systematic program of inspection and examination of animals or 
things to determine the presence or absence of a disease. 
Suspect animal  An animal which is under suspicion of having been exposed to an 
exotic disease such that quarantine and intensive surveillance, but 
not pre-emptive slaughter, are warranted; or an animal not known to 
have been exposed to the disease agent but showing suspicious 
clinical signs. 
Suspect premises  Premises containing suspect animals which will be subject  to 
quarantine and intensive surveillance. 
Tracing  The process of locating animals, persons or things which may be 
implicated in the spread of disease. 
Zoning  Dividing a country into defined infected and disease-free areas. A 
high level of movement control between zones apply.  
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•   A range of measures are in place to prevent a Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) 
outbreak in Australia. All Governments and the livestock industries are also 
reviewing their preparedness to deal with an outbreak should it occur. 
•   An FMD outbreak would result in the immediate closure of many of Australia’s major 
export markets for livestock products. Key beef and lamb markets would not reopen 
until at least three months after the disease was eradicated, and it could then take 
some time to rebuild those markets. 
–  The Commission estimates that the cumulative losses of export revenue would 
range from over $3 billion for a short outbreak to over $9 billion for a 12 month 
outbreak. The majority of losses would be in the beef industry. 
•   The resulting oversupply of meat on the domestic market would result in a large 
drop in price in Australia and a further decline in industry revenue. 
–  The cumulative decline in revenue from domestic sales is estimated to be over 
$2  billion for a short outbreak to over $3  billion for an outbreak that takes 
12 months to control. 
•   Control and compensation costs are estimated to be around $30 million for a short 
outbreak rising to $450 million for a 12 month outbreak. 
•   There would be significant flow-on losses to the economy, including to many 
businesses reliant on livestock industry revenue in rural and regional Australia. 
–  Overall, the cumulative loss to the national economy is estimated to be around 
$2 billion to $3 billion in Gross Domestic Product for a short outbreak, rising to 
between $8 billion and $13 billion for a 12 month outbreak. 
•   All jurisdictions would suffer losses but, because of the size of its beef industry, 
Queensland would be particularly affected. 
•   Establishing FMD-free trade zones could reduce the costs of an outbreak to 
Australia by up to two-thirds. 
•   Emergency ring vaccination of livestock is likely to be an appropriate policy option 
whenever it could materially reduce the length of an outbreak. 
•   There would be significant social costs associated with any FMD outbreak. In 
addition to the disruption and distress caused by the control and eradication 
measures in the infected areas, the widespread financial losses arising from the 
trade costs of an outbreak would result in significant social costs to individuals and 
communities throughout rural Australia. 
•   Environmental costs, which stem mainly from the disposal of animal carcasses, 
could be minimised with good preparation and site selection. 
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Overview 
Geographical isolation and sound quarantine procedures have protected Australia’s 
agricultural industries from major animal diseases, such as Foot and Mouth Disease 
(FMD). Nevertheless, with FMD endemic in many parts of the world, and becoming 
more prevalent in our region, Australia needs to be well prepared to control an 
outbreak should it occur. 
The Commonwealth Government, as part of its planning and preparedness for a 
possible FMD outbreak, has asked the Productivity Commission to assess the 
potential economic, social and environmental impacts on Australia of a range of 
hypothetical FMD outbreaks. 
FMD is a highly contagious virus that affects cloven-hoofed animals such as cattle, 
sheep, pigs, goats and deer. It does not generally kill otherwise healthy mature 
animals, but can cause the death of young animals and reduce livestock 
productivity. It does not pose a health risk to humans. The single greatest 
consequence of an outbreak of FMD in Australia would be our exclusion from 
premium meat markets in currently FMD-free countries such as Japan and the 
United States of America (USA). FMD is essentially a ‘trade disease’. 
The details of the outbreak scenarios used for this study were developed by the 
Commonwealth Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry — Australia 
(AFFA) in consultation with State Governments. The scenarios are: 
•   A small single point outbreak taking 3 months to control and eliminate, which 
has been modelled as occurring in the wheat-sheep zone of south west Western 
Australia, primarily affecting sheep. It lasts for around 3 months and results in 
the slaughter of 38 000 livestock to stamp out the disease. 
•   A medium outbreak lasting 6 months, which has been modelled as starting in 
north Queensland and spreading to central Queensland and the Northern 
Territory, primarily occurring in beef cattle. The outbreak results in the slaughter 
of around 50 000 animals. 
•   A multi-state outbreak taking 12 months to control, which has been assumed to 
begin in southern NSW and to spread to western Victoria and south east South 
Australia. It has been modelled as spreading through several regions in each of 
these three States and affecting high density mixed livestock, including beef and     
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dairy cattle, sheep and pigs. The outbreak involves the slaughter of around 
750 000 animals. 
Industries vulnerable to FMD — primarily the meat, livestock and dairy industries 
— make major contributions to the Australian economy. Annual production of these 
industries total around $16 billion. Exports totalled almost $10 billion in 2000-01, 
or 6 per cent of Australia’s total exports. 
To assist in understanding the economic, social and environmental impacts of an 
FMD outbreak, the Commission has consulted widely with industry and 
governments. It has also drawn on the recent United Kingdom (UK) experience 
with FMD and Australia’s experience with other recent animal disease outbreaks. 
Broadly, the impacts of an FMD outbreak arise from two sources: 
•   the costs of control and eradication of the disease itself; and  
•   to a greater extent, the costs from closure of export markets for affected 
livestock products.  
Control and eradication costs 
A nationally agreed strategy to control an FMD outbreak is set out in the Australian 
Veterinary Emergency Plan (AUSVETPLAN). This strategy — known as 
‘stamping out’ — involves: 
•   establishing a quarantine area around the outbreak; 
•   slaughtering all infected herds and other herds that have been in ‘dangerous 
contact’ with them; 
•   disposing of animals; 
•   disinfecting properties; 
•   compensating stock owners for the livestock slaughtered; and 
•   carrying out clinical inspection and surveillance to ensure the disease has not 
spread. 
As set out in the AUSVETPLAN, compensation applies only to livestock 
slaughtered for the purpose of eradication or prevention of the spread of FMD. It 
does not cover loss of income or consequential losses arising from the outbreak, 
such as those resulting from movement restrictions preventing the transport of stock 
to markets.     
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Significant government and industry resources would be required to ‘stamp out’ 
FMD. For example, the 1999 outbreak at Mangrove Mountain in New South Wales 
of a highly infectious disease affecting chickens — Newcastle disease — was 
confined to one local area. Nonetheless, around 5 000 people were involved in its 
control and the total control and compensation costs exceeded $25 million. 
Based on the control costs of the UK FMD outbreak in 2001 and the cost of the 
Mangrove Mountain outbreak, the Commission estimates that control and 
compensation costs could range from around $30 million for the 3 month outbreak, 
to up to $450 million for 12 month outbreak. As shown in table 1, control costs for 
each scenario would be significantly larger than the cost of compensation for 
livestock destroyed. 
Table 1  Compensation and control costs for the FMD outbreak 
scenarios 
Outbreak Compensationa  Control costs 
 $m  $m 
3 month outbreak — WA  4  20 – 25 
6 month outbreak — Qld, NT  19  130 – 150 
12 month outbreak— Vic, SA, NSW  41  360 – 420 
     
a Calculated at pre-FMD-outbreak values. 
Source: PC estimates. 
Costs of trade restrictions 
For a country such as Australia with major exports of livestock product, the 
economic impact of the trade restrictions resulting from an FMD outbreak would be 
far greater than the control costs. Trade costs would be large because countries that 
are free from FMD will not import meat (or a range of other agricultural products) 
from FMD-infected countries for fear of importing the disease. This effectively 
divides the world market for meat in two — an FMD-free market and an FMD-
endemic market. Prices in the disease-free market are markedly higher than those in 
the endemic market. Currently, Australia exports over 85 per cent of its beef and 
around 40 per cent of its sheep meat to FMD-free countries. 
If there were an FMD outbreak in Australia, all markets for livestock commodities 
would immediately close.  
•   Initially, FMD-endemic markets would close because of concerns about the 
possible introduction of a new strain of FMD virus. However, once the strain of 
the virus had been identified, there are good prospects of exports recommencing     
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to FMD-endemic countries with the same strain during a medium or long 
outbreak. This could particularly lessen the impact of the outbreak on mutton, 
live sheep and live cattle exports.  
•   FMD-free markets would remain closed to Australian livestock commodities 
until at least three months after the last infected animal was eradicated. This 
would particularly affect beef and lamb producers as few alternative markets 
exist.  
Because wool and dairy products can potentially also carry the virus, it is likely that 
there would be an initial disruption to exports of these commodities until assurances 
could be given that they had been treated to inactivate the virus. 
The closure of export markets would have a severe effect on Australia’s livestock 
industries, irrespective of the location of the FMD outbreak within Australia. Export 
prices and returns to exporters would fall dramatically. A glut of meat would cause 
the domestic price of all meats to fall, which would further lower returns to 
producers and processors. In turn, low prices would affect both farm production and 
domestic consumption of meat. 
Impact on production 
The impact of an FMD outbreak on production levels of affected livestock would 
differ depending on the commodity affected: 
•   In response to the price fall, it is likely that many beef and sheep producers 
reliant on grazing would initially withhold some production from the market, 
leading to an increase in total livestock numbers. However, feed constraints 
would limit the extent of holdback possible. At some point — which would 
differ considerably between regions — surplus stock would be dumped on the 
market. For sheep producers, the choice of surplus stock to dump could be 
influenced by the possibility of increasing wool production. Based on the 
Commission’s assumptions about domestic and export demand for meat, it is 
unlikely that all livestock production could be sold, raising the spectre of some 
on-farm culling of animals beyond that required to eradicate the disease. 
•   In relation to pigmeat, the low prices for meat relative to the cost of feed would 
limit the holdback of production and lead to a significant temporary increase in 
supply as producers dumped stock. The breeding herd would be reduced to a 
level necessary to supply the reduced domestic demand and supply would 
remain subdued until the domestic prices for beef recovered and export markets 
for pork were re-established.     
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Impact on consumption 
FMD does not raise human health issues. Nonetheless, because this would not be 
understood or accepted by all consumers, initially it is likely that consumption of 
red meat (including pork) would decline. However, once the initial fear of FMD 
receded, it is likely that low prices would lead to an increase in domestic 
consumption of red meat. While meat consumption would be likely to rise overall 
(the Commission has modelled an increase of 10 per cent), there would be a greater 
increase in red meats, at the expense of poultry. Indeed, competition from red meats 
could lead to a fall in the price of poultry and revenue losses to the poultry industry. 
Estimates of the economic impacts 
Loss of livestock industry revenue 
Each of the outbreak scenarios would result in a significant loss in revenue to the 
livestock and meat processing industries. The Commission estimates that the 
cumulative loss in export and domestic market revenue to the industries would be 
around $5  700  million for the single point outbreak scenario, rising to around 
$12 800 million for an outbreak lasting 12 months. As shown in figure 1, in each 
scenario, revenue losses extend beyond the eradication of the disease owing to the 
time it would take to rebuild international markets.  
Figure 1  Estimated revenue losses to the livestock industries for each 
outbreak scenario 




















3 month 6 month 12 month
 
Source: PC estimates.     
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These trade-related losses would continue for significantly longer under the 
12 month scenario than for the shorter outbreaks. In each of the scenarios, the total 
value of lost exports exceeds the reduction in revenue on the domestic market (see 
table 2). 
Table 2  Estimated revenue losses to the livestock industries, by market 




Loss of national income 
Domestic market 
Transfer to consumers 
 
Total revenue loss  
  $m $m $m 
3 month   3 333  2 373  5 706 
6 month   4 611  2 994  7 605 
12 month   9 480  3 332  12 812 
     
Source:  PC estimates. 
It is important to note that after an initial reaction by consumers, the reduction in 
revenue to the livestock and meat processing industries on the domestic market is 
primarily a transfer to meat consumers from the greater availability of lower priced 
meats. This would result in an increase in the consumption of other goods and 
services in the economy and/or to increased savings. 
Impact on different commodities 
The beef industry would account for the majority of revenue losses in each of the 
outbreak scenarios (see figure  2). This reflects the high proportion of beef 
production that is exported and the FMD-free status of Australia’s key beef markets 
in the USA and Japan. While the losses in other industries are smaller, they are 
significant in terms of the size of these industries. 
Impact by State 
The estimated losses by State, shown in figure 3, reflect the significant impact on 
the beef industry. As Australia’s major beef producer and exporter, Queensland is 
more affected than other States in absolute terms. The impact on New South Wales 
reflects a combination of losses in the beef, sheep and pork industries. This is also 
the case in Victoria, where dairy losses are also overwhelmingly concentrated. 
While the losses in Western Australia, South Australia, Tasmania, and the Northern 
Territory appear smaller, relative to the level of production in those jurisdictions 
they are, nevertheless, significant. For example, a number of the regions likely to 
suffer the largest relative losses in output are in South Australia (see figure 4).     
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Figure 2  Estimated revenue losses to the livestock industries by product 
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Source: PC estimates. 
Figure 3  Estimated revenue losses to the livestock industries, by State 
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Source:  PC estimates. 
Indirect and economywide effects 
The revenue losses to the livestock and meat processing industries and costs to 
control the outbreak would have wider impacts on the national economy. The 
Commission estimates that the 12  month outbreak scenario would reduce 
Australia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by around $2 000 million in the first     
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year and by between $8 000 million and $13 000 million over 10 years. The effects 
of a 6 month outbreak on GDP would be around half that of the 12 month scenario 
— see table 3. 
Table 3  Impact of the outbreak scenarios on Gross Domestic Product 
Outbreak scenario  Loss in the first year  Total loss a 
 $m  $m 
3 month   900  2 000 – 3 000 
6 month   1 400  3 000 – 5 000 
12 month  2 000  8 000 – 13 000 
a Net present value of losses at the wholesale level. 
Source: PC estimates.  
Reflecting the direct impacts, activity and employment levels in the livestock 
industries are estimated to be significantly reduced. For instance: 
•   value added in beef production for a 12 month outbreak is projected to decline in 
the first year by 40 per cent and employment by 30 per cent. There would be a 
significant contraction of the feedlot industry — especially those operators 
geared towards production for the Japanese market; 
•   the meat processing industry would be affected to an extent similar to primary 
producers. It is estimated that, for the 12 month outbreak, activity and 
employment in meat processing would decline by around 30 per cent in the first 
year. 
Employment in industries supplying inputs to livestock production would also fall. 
These include employment in road transport (around a 2 per cent decline), and in 
the agricultural and mining equipment industry (of around 2.5 per cent).  
Measures to control the disease would also have an impact on other industries. In 
the UK, control measures had a large effect on the tourist industry. Australia’s 
tourist industry is not linked to agriculture to the same extent and most major tourist 
attractions would not be affected directly by an outbreak. A decline in domestic 
tourism in areas surrounding the outbreak may largely be transferred to other 
domestic tourism centres. There would also be some initial effect on international 
tourism because of a misperception that an outbreak would restrict tourist activities 
or cause health problems. The Commission estimates that initially the international 
tourism industry could lose around $300 million in receipts under the 12 month 
scenario, but that as a result of the trade effects of FMD on the exchange rate, 
cumulatively, there could be a small net boost to such tourism.     
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The Commission’s modelling also shows activity in some industries would increase, 
partially offsetting the livestock industry losses. For example, the loss of export 
markets for livestock commodities would add to pressure for a depreciation of the 
exchange rate. This could result in higher exports from other sectors of the 
economy, such as the mining industry and some manufacturing industries. 
Impact by region 
The effects within States are not uniform, but are generally concentrated in inland 
rural areas where livestock intensity is greatest and where a high proportion of 
people are employed in livestock production (figure 4).  
Figure 4  Regional pattern of the impact of the 12 month FMD scenario  
Cumulative change in output over 10 years 
 
Source: MMRF model estimates. 
Least affected third 
Most affected third 
Middle third     
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Impact on farm receipts 
Farm receipts are projected to be severely affected by an outbreak of FMD. For the 
12 month outbreak, average broadacre farm cash receipts are projected to fall by 
$58 000 or 26 per cent of total receipts during the first year from the price effect of 
an outbreak alone. However, the decrease in cash receipts would differ significantly 
by farm type — ranging from 8 per cent of receipts for farms mainly producing 
wheat and crops to 70  per cent for predominantly beef production enterprises 
(table  4). Smaller farms would suffer a higher proportionate reduction in cash 
receipts than larger farms. 
Table 4  Impact of FMD on farm cash receipts, by broadacre farm type 
Average per farm for the first year of a 12 month outbreak  
  Total farm cash receipts  Estimated loss of farm cash receipts 
12 month outbreak 
 $  $  % 
All broadacre  224 736  58 200  26 
Wheat & crops  395 945  30 900  8 
Mixed livestock & crops  244 989  43 000  18 
Sheep 145  180  32  300  22 
Beef  160 496  112 500  70 
Sheep-beef 137  329  59  400  43 
Source: PC estimates based on ABARE 2002a.  
Such losses in receipts would undoubtedly cause financial hardship in many areas. 
On average, broadacre farms have low levels of debt and significant equity, which 
could provide some basis for support until prices improved. However, for farms that 
were already under financial stress, an FMD outbreak could prove the ‘final straw’. 
Impact of vaccination and of establishing FMD-free trade zones 
The terms of reference ask the Commission to estimate the impact on the costs of 
the 6 month and 12 month outbreak scenarios if a vaccination policy were adopted 
as part of the control strategy and if FMD-free zones were established. 
Vaccination 
Epidemiological modelling by AFFA has shown that using emergency ring 
vaccination during the 6 month outbreak in Northern Australia would not only 
increase the average length of the outbreak, but also create a large pool of 
vaccinated animals that, in all likelihood, would need to be slaughtered before     
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Australia could be declared FMD-free. Hence, using vaccination in this type of 
disease scenario would not be a sound policy. 
In contrast, the modelling of the use of emergency ring vaccination in the 12 month 
scenario has shown that it considerably reduces the duration of the outbreak and 
increases the certainty of achieving control. The Commission estimates that by 
reducing the duration of the outbreak, and hence achieving quicker access to 
international markets, the losses in livestock industry revenue would be reduced by 
$1 000 million to $2 500 million. Against this benefit, the costs of vaccination and 
compensation for slaughter of vaccinated animals would be around $130 million. 
Thus, for the 12 month scenario, emergency ring vaccination would be an effective 
strategy. 
More generally, whenever emergency ring vaccination offers the likelihood of 
materially reducing the duration of an outbreak, the benefits from quicker re-entry 
to FMD-free international markets would likely outweigh the additional costs 
involved. 
Zoning 
International trade rules relating to FMD provide for the establishment of FMD-free 
zones which would allow non-infected areas to continue to trade in international 
markets. In exploring the impact of zoning on the cost of an FMD outbreak, the 
Commission has assumed that an FMD-free zone could be established comprising 
all States that could demonstrate they did not have an infection, and that it would 
take three months for the necessary barrier control measures to be implemented and 
recognised internationally. The results indicate that zoning has the potential to 
dramatically reduce the costs of an outbreak on Australia. For example: 
•   for the 6 month outbreak scenario, the direct revenue loss to the livestock 
industry could be reduced by 40 per cent, or $3 000 million (figure 5); and  
•   for the 12 month outbreak scenario, the losses could be reduced by two-thirds or 
$8 600 million (figure 6). 
Naturally, losses would be reduced most in the FMD-free zone. However, the 
Commission estimates that losses could also be reduced in the infected zone since 
the earlier re-establishment of exports from the FMD-free zone would allow the 
infected zone to rebuild export markets more quickly once it achieved disease-free 
status. The reduced time required to regain export markets reflects the fact that, with 
zoning, Australian meat products (albeit from the FMD-free zone) would continue 
to have a presence in export markets. Consequently, brand image and distribution 
systems could be rebuilt more quickly than would be the case if all exports ceased.     
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Figure 5  Estimated impact of zoning on the 6 month outbreak scenario 
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a Expressed as the net present value of the losses over the outbreak. 
Source: PC estimates. 
Figure 6  Estimated impact of zoning on the 12 month outbreak scenario 
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a Expressed as the net present value of the losses over the outbreak. 
Source: PC estimates. 
Social impacts 
The social impacts of an FMD outbreak would include a large range of effects on 
individuals and communities as a result of the disruption caused by the control and     
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quarantine measures undertaken to contain and eliminate the disease, but also the 
pervasive effects throughout the livestock industries from the loss of revenue. 
Previous outbreaks and natural disasters have identified financial stress or hardship 
as one of the main causes of adverse social impacts. In the case of FMD, significant 
negative social impacts would not be confined to the control zones — an outbreak 
would cause financial stress throughout rural communities in Australia. 
However, within control zones, there would be significant added pressures on 
individuals, communities and emergency workers from: the trauma associated with 
the compulsory slaughter and disposal of livestock; the disruption and 
inconvenience associated with movement restrictions; and the long hours of work, 
often in the face of antagonism and the need to provide emotional support.  
On the basis of previous outbreaks, the financial and other stresses arising from an 
outbreak could lead to problems for: 
•   individuals, such as depression and other psychological problems, substance 
abuse and physical health problems, ranging from insomnia to increased rates of 
heart attacks and stroke; 
•   families, including relationship problems within families, increases in domestic 
violence and disruption to children’s education; and 
•   communities, such as disruption to the cohesiveness of the community. For 
example, some groups could be unfairly blamed for spreading the disease and 
become scapegoats for the disruption to the community. Groups that receive 
compensation could be resented by groups that suffer losses but do not receive 
compensation. Emergency workers could be seen as unwelcome outsiders and 
also become a source of antagonism. 
In many instances, the elimination of the disease would reduce the sources of stress 
and people’s wellbeing would quickly recover. However, some of the impacts 
identified above would result in longer-term problems. In particular: 
•   psychological problems generally take a significant amount of time to resolve; 
•   disruption to education can have long lasting effects; and 
•   previous experience suggests that community divisions and antagonism can 
persist long after the event. 
Thus, while they cannot be costed in the normal manner, the social impacts from an 
FMD outbreak would clearly be significant. In some cases, they could be short 
term. However, in other cases, they could entail additional costs that extend well 
beyond the length of the outbreak for the individuals and communities concerned, 
and indirectly for governments through the health and welfare systems.     
XXXII  OVERVIEW  
 
Environmental impacts 
The potential environmental impacts of an FMD outbreak would be largely 
associated with disposal of animal carcasses. Carcasses can be buried, burnt on 
pyres or rendered (which involves boiling and reducing ground carcasses). Burial is 
the preferred disposal method in the AUSVETPLAN. Burial and pyre burning were 
used extensively during the 2001 FMD outbreak in the UK.  
The main potential environmental problem with burial is contamination of ground 
water by leachates from the disposal pit. The UK experience indicates that burial 
would not be suitable in some areas where there is a high water table or aquifers 
close to the surface. However, in other areas, with appropriate monitoring, burial 
would have a minimal impact on the environment. Monitoring of burial sites in the 
UK to date has found that no water sources used for public or private supply have 
been affected by FMD disposals. 
From an environmental perspective, burning can raise concerns about visual 
pollution and toxic emissions (particularly of dioxins). That said, monitoring in the 
UK has not shown any ongoing air quality deterioration, and concentrations of 
dioxins in soil samples close to pyres are within the range previously found in the 
rural environment.  
The Commission has not attempted to cost the likely environmental impact of the 
outbreak scenarios. However, the key to minimising potential environmental 
problems is good preparation. Given the lessons from the UK — such as advances 
in pit design — and the considerable work on carcass disposal that is being 
coordinated by the NSW Government for a possible animal disease outbreak in 
Australia, the Commission considers that significant environmental problems could 
be avoided if there were an outbreak in Australia. However, this would involve 
ongoing monitoring and remediation costs as necessary. While the costs of ensuring 
environmental impacts are minimised would not be small in absolute terms, in 
relation to the economic and social consequences of an outbreak, their magnitude 
would be modest. 
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1 Introduction 
The Government has asked the Productivity Commission to assess the potential 
economic, social and environmental impacts of a range of hypothetical Foot and 
Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreaks on Australia. 
FMD is a highly contagious virus that affects cloven-hoofed animals such as cattle, 
sheep, pigs, goats and deer. It does not generally kill otherwise healthy mature 
animals, but can cause the death of young animals and reduce livestock 
productivity. It does not pose a risk to humans. As the recent outbreaks in the 
United Kingdom (UK) illustrate, an outbreak of FMD in Australia would have a 
significant impact on our trade with other countries, on livestock production and on 
rural communities generally. 
Australia’s agricultural industries are key sectors of the Australian economy and 
contribute significantly to its exports. Production in these sectors is valued at almost 
$35 billion. Exports totalled around $15 billion in 2000-01 or 10 per cent of total 
exports.  
Geographical isolation and sound quarantine procedures have protected Australia’s 
agricultural industries from major diseases. Nevertheless, with FMD outbreaks in 
Japan, Korea and Malaysia in the last 12 months, Australia cannot afford to assume 
that border protection will guarantee it against an outbreak. It must also have in 
place procedures to manage an outbreak and to limit the trade impact. 
The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) meeting held in June 2001 noted 
that, if a significant outbreak of FMD occurred in Australia, ‘the technical, 
logistical, social and financial resources needed to manage the situation would be on 
a whole-of-government level not experienced before in peacetime’. The meeting 
agreed to the continued high priority review and revision of national whole-of-
government frameworks for the prevention, preparedness for, and management of a 
major emergency disease outbreak such as FMD. 
1.1 The  project 
As an input to the broader FMD management processes, and to assist in the 
planning for, preparedness of and response to an FMD outbreak, in late December     




2001 the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer asked the Productivity 
Commission to undertake research to evaluate the full economic, social and 
environmental impacts of a range of specified outbreak scenarios on the agricultural 
sector, regional Australia and the national economy. These scenarios are: 
•   a small single point outbreak; 
•   a medium-sized outbreak which impacts two states and takes 6 months to 
control; and 
•   a large multipoint outbreak which takes 12 months to control and eradicate. 
For the second and third scenarios, the Commission has been requested to give 
consideration to scenarios with and without vaccination of livestock and with and 
without a zoning policy in place (under which non-infected areas or States could be 
declared FMD-free and continue to export products). The specific scenarios 
modelled by the Commission are set out in box 1.1. 
 
Box 1.1  FMD scenarios used in this study  
The Commission’s modelling of the impact of FMD is based on the following scenarios 
that have been developed by the Commonwealth Department of Agriculture,   
Fisheries and Forestry – Australia (AFFA) in consultation with State Government 
epidemiologists. 
•   The small single point outbreak has been modelled as occurring in the wheat-sheep 
zone of south west Western Australia, primarily affecting sheep. 
•   The medium outbreak has been modelled as starting in north Queensland and 
spreading to the Northern Territory, primarily occurring in beef cattle. 
•   The multi-state outbreak has been assumed to begin in southern NSW and to 
spread to western Victoria and south east South Australia. It has been modelled as 
spreading through several regions in each State and affecting high density mixed 
livestock, including beef and dairy cattle, sheep and pigs.  
Source: Garner 2002. 
 
 
The Commission was asked to complete its research and report six months after 
receipt of the terms of reference.  
1.2   The Commission’s approach 
To estimate the impact of various FMD outbreaks on Australia, the Commission has 
brought together a number of strands of analysis.  These include: 
•   epidemiological modelling of the disease outbreak scenarios by AFFA;     
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•   wide consultation with industry and governments to develop plausible 
assumptions about the likely production and trade effects under the outbreak 
scenarios; 
•   using the assumptions as inputs, the development of a cash-flow model to 
estimate the direct trade and production effects on each scenario; 
•   general equilibrium modelling using the Monash Multi-Regional Forecasting 
(MMRF) model of the Australian economy to estimate the economywide 
impacts of the disease, including the flow-on effects to other industries; and 
•   using a range of techniques to quantitatively and qualitatively analyse the likely 
socioeconomic and social impacts of the disease on farmers, farming 
communities and the environment. 
Upon receipt of the terms of reference, the Commission conducted a round of 
industry and Commonwealth, State and Territory government visits. The purpose of 
these visits was to draw on industry and government expertise to: 
•   develop plausible assumptions about the production and trade effects of an 
outbreak; 
•   discuss likely control and eradication costs; and 
•   gather information on the likely socioeconomic effects of a disease outbreak. To 
help gauge the social costs of the disease, the Commission met with personnel 
involved in controlling the UK outbreak in 2001 and with those involved in 
managing disease outbreaks in Australia, such as the Newcastle disease outbreak 
in chickens at Mangrove Mountain in New South Wales. 
The Commission released its preliminary modelling assumptions to stakeholders for 
comment and, in March 2002, held a workshop to discuss the methodology, 
assumptions and preliminary results for the project. The workshop was attended by 
over 50 government and industry representatives and provided useful feedback on 
the Commission’s work. The assumptions were broadly accepted, although the 
Commission made specific modifications in the light of the comments received.  
The Centre for International Economics was commissioned to run a series of 
international trade scenarios using its model of the international meat trade. This 
provided another check on the study’s assumptions on the trade effects of an 
outbreak. It also assisted in developing realistic scenarios in relation to world meat 
prices and the flows of trade if Australia were to establish FMD-free zones (which 
could continue trading) in response to an outbreak. 
The Commission’s trade and production model, developed to estimate the direct 
economic impact of the disease, was refereed by an external consultant — Professor     




Ron Duncan, Executive Director of the National Centre for Development Studies at 
the Australian National University. 
The Commission records its thanks to those that participated in the workshop, and 
to all other individuals and organisations that contributed to this research project. 
1.3  Interpreting the Commission’s results 
In March 2002, the UK Government released a paper on the cost of the UK FMD 
outbreak. In presenting its estimates the Government commented that: 
These assessments are limited by the nature of the available information. … the 
conclusion of this report has to be treated with great care, as “best available estimates” 
rather than as hard fact. (DEFRA 2002, p. 1) 
Estimating the impacts of potential outbreaks is an even more difficult exercise. 
Many of the estimates of the impact of FMD presented in this report are sensitive to 
the assumptions used. While the Commission has consulted widely on its modelling 
assumptions, many factors associated with an outbreak are difficult to predict in 
advance, and there are areas where experts can disagree. The Commission’s 
estimates should, therefore, be interpreted as being relative orders of magnitude 
rather than precise calculations. 
Given these factors, the Commission considers that the modelling in this report is a 
means to an end rather than an end in itself. For policy making, relative differences 
between scenarios are more important than the absolute numbers — for instance, 
results from zoning compared to those without zoning, or the differences in regional 
impact. Similarly, to plan for recovery from any outbreak, understanding the nature 
of the impact on farmers and the community is clearly as important as the precise 
value of those losses. 
1.4  Structure of the report 
The report is structured as follows: 
•   Chapter 2 outlines the key characteristics of FMD, its recent spread throughout 
the world and the approach that Australia would take to controlling an outbreak.  
•   Chapter 3 summarises the work undertaken by AFFA to model the epidemiology 
of the three outbreak scenarios developed to meet the terms of reference, 
discusses the control costs of these scenarios and explores issues regarding 
vaccination.      
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•   Reflecting the central importance of trade issues to any outbreak, chapter  4 
examines the products and export markets that would be affected by bans 
imposed by Australia’s trading partners. 
•   Chapter  5 then describes wider economic impacts arising from an FMD 
outbreak. 
•   The results of the Commission’s modelling of the disease’s direct and 
economywide impacts, including the flow-on effects to other industries, are 
presented in chapter 6. 
•   Chapter 7 explores how these impacts would be felt at the regional and farm 
level, and examines a range of socioeconomic indicators relevant to assessing 
the regional impact of an outbreak.  
•   Chapter  8 explores the likely social impacts on farming families, emergency 
workers and rural communities. 



















     







     




2  FMD and its management 
2.1 Epidemiology  of  FMD   
FMD is a highly contagious viral infection of cloven-hoofed animals, manifested 
typically by fluid filled blisters (called vesicles) and ulcers in the mouth, muzzle, 
feet, teats and udders of infected animals. Affected animals usually have a fever, are 
lame, off their feed and may display excessive drooling. 
FMD is caused by a picornavirus with seven identified serotypes — O, A, C, SAT1, 
SAT2, SAT3 and Asia 1. Moreover, within these seven types there is a wide range 
of antigenic diversity (AUSVETPLAN 2001a; Ekboir 1999).  
In Australia, animals susceptible to infection include those in intensively managed 
dairies and piggeries, extensive cattle and sheep properties, and feral populations 
such as wild pigs, goats, buffalo and camel. While FMD may be transmitted to 
mice, rats and rabbits, these species are not generally associated with the spread of 
the disease. Horses do not become infected with the FMD virus (AUSVETPLAN 
2001a). Snowden (1968), reporting on testing based on the experimental inoculation 
of Australian marsupial species, concluded that only in exceptional circumstances 
could Australian fauna participate in the spread of FMD.  
Clinical signs of FMD can vary in severity, particularly across the different 
susceptible species — for example, in sheep, the disease can be mild with lameness 
more apparent than mouth lesions. Indeed, drawing on the work of Donaldson 
(1994) and Geering et al. (1995), Garner et al. (1997a) note that: 
•   pigs are highly susceptible to FMD and once infected excrete, in aerosol form, 
high concentrations of the virus — accordingly, pigs are considered to be a 
major amplifying host for FMD and have been implicated with windborne spread 
of the disease; 
•   cattle are considered to be an indicator species for FMD owing to their high 
susceptibility to infection and ready display of its symptoms; and 
•   sheep are accorded the status of maintenance  hosts as they can have mild 
symptoms that may be difficult to detect and can be short-term carriers of the 
disease.     




These general observations vary according to the strain of the FMD virus. For 
example, the Pan-Asian strain of FMD which reached the UK in 2001, was strongly 
associated with sheep, whereas the epidemic in the UK in the late 1960s essentially 
progressed through pigs to cattle. The FMD outbreaks which have struck Taiwan 
since 1997 have essentially been confined to pigs. 
In adult animals, the morbidity is high but the overall mortality rate stemming from 
FMD is usually low. Ekboir (1999) reports that, after a short period (around two to 
three weeks), most animals will recover from the lesions and become productive 
again, but in some cases a permanent loss of productivity has been observed.  
On recovery from FMD, up to 80 per cent of ruminants may become ‘carriers’ (that 
is, persistently infected) and could potentially cause fresh outbreaks if in contact 
with susceptible animals (Ekboir 1999). Vaccinated or immune animals can also 
become carriers if exposed to FMD. According to Donaldson (1994), the maximum 
recorded periods for carriage of FMD are over three years for cattle, nine months 
for sheep and four months for goats. However, the importance of carrier animals in 
the epidemiology of FMD remains unclear. Although circumstantial evidence from 
the field suggests that carrier animals may occasionally transmit virus to susceptible 
animals in close contact with them, it has been extremely difficult to demonstrate  
transmission of infection by carrier animals under controlled experimental 
conditions. 
People are rarely affected by FMD virus. In the unlikely event that this were to 
occur, any infection would be temporary and mild (with symptoms of fever and 
vesicles on the hands, feet or mouth). Thus, FMD is not considered a public health 
problem (AUSVETPLAN 2001a, p. 2).  
Source and transmission of FMD 
The key factors contributing to the spread of FMD have been identified as 
including:  
•   a wide range of hosts and the ability to initiate infection through a variety of 
sites;  
•   a small infective dose; 
•   a short incubation period;  
•   the ability for FMD to spread before clinical signs become apparent;  
•   the large quantities of virus excreted from infected animals (virus is in all 
secretions/excretions such as milk) — pigs excrete around 1 000 times as much 
virus in expired air than ruminants; and     




•   its persistence in the environment (see AUSVETPLAN 2001a and Garner et al. 
1997a).  
The many modes of transmission make FMD highly contagious. While direct 
contact and inhalation are the primary methods of transmission, other factors such 
as wind and contaminated vehicles can be important. FMD can also be transmitted 
through insemination from an infected donor. Where animals are in close proximity 
— such as milking sheds, piggeries and watering and feeding points — the spread 
of infection can be very high.  
Airborne virus is expelled over four to five days after an animal has been infected 
and may occur several days before the onset of clinical signs. At peak excretion 
levels, pigs may reach 100 million infectious units (IUs) in 24 hours, whereas the 
equivalent peak for cows, sheep and goat is around 100 thousand IUs. Cattle, sheep 
and pigs can be infected by inhaling doses as low as 10–25 IUs (Ekboir 1999). 
The AUSVETPLAN states that ‘windborne spread’ of FMD can result in infection 
of animals ‘remote from known foci’. Windborne spread of infection may occur 
over many kilometres, depending on factors such as the strength of the wind, the 
species of affected animal and the stage of the disease. Infected piggeries appear to 
pose the greatest problem. Indeed, the pattern of windborne spread most commonly 
observed is from piggeries to cattle situated downwind. In the recent UK outbreak, 
during the period of infectivity before FMD was first confirmed, the windborne 
spread of virus infected cattle and sheep on nearby farms in Northumberland 
(DEFRA 2002). Even milk tankers have been implicated in the spread of FMD by 
venting infected aerosols when collecting milk at unaffected dairies. Most experts 
consider that temperature and humidity would need to favour the spread of the virus 
for this to occur.  
One relatively common source of FMD outbreaks is the practice of swill feeding of 
pigs with infected animal products. Uncooked garbage from foreign ships has also 
been implicated as a source of FMD infection in pigs. For example, an outbreak in 
South Africa in 2000 was traced to meat scraps from a ship’s garbage being fed to 
pigs (Nunn 2001). In the recent UK outbreak, DEFRA noted that the precise means 
of introduction of the virus is unknown and subject to continuing investigations. It 
stated that ‘it may have been introduced in illegally imported meat or meat 
products’ (2002, p. 13). The AUSVETPLAN notes that: 
The first case of FMD in Australia would probably be in pigs. FMD virus is most likely 
to be introduced in contaminated meat products (Geering 1990). These materials are 
most likely to be eaten by pigs than other livestock, and pigs are highly susceptible to 
infection by ingestion. If the infected pigs were wild or belonged to a swill feeder 
unconcerned about or reluctant to report sick animals, the initial outbreak could well go 
unnoticed and uncontrolled. (AUSVETPLAN 2001a, p. 13)     




Such products could be brought into the country by international passengers, or 
could enter via passengers’ contaminated clothing and footwear. Articles entering 
by post, garbage from ships and yachts, and refuse from aircraft also raise risks.  
Animal Health Australia (AHA 2001) recently observed that: 
Australia cannot become complacent about FMD… Between similar periods in 1997 
and 2000 there was a 29% increase in declared and detected animal products 
accompanying passengers entering Australia from FMD-infected countries. For the 
highest risk bloc of countries the increase was 43%. Undeclared food accompanying 
incoming travellers is arguably the highest risk route of introduction of FMD virus into 
Australia. AQIS border operations staff pay particular attention to passengers arriving 
from countries with endemic FMD, who may not fully appreciate Australia’s 
quarantine laws and who have a cultural propensity to carry high-risk food.  
A lower, though definite risk of introduction of virus is by contaminated clothing and 
personal effects of travellers from FMD-infected countries. There was a minor increase 
between the June quarters of 1997 and 2000 in the number of passengers from infected 
countries arriving in Australia.  
While Australia, as an island continent, is somewhat protected from illegal 
movements of infected livestock, which have been a source of infection in countries 
with land borders, freedom from FMD cannot be guaranteed. The Pan-Asian strain 
of the type O virus, for example, has spread rapidly throughout the world since the 
early 1990s, infecting a number of countries that had been free of FMD for many 
years (for example, Japan and South Korea).  
There do not appear to be any significant insect vectors for the spread of FMD. 
However, animal species and humans can be involved in the spread of the virus. 
Indeed, the virus can be spread through contaminated vehicles and, as noted above, 
via footwear and clothing. Humans can also carry the virus in the nasal passages 
and throat. Effluent from infected piggeries and dairies — perhaps draining onto 
stock routes — can also contaminate animals, vehicles and equipment. 
Livestock production and marketing systems are a critical determinant of the spread 
of FMD. In fact, Donaldson (1994) identified the movement of infected animals and 
the movement of contaminated animal products as the most important mechanism 
for the transmission of FMD. The rapid dispersion of infected animals over a wide 
area appears to have been a major influence on the spread of FMD in the UK in 
2001 (see box 2.1). The UK experience is also relevant to Australia. As noted in the 
AUSVETPLAN (2001a): 
•   the capacity to trace livestock and product movements is critical for the early 
control of an outbreak; 
•   the movement of sheep is particularly important because affected sheep may not 
readily display clinical signs of disease;     




•   in many pastoral areas of Australia, livestock are managed extensively and 
disease could be harder to detect (the low density may also provide limited 
opportunity for spread and the disease could die out);  
•   in intensively managed areas, stock movements to and from saleyards could 
cause a rapid spread of infection over a wide area; and 
•   high risk enterprises such as piggeries and feedlots may influence the spread of 
FMD in a region. 
2.2  The global pattern of FMD 
FMD is present in many parts of the world, particularly in Africa, Asia and regions 
in South America (figure 2.1). There has been a significant increase in the incidence 
of FMD outbreaks reported in Asia over the last few years. The expansion of the 
Pan-Asian strain of type O FMD has been most pronounced. Since it was first 
identified in north India in 1990, it has spread to 28 countries throughout the Middle 
East, Europe and Asia. By 1999, this strain had reached Japan (FMD-free since 
1908), South Korea (free since 1934), eastern Russia (free since 1964) and 
Mongolia (free since 1973). The 2001 UK outbreak also was caused by the Pan-
Asian strain of type O FMD. Linked to this UK outbreak were subsequent outbreaks  
Figure 2.1  Countries recognised by the OIE as foot and mouth disease 
free countries where vaccination is not practiseda 
 
a  Those countries that are shaded are FMD-free, according to the provisions of chapter 2.1.1 of the 
International Animal Health Code. The UK regained FMD-free status without vaccination on 21 January 2002.  
Source: http://www.oie.int/Cartes /world/A_Monde.htm (accessed 4 April 2002).      




in France, the Netherlands and the Republic of Ireland. (The FMD status of 
countries is maintained by the Office International Des Epizooties (OIE) and is 
available on its website at <http://www.oie.int/eng/info/en_fmd.htm>.)  
The movement of other strains of FMD has been monitored in Africa, Asia, South 
America, the Middle East and Europe. In 2000, Argentina lost its recently acquired 
free status owing to an incursion of the type A virus. In the same year, Uruguay 
recorded its first cases for 10 years (of type O virus). Similarly, the Asia 1 type of 
the virus caused the first disease outbreak in Greece for four years. There were also 
outbreaks of the SAT 2 virus in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and types O and SAT 1 
in South Africa (AHA 2001).  
Since 1994, a pig-adapted strain of type O virus (different to the Pan-Asian type O 
virus) has occurred in Russia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan. The outbreak in 
Taiwan, previously FMD-free for nearly 70 years, resulted in the slaughter of over 
35 per cent of the national pig inventory (3.85 million pigs) (AHA 2001).  
The OIE currently recognises 55 countries as FMD-free without vaccination (see 
box  2.1). Australia and North America are free of FMD and, subject to the 
outbreaks noted above, Europe has largely been FMD-free since the 1960s. 
Countries in close proximity to Australia including Indonesia, Singapore, New 
Zealand and the Pacific nations are also FMD-free.  
Australia has been free of FMD for some 130 years. Minor outbreaks of possible 
FMD in Australia were reported in 1801, 1804, 1871 and 1872. The last case, 
associated with a bull imported from England, was probably due to contaminated 
straw and involved only two farms before the disease was eradicated (Bunn 1998).  
The recent experiences of South Korea, South Africa and the Netherlands 
demonstrate that, in contrast to the UK experience, early identification and prompt 
introduction of control measures can contain the spread of FMD. This issue is taken 
up in section 2.3. 
OIE’s Animal Health Code  
The OIE’s International Animal Health Code provides international guidelines for 
trade in relation to specific animal diseases, including FMD. Box 2.2 describes the 
OIE’s role. The Animal Health Code is intended for use by authorities of veterinary 
departments, import/export services, epidemiologists and all those involved in 
international trade.      





Box 2.1  The FMD status of OIE Member Countries  
















The OIE recognised France, Ireland and the Netherlands as FMD-free without 
vaccination as of 19 September 2001. The UK regained FMD-free status without 
vaccination on 21 January 2002.  
Source: OIE (2002a). 
 
 
Under the Code, a country is required to notify the OIE within 24 hours of the 
occurrence or re-occurrence of a priority disease, such as FMD, if the country or 
zone of the country was previously considered to be free from that particular 
disease.  
2.3  Control and eradication strategy 
In Australia, contingency plans for managing incursions of exotic diseases are based 
on a comprehensive approach to emergency management. The approach covers a 
range of prevention, preparedness, response and recovery actions that can be 
applied in a generic sense to an unknown disease outbreak, or alternatively in 
response to a specific animal disease like FMD. Australia’s proposed technical 
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Box 2.2  The Office International Des Epizooties  
The OIE — the World Organisation for Animal Health — is an intergovernmental 
organisation created by an agreement between member countries in 1924. There are 
currently 158 member countries of the OIE. The OIE aims to improve and promote the 
animal health status of countries throughout the world through:  
•   Ensuring transparency of a country’s animal disease status – each Member Country 
undertakes to report the animal diseases that it detects on its territory. The OIE then 
disseminates the information to other countries, which can take the necessary 
preventive action.  
•   Collecting, analysing and disseminating scientific information on animal disease 
control. Providing expertise and promoting international solidarity for the control of 
animal diseases — the OIE provides technical support to member countries 
requesting assistance with animal disease control and eradication operations. 
•   Developing rules that member countries can use to protect themselves from 
diseases without setting up unjustified sanitary barriers, for example, the OIE’s 
International Animal Health Code. 
The International Animal Health Code is the result of work which began in 1960. The 
objective is to prevent the spread of animal diseases, while facilitating international 
trade in live animals, animal products, semen and embryos. The OIE Code is a 
reference document for use by authorities of veterinary departments, import/export 
services, epidemiologists and all those involved in international trade. 
Measures recommended in the Code cover ‘priority’ diseases and take into account the 
wide range of conditions which may prevail in importing and exporting countries. The 
Code provides a series of recommendations, relating to issues such as the transport of 
animals and standards for the epidemiological surveillance of certain animal diseases. 
Source: OIE (2002b). 
 
 
responses to outbreaks of major exotic diseases are described in the 
Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan, AUSVETPLAN (for details refer 
http://www.aahc.com.au/ausvetplan/index.htm). The documents provide guidance 
based on analysis, policy, strategies, implementation, coordination and emergency 
management plans.  
The AUSVETPLAN (2001a) contains a policy for the control and eradication of an 
FMD outbreak. The principles in this Plan, conforming with the OIE International 
Animal Health Code, involve:  
•   preventing contact between susceptible animals and the FMD virus; 
•   stopping the production of virus by infected animals; and 
•   increasing the resistance of susceptible animals (AUSVETPLAN 2001a, p. 18).     




The primary strategy for eradicating FMD in the shortest possible time is by a 
policy of ‘stamping out’. Stamping out involves quarantine, slaughter of all infected 
and exposed susceptible animals, sanitary disposal of destroyed animals and 
contaminated animal products, and decontamination of infected premises in order to 
remove the source of the infection. These and a number of other control measures, 
including vaccination and zoning, are discussed below.  
Quarantine and movement controls 
In the event of an outbreak, the AUSVETPLAN provides for strict movement 
controls to ensure that the virus is contained and to help prevent the spread of the 
virus.  
Total movement control would be imposed on infected premises and on premises 
containing susceptible animals, or infected or exposed products, which have been in 
direct or indirect contact with an infected premises or infected animals or products 
(termed ‘dangerous contact premises’). Premises with suspect animals would be 
subject to quarantine and surveillance until there is no evidence of infection.  
A restricted area of at least a 10 km radius would initially be drawn around all 
infected and dangerous contact premises, including as many suspect premises as 
practical. The actual size and shape of this area would be influenced by factors such 
as geography, climate and feral animal distribution. The restricted area would be 
subject to movement control and surveillance.  
In addition, the whole State/Territory affected would initially be declared as the 
control area, and subject to movement restrictions. This measure is designed to 
control stock movement of susceptible livestock while completing trace-back and 
epidemiological studies. Once the limits of the disease have been confidently 
defined, it may be possible to reduce the control area boundaries and movement 
restrictions.  
Zoning 
‘Zoning’ involves the identification and designation of areas within a country as 
either FMD infected or FMD-free. It has been endorsed by the OIE that has 
developed a generic code on Zoning and Regionalisation, with disease-specific 
requirements included in specific disease codes. Article 2.1.1.4 of the OIE FMD 
code clearly identifies a number of requirements that must be met for zoning to be 
accepted, namely:     




•   the FMD-free zone must be separated from the rest of the country (infected 
zone) by a surveillance zone or physical or geographical barriers;  
•   animal health measures that prevent entry of the virus must be implemented so 
that a country must; 
–  have a record of regular and prompt disease reporting; 
–  supply documentary evidence of an effective system of surveillance for the 
FMD-free zone and the surveillance zone, if applicable; and 
–  describe in detail the boundaries of the FMD-free zone and the surveillance 
zone, the system for preventing entry of the virus into the FMD-free zone, 
and supply evidence that these are properly implemented and supervised; and  
•   provide documentary evidence that there is a system of intensive and frequent 
surveillance in the FMD-free zone.  
In principle, zoning could be used to reduce the adverse economic effects by 
maintaining international market access from areas demonstrated as being FMD-
free. However, although the OIE Code on Zoning and Regionalisation has 
international acceptance, in practice, there is considerable uncertainty about how 
and under what conditions zoning will be accepted by individual importing 
countries.  
In the past, the principles of zoning have been applied in FMD outbreaks in Italy (in 
1993), Greece (in 1994), and in Zimbabwe and some South American countries to 
gain access to European Union markets for deboned meat (see chapter 4, box 4.2). 
Based on the OIE codes and recent international experience, it seems likely that, to 
apply zoning, a country would need to demonstrate: 
•   movement controls between the infected zone, the surveillance zone and the rest 
of the country; 
•   clinical surveillance; and  
•   serological surveillance in the FMD-free zone to provide quantitative data to 
support claims of FMD freedom (that is, the blood testing of herds to 
demonstrate the absence of antibodies against a specific pathogen).  
The surveillance required to demonstrate that a zone is free of FMD would depend 
on negotiations with the OIE and our overseas trading partners. This would have 
implications for the resources required for such activities as zone security, 
collection of samples and laboratory testing (Garner 1997b).  
The AUSVETPLAN notes that, initially, state/territory boundaries would provide 
the most acceptable limits because it could be argued internationally that these are 
distinct geopolitical boundaries. Thus, zoning for trading purposes would not be the     




same as zones for disease control purposes. As the situation is clarified, it is 
possible that the infected zone for trading purposes could be reduced to an area 
within state boundaries.  
Tracing and surveillance 
Rapid trace-back and trace-forward from the infected premises assist in containing 
the disease. According to the AUSVETPLAN, trace-back should be applied for a 
minimum of 14 days before the onset of clinical signs. Trace-forward should be 
applied up to the time that quarantine is imposed. Tracing should include all 
movements of susceptible livestock, animal products, vehicles, grains/crops and 
people.  
Surveillance is used to determine the spread of the disease so that an appropriately 
sized restricted area can be declared and to establish disease-free zones. This 
involves inspection of stock, investigation of reports of suspect disease and 
serological surveillance. Factors such as potential spread by wind or wild animals 
may complicate the surveillance task in some areas.  
Slaughter of infected animals and dangerous contacts  
The AUSVETPLAN provides that, for FMD control, all animals are to be 
slaughtered on all infected and dangerous contact premises. Animals on suspect 
premises are to be regularly inspected and observed over an agreed period of least 
14 days. Animals considered to be most infective or at risk would be given priority 
for destruction. Clinically-infected animals would be slaughtered first to reduce 
virus excretion, with infected pigs slaughtered before cattle and cattle before sheep, 
based on the relative volumes of virus excreted by these various species.  
Treatment of infected animal products/by-products 
The AUSVETPLAN specifies a very cautious approach with detailed procedures set 
out for the salvage of animal products and by-products. The movement of most 
products and by-products from infected premises and dangerous contact premises 
would be prohibited. Certain products such as wool, semen and embryos may be 
permitted to be marketed under special conditions or after treatment, with their 
movement subject to permit. For example, the movement of wool is allowed under 
permit after storage at 18 degrees celsius for at least four weeks and/or industrial 
scouring, with the precise treatment dependent on when animals were shorn in 
relation to the earliest likely onset of infection.      




Products from suspect premises would be treated in the same way while under 
surveillance, but specified products, such as meat and hides, may be permitted to 
leave the property for sale subject to treatment under OIE guidelines and permit, or 
after an agreed period. Products from FMD-free premises within the restricted area 
would be subject to permit and/or treatment prior to release. 
Disposal 
There is a range of methods for disposing of carcasses and other infected products 
including burial, pyre burning, rendering and incineration. The AUSVETPLAN 
endorses burial as the preferred means of disposal of carcasses, milk and feedstuff 
— it is easier, quicker, uses less resources and is less polluting. However, a number 
of factors such as soil type, water table depth and topography should be considered 
in the selection of sites. (See chapter 9 for a more detailed discussion of disposal 
methods and the environmental considerations.) 
Under certain circumstances, alternative methods of disposal (such as rendering) 
may be possible and should be considered.  
Decontamination  
Certain products such as hay, hides and wool and equipment, materials and 
buildings that may be contaminated need to be cleaned and then disinfected. The 
strategy stresses a need to reduce the generation and dispersal of infective dust and 
aerosols. If items cannot be adequately decontaminated, they should be destroyed.  
Wild animal control 
Australia has a range of wild and feral animals, such as feral pigs, goats, cattle, 
buffalo, camel and deer that are susceptible to FMD, and sometimes are in close 
contact with domestic livestock. However, there is great variation in their 
distribution, density and habits between and within regions. Feral pigs have been 
identified as the greatest wild animal threat to the disease’s control, while feral deer 
and camels are regarded as unlikely to be important as carriers of FMD virus.  
The AUSVETPLAN 2000, Wild Animal Management Manual notes that ‘the role 
of carrier animals in the transmission of FMD has been uncertain, and transmission 
from carrier to susceptible cattle has never been unequivocally demonstrated’ 
(AUSVETPLAN 2000, p. 6). Further, ‘in the unlikely event that wild animals are a 
primary source of virus, or infection is being maintained in wild animal populations, 
then monitoring and control programs may need to be instigated’ (AUSVETPLAN     




2001a,  p.  23). Thus, although wild and feral animals may become infected if 
exposed to the virus, the role that they might play in spreading and maintaining 
infection is less clear. 
Assessment of the extent of risk posed by feral animals requires information about: 
•   their density and distribution; 
•   social organisation;  
•   habitat; 
•   perceived contact with domestic species;  
•   the strain of FMD virus; and  
•   the length of time feral animals have been exposed to the virus.  
This information influences decisions about whether further measures will need to 
be taken including containment, survey and surveillance, and population reduction. 
In the event that wild animals are regarded as a risk factor in the dissemination or 
persistence of infection, the manual suggests that, where control operations are 
considered, pigs should be targeted first.  
At the end of an eradication campaign, sampling of wild animals may be required to 
prove freedom from disease. However, in some outbreaks overseas (for example, 
Italy in 1993), there was no eradication of wild animals and the lack of disease in 
domestic animals was accepted as proof that there was no disease in wild animals.  
Vaccination  
The OIE Code defines criteria for vaccine standards and for determining when 
vaccination should be used. The AUSVETPLAN states that vaccination is not a 
preferred option for control of FMD. However, it may be approved in special 
circumstances.  
While vaccination protects against disease, vaccinated animals are not totally 
resistant — they can still become infected with FMD and shed the virus, but at a 
reduced rate.  
A number of factors need to be considered in deciding whether to vaccinate such as: 
•   the trade implications; 
•   masking of clinical disease;  
•   the diversion of scarce personnel resources; 
•   the extent to which FMD has spread; and     




•   the availability of vaccine. 
The decision on whether to use vaccination, in conjunction with a policy of 
stamping out, is a complex one. In larger outbreaks, where availability of resources 
may be an issue, and in high risk situations, vaccination could help contain the 
spread of the disease and thus reduce control and compensation costs. Vaccination 
of high risk premises, such as large intensive piggeries and feedlots, may offer 
significant benefits. In such situations, vaccination can ‘buy time’ to help in the 
logistical problems associated with the destruction, disposal and decontamination of 
such large livestock enterprises.  
However, there are also some disadvantages in pursing a strategy of vaccination. 
First, it is a resource intensive operation, particularly when re-vaccination is needed 
(after about 4–6 months). Second, it can defer the declaration of freedom from 
disease, thus prolonging the adverse effects on producers. Currently, vaccinated 
animals must be permanently identified as they will need to be slaughtered towards 
the end of the campaign for a country to achieve eradication and disease-free status 
within a three-month period. While improved testing techniques that will allow 
confident differentiation between infected and vaccinated animals are being 
developed, they will require approval by the OIE. Consideration is currently being 
given by the OIE to changes to the FMD code proposing modification to periods for 
regaining FMD freedom when emergency vaccination is used, provided serological 
studies using the newer diagnostic tests are done. However, this has not yet been 
endorsed.  
A further disadvantage associated with vaccination is the potential for vaccination 
teams to inadvertently spread the virus. 
Vaccination options include: 
•   ring vaccination (regarded as the most likely application) which involves 
vaccination of all susceptible stock in a ring of fixed width around an outbreak to 
contain the disease while stamping-out operations are carried out; and  
•   blanket vaccination, which is general vaccination over a wide area where other 
disease control methods would be too demanding of veterinary resources or too 
costly in terms of compensation payments.  
If vaccinated animals are slaughtered at the end of the outbreak, then the period 
until recognition of FMD freedom is three months (as for stamping out). If 
vaccinated animals are not slaughtered, currently, the country must wait 12 months.  
In Australia, a very strong preference has been expressed for stamping-out by 
slaughter. Until recently, vaccination has only been considered as a control measure     




where efforts to stamp out the disease have not been successful. Recent 
developments, such as the newer diagnostic tests, marker vaccines, changes to 
community attitudes and a growing awareness of the limited availability of trained 
staff to combat exotic disease outbreaks, have seen a change of attitude to the way 
vaccination might be used, including consideration of its use as an emergency 
control option.  
The National FMD/BSE Policy Forum held in Canberra in November 2001 
considered that emergency vaccination could be used under certain circumstances, 
with all vaccinated animals being subsequently slaughtered. This resolution was 
endorsed by the Primary Industries Ministerial Council. This policy may be able to 
be eased in the future with changing trends towards the handling of vaccinates in 
international trade standards and the OIE code.  
Australia has access to an emergency source of FMD vaccine through its 
membership of the UK International Vaccine Bank. This stock of vaccine 
concentrate can be reconstituted at short notice to provide up to 500 000 doses of 
each of four serotypes (types O, A, C and Asia 1). After that, Australia would have 
to depend on commercially held vaccine stocks of an appropriate serotype or 
arrange for supply from overseas. Current arrangements for access to FMD vaccines 
are under review. 
Decision making 
The Emergency Animal Disease National Management Group (NMG), comprising 
chief executives of government agencies and presidents of relevant livestock 
industry organisations, has been formed with responsibility for decision making on 
policy and resource allocation issues associated with the control of any outbreak. Its 
role is to approve response plans and budgets and monitor expenditure.  
The Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Diseases, comprising the Chief 
Veterinary Officer (CVO) from each of the States and Territories, the 
Commonwealth CVO, the head of the Australian Animal Health Laboratory and 
industry representatives, is the key technical coordinating body. In the event of an 
FMD outbreak, it would advise the NMG on the national response.  
Cost-sharing arrangements  
In Australia, each State and Territory has operational responsibility for the control 
and eradication of animal diseases within its borders. To this end, each jurisdiction 
administers its own emergency disease control legislation which is supported by     




emergency services arrangements. Commonwealth legislation includes powers 
under the Quarantine Act 1908 that would be available to support the States and 
Territories.  
An Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA) outlines funding 
arrangements for an initial response to a disease incursion or outbreak by the 
Commonwealth, State and Territory governments and major livestock industry 
organisations. It classifies 63 diseases according to their impact on human health 
and society in general (including the economy, the environment and livestock 
production). A different mix of funding is proposed for each category. FMD is 
regarded as a category  2 disease that has little impact on human health, but 
considerable impact on the economy through trade losses, national market 
disruptions and severe production losses in the associated livestock industries. If 
called upon, funding by government would amount to 80 per cent, with 20 per cent 
funding by industry. The costs of each party would be managed by applying an 
‘agreed limit’ that ensures examination of costs and benefits before committing to 
further national resources. An agreed limit to cost sharing of 1 per cent of the gross 
value of production of the industries involved applies (calculated to be around 
$112 million in 2001).  
In relation to the industry contribution, where more than one animal species is 
affected by a disease, the contributions from the affected industry parties would take 
account of both the gross value of production of each industry and the importance 
of that disease for the particular industry. The latter is assessed by the use of an 
agreed weighting. In the case of FMD, the weighting is 50 per cent for cattle, 30 per 
cent for sheep/goats and 20 per cent for pigs.  
The costs of wages and salaries, operating expenses, capital costs incurred by 
parties responding to the disease and compensation to affected owners for livestock 
destroyed are covered by this arrangement. Compensation policies are an important 
component of a control program. In their absence, there could be an inadequate 
incentive for farmers to report outbreaks, or even an incentive to evade detection. 
Conversely, too generous a level of compensation could reduce the incentive for 
farmers to contain the spread of the disease. Compensation arrangements are 
described in the next section.  
In relation to the government contribution, FMD is also included in the list of 
diseases for which arrangements exist under the Commonwealth/States cost-sharing 
agreement for the eradication of certain exotic animal diseases. Under this 
arrangement, the Commonwealth would contribute 50 per cent of the eradication 
and associated control costs and the States and Territories would collectively 
contribute the remaining 50 per cent on an agreed pro-rata basis. These proportions     




for FMD (table 2.1) are based on the latest 10-year average figures for the numbers 
of susceptible livestock and the gross value of production of susceptible livestock.  
Table 2.1  Current apportionment of eradication costs  
Per cent  
State/territory   Vesicular disease including FMDa 
NSW  14.347 
Qld  11.613 
Vic  10.863 
WA  6.833 
SA  3.861 
Tas  1.423 
NT  1.061 
ACT   0.015 
Cwlth   50.000 
a In accordance with section 17 of the Agreement, the apportionments apply for the diseases shown for the 
five years beginning on 1 July 1998. 
Source: AUSVETPLAN 1999, Appendix 3. 
Compensation arrangements  
The AUSTVETPLAN and EADRA 2002 contain provisions for compensation to be 
paid for any livestock which is destroyed for the purpose of eradication or 
prevention of the spread of FMD. These costs are shared between the 
Commonwealth and State governments, and the livestock industry. 
Compensation applies only to direct losses, rather than to any indirect or 
consequential losses arising from the outbreak. For example, it would apply to 
vaccinated animals that were subsequently destroyed, but it would not apply to any 
livestock (inside or outside the control area) that had to be destroyed because they 
were unable to be marketed. As such, compensation is more appropriately viewed 
as a control measure to encourage reporting of disease outbreaks rather than a 
program which attempts to fully offset stock losses arising from FMD.  
The EADRA outlines the basis for valuing stock for compensation purposes. It 
provides for compensation to be paid to the owner at potentially two stages: 
•   when the disease is identified for any livestock or property which is destroyed 
for the purposes of eradicating or controlling the spread of FMD; and  
•   when the property is cleared for restocking, if the valuation of livestock at this 
time is higher than at identification. 
     







     





3 Outbreak  scenarios and control costs 
3.1 Background   
As noted earlier, the terms of reference ask the Commission to consider the impact 
of three FMD outbreak scenarios: 
•   a small single point outbreak; 
•   a medium-sized outbreak which impacts on two States and takes up to 6 months 
to contain and eradicate; and  
•   a large multi-point outbreak which takes up to 12 months to control and 
eradicate.  
The location and specific details of these outbreaks have been developed by AFFA 
in consultation with State and Territory Governments through a Veterinary 
Committee’s Working Group. For each scenario, Commonwealth, State and 
Territory epidemiologists provided expert advice and local knowledge on livestock 
production and farm management in each of the outbreak regions. As discussed 
below, the medium and large outbreaks cover more than one regional area.  
AFFA used an epidemiological FMD model, which it has developed over a number 
of years, to estimate the size and duration of the outbreaks in each infected region. It 
then combined the regional results to estimate the duration of the total epidemic 
under each scenario. Key factors that affect the size of an outbreak are: 
•   the delay until FMD is recognised;  
•   the rate of spread within the region; 
•   the availability of resources to control an outbreak; and  
•   the effectiveness with which control measures are implemented. 
Each of these factors has been incorporated in the model (see box  3.1 for a 
description of the model).     
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Box 3.1  AFFA FMD model  
The model is a state-transition model (developed from a Markov chain) that has been 
modified to incorporate random events and probabilities. The herd or flock is the unit of 
concern. The model simulates herd-to-herd spread of disease on a week by week 
basis. In the model, the population is considered in terms of possible ‘states’ that herds 
could be in, namely: 
•   susceptible to the disease; 
•   latent, meaning infected, but not yet infectious to other herds; 
•   infected with the disease and capable of spreading the disease;  
•   immune after recovery from the disease or after vaccination; or 
•   dead or destocked as a result of the disease.  
During any time period, depending on various factors, a herd has a probability of 
remaining in that state or moving to another state (a transition).  
Values for a number of disease parameters (latent, infectious and immune periods, and 
dissemination rate — a measure of the disease’s ability to spread to other herds) and 
control variables are specified for each scenario. These in turn determine the 
probabilities of transition from one state/condition to another. Resource limits are 
imposed on the number of herds able to be stamped out or vaccinated per week. The 
model is non-spatial, so it is necessary to set the number of discrete foci of infection 
and the width of vaccination ‘rings’.  
As the model includes stochastic elements, it can give different results each time it is 
run. It is run repeatedly to generate a meaningful distribution of likely outcomes. 
Results are reported as means and standard deviations derived from 1000 simulation 
runs in each case. The mean is the average of the results, while the standard deviation 
is an indicator of the variability of results around that average.  
Source: Garner 2002. 
 
 
The modelling also simulated two different control strategies. The baseline control 
strategy was based solely on identification and stamping out of infected and 
dangerous contact herds (the stamping out strategy is described in chapter  2). 
However, in accordance with the Commission’s terms of reference, the option of 
using emergency ring vaccination as part of the control strategy was included for 
the medium and large outbreaks. 
Collectively, the scenarios provide a range of plausible examples of what could 
happen if FMD were introduced into Australia as a basis for assessing the 
economic, social and environmental effects of an outbreak. Each of the scenarios is 
described in sections 3.2–3.4, followed by an overview of the modelling results in 
section 3.5.      





3.2  Small outbreak — scenario 1 
Stamping out and dangerous contact slaughter 
This involves a single state outbreak (using the Type O Pan-Asia strain of FMD 
virus) in south western Western Australia in the wheat-sheep zone. The disease is 
spread within the region primarily among sheep.  
In this scenario, FMD is assumed to be discovered in an abattoir in Busselton. It is 
traced back to a smallholding property where the owner had purchased some goats 
from a local sheep producer. This sheep producer also operates as a ‘tourist’ farm 
with tame livestock, including pigs. It is thought that a local itinerant worker or 
international visitor, who fed the ‘display’ pigs with contaminated food scraps, 
introduced FMD to the tourist farm about two weeks prior to its discovery. The 
producer has moved sheep to his brother’s property at Boyup Brook, where FMD 
has also subsequently been confirmed (figure 3.1).  








Source: Garner 2002. 
Figure 3.2 shows the probability distributions of the duration of the outbreak when 
the strategy of stamping out of infected herds and dangerous contact slaughter is 
successful. On this basis, the model reveals that the outbreak could last from two to 
47 weeks, with a 90 per cent probability of it lasting less than 11 weeks. The long 
tail reflects the situation where the disease persists due to the failure to detect and 
remove infected sheep flocks. There is a small probability (0.2 per cent) that the 
outbreak will not be contained with the available resources.  
Perth 
Western 
Australia   Busselton 
Boyup Brook     
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Source: Garner 2002. 
On average, the outbreak lasts 7.8 weeks. As FMD is not recognised until two 
weeks after introduction, the duration of the outbreak would be 5.8 weeks from the 
time of first detection. There would be 15 infected herds and a total of 53 infected 
and dangerous contact herds stamped out to eradicate the disease. Further details are 
provided in table  3.1 (see section  3.5 for the modelling results). A total of 
approximately 38 000 stock (with nearly 30 000 sheep) would be destroyed during 
the eradication campaign.  
3.3  Medium-sized outbreak — scenario 2 
This scenario involves FMD occurring in three separate regions, two in Queensland 
and one in the Northern Territory, primarily in beef cattle. Under this scenario, 
FMD is first detected in a feedlot west of Rockhampton (region B). Tracing of 
livestock consignments brought into the feedlot finds evidence of infection on a 
large extensive beef property south west of Charters Towers (region A). It also 
operates as a bed and breakfast catering for overseas visitors. FMD was introduced 
with contaminated food scraps fed to pigs kept on the property for consumption and 
tourist viewing. This property also sent a consignment of steers for live export 
through Darwin. Tracing of this group finds them at a live cattle export holding 
property, located near Katherine NT, where the presence of FMD is also confirmed 
(region C).      














Source: Garner 2002. 
A schematic representation of the timing of events is shown in figure 3.4. 





Timeline for introduction, detection and eradication by region
 
 
Source: Garner 2002. 
Stamping out and dangerous contact slaughter  
The model results indicate that for the Qld-NT epidemic overall, the outbreak would 
last between six and 39 weeks from when it was first introduced, with a 90 per cent 
probability that it would be less than 19 weeks.  
1 week 
4 weeks 
2 weeks     
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Figure 3.5  Probability distribution of the duration of an outbreak under 














Source: Garner 2002. 
On average, the outbreak lasts 13.2 weeks from introduction. As the disease is not 
recognised for four weeks after initial introduction, the average duration of the 
epidemic is 9.2 weeks from detection. Seventy-two herds would need to be removed 
to achieve eradication, with 27 of these being infected herds and 45 dangerous 
contact herds. In total, about 50  000 livestock, primarily beef cattle, would be 
destroyed to eradicate the disease (see table  3.1, section  3.5 for the modelling 
results).  
Stamping out and ring vaccination  
AFFA modelled vaccination for this scenario to meet the Commission’s terms of 
reference. However, given the livestock densities, the type of management systems 
and expected low rate of spread of FMD in northern Australia, it is unlikely that 
vaccination would be considered as a ‘front-line’ control strategy. Nevertheless, the 
modelling assumes that a decision to use a containment (ring) strategy around 
infected premises in regions A and B is taken in week two of the outbreak, with 
vaccination beginning in week three. Region C is excluded as NT authorities are 
confident that stamping out can contain the outbreak in that area.  
The decision is taken to create a containment buffer zone 10 km wide around five 
distinct foci of infection in the affected regions (two in region A and three in region 
B). Given travel times, the average size of herds and the time taken to muster and 
yard animals, it is assumed that a vaccination team will be able to vaccinate one 
herd per week. As well as administering vaccine, teams must ensure that all     





vaccinated animals are permanently identified (earmarked) and good records are 
kept. In the first week of operations, four vaccination teams are assembled (two in 
each region) and over the next few weeks as additional resources become available 
capacity increases to 12 herds able to be vaccinated per week (six in each region).  
The epidemic overall lasts between 12 and 22 weeks, with a 90 per cent probability 
that it lasts less than 18 weeks (figure 3.6).  
The disease is not recognised for four weeks after its initial introduction, so the 
epidemic lasts, on average, for 16.4 weeks from introduction. Based on average 
herd sizes, the number of destroyed animals is estimated at just over 46 000 and 
there would be about 41 000 vaccinated animals (table 3.1). 
Figure 3.6  Probability distribution of the duration of an outbreak under 
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Source: Garner 2002. 
3.4  Large outbreak — scenario 3 
This scenario is a multi-state outbreak in south east Australia occurring in seven 
regions across three states — Victoria, south east South Australia and southern New 
South Wales — in high density mixed livestock, including beef, dairy cattle, sheep 
and pigs. In this case, FMD is first detected in a stud dairy herd near Corowa in 
New South Wales. Investigations reveal that a nearby infected piggery is the most 
likely source of the outbreak. The infection spreads from the dairy herd in a 
consignment of pregnant dairy heifers sent to the Warrnambool area in south west 
Victoria and to the Mount Gambier district in South Australia. A neighbouring     
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cattle property to the piggery is also found to be infected. It has sent cattle to a 
feedlot in Yanco, setting up another focus of infection.  
At these three sites, there is local spread within the regions as well as secondary 
spread to two additional regions — the Rupanyup area of north west Victoria and 
the Lower Murray River/Lakes area of South Australia. From the original focus 
near Corowa, the disease is introduced into the extensive sheep areas of south 
western New South Wales by means of a contaminated livestock transport vehicle, 
where it was undetected for some time (figure 3.7). Initially, there are 16 infected 
foci in six regions, with another three identified some weeks later in south west 
New South Wales.  










Source: Garner 2002. 
Figure 3.8 shows when FMD is introduced into each region and the delays until it is 
recognised. 
Stamping out and dangerous contact slaughter  
In several cases, the regional modelling produces a distribution that is bi-modal. 
This means that, with the available resources, the outbreak is either controlled 
relatively quickly or it gets out of control and spreads widely. In some cases, the 
outbreak ends, not because FMD has been eradicated, but because there are no 
susceptible herds left in the area. Under these circumstances it is unlikely that the 
outbreak would be contained, and subsequent analyses were restricted to those 
simulation runs where the control program is effective.      










(Present for 2 
weeks) 
Region C (Vic) 
Warrnambool 





Intro 4 July 
(1 week) Region E (SA) 
Mt Gambier 
Intro 30 June 
(2 weeks)
Region D (Vic)  
Rupanyup 
Intro 5 July 
(3 weeks) 
Region F (SA) 
Murray Bridge 
Intro 5 July 
(2 weeks)
Spread of FMD in south east Australian scenario 








Source: Garner 2002. 
The overall duration of the epidemic was determined by combining the modelling 
results for each region. For those simulations where the control program is 
effective, the probability is that the epidemic as a whole lasts between 10 and 87 
weeks, with a 90 per cent chance that it is less than 43 weeks (figure 3.9).  
The average size and duration of the outbreak for the epidemic as a whole when 
FMD is successfully controlled is shown in table  3.1 (see section  3.5 for the 
modelling results). The probability of successfully containing the outbreaks in each 
region with the resources available varied from 79 to 100 per cent. Overall, there is 
a low probability (43  per cent) that, with the resources available, the epidemic 
would be successfully controlled in all regions. However, these figures overstate the 
severity of the situation because, as the disease is controlled or is less severe in one 
region, additional resources would become available to be used in other regions. 
Nonetheless, it is important to appreciate that in using a stamping out and dangerous 
contact slaughter policy, with the available resources, there is a real risk that FMD 
will not be controlled.      
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Figure 3.9  Probability distribution of the duration of an outbreak under 
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Source: Garner 2002. 
The disease is not recognised for two weeks after its initial introduction, so the 
average duration of the outbreak (when FMD is successfully controlled) will be 33 
weeks from first introduction. There would be an average of 211 infected premises 
identified and 493 premises in total would be destocked to achieve eradication. In 
this case, more than 750 000 animals would be destroyed, with the majority (over 
90 per cent) of these being sheep.  
Stamping out and emergency ring vaccination  
For this scenario, the effectiveness of ring vaccination was also evaluated. As this 
outbreaks occurs in one of the more intensively managed livestock areas of 
Australia, with high animal densities and piggeries being involved (with the 
potential for wind-borne spread of virus in at least some of the areas), the decision 
is taken to use emergency ring vaccination early in the outbreak.  
In most regions, a 5 km ring is considered adequate for ring vaccination. However, 
for two regions with high pig populations and another region where the situation is 
uncertain and there are large property sizes, a 10 km ring is used.  
The results show that (again when FMD is successfully controlled) overall, with 
stamping out and emergency ring vaccination, the epidemic lasts between 10 and 29 
weeks, with a 90 per cent probability that it lasts less than 24 weeks (figure 3.10).      





Figure 3.10  Probability distribution of the duration of an outbreak under 
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Source: Garner 2002. 
On average, the outbreak lasts 20 weeks from first detection, as the disease is not 
recognised until two weeks after initial introduction. There would be an average of 
349 infected premises destocked and 594 premises vaccinated to achieve 
eradication. Around 450 000 animals would be destroyed to eradicate the disease 
and nearly 600 000 animals would be vaccinated (table 3.1). 
3.5 Modelling  results 
The results of the modelling are summarised in table  3.1. They indicate that 
stamping out of infected herds and dangerous contact slaughter is effective in 
eradicating FMD in scenarios 1 and 2. However, it is less effective in scenario 3 as 
there is a high probability that the epidemic would not be contained with the 
available resources. 
Under the assumptions used in the study, a control strategy of stamping out and 
emergency ring vaccination is effective in containing FMD. However, under 
scenario 2, this strategy increases the average length of the outbreak and results in 
some 41 000 vaccinated animals to be dealt with at the end of the outbreak. This 
control strategy, however, reduces the variability of the outcome and results in a 
marginal decline in the total number of herds removed (68 compared to 72 — 
equivalent to some 4 000 animals).      
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Table 3.1  Average size and duration of epidemics by scenario and control 
strategy  
  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Strategy of stamping out and dangerous 
contact slaughter  
    
Duration of outbreak from infection, 
assuming 90% probability of FMD control 
(weeks) 
11  19 43 
Infected herds   15  27 211 
Dangerous contact herds   38  45 282 
Total herds removed   53  72 493 
No. of animals destroyed   38 000  50 000  750 000 
Strategy of stamping out and emergency 
ring vaccination 
    
Duration of outbreak from infection, 
assuming 90% probability of FMD control 
(weeks) 
na  18 24 
Infected herds   na  62 349 
Dangerous contact herds  na  6 0 
Total herds removed   na  68 349 
No. of animals destroyed   na  46 000  450 000 
Herds vaccinated   na  68 594 
No. of animals vaccinated   na  41 000  600 000 
na not applicable. 
Source: Garner 2002. 
In contrast, a policy of stamping out and emergency ring vaccination is effective in 
eradicating FMD from all regions under scenario 3. It reduces the variability in the 
outcome, the average duration of the epidemic (by about 11 weeks) and the total 
number of herds removed (by some 144 herds or 300 000 animals). However, there 
would be about 600 000 vaccinated animals at the end of the outbreak that would 
have to be dealt with in such a way as to avoid undue trade restrictions.  
The results indicate that with large herd sizes and relatively low rates of spread, 
emergency vaccination does not appear to offer any advantages for control. If 
resources are limited, stamping out should concentrate on infected herds, even if 
this is at the expense of removing some dangerous contact herds. In situations 
where the disease is likely to spread rapidly and resources may be limited, 
emergency ring vaccination can be an effective tool for containing outbreaks as it 
can reduce the overall duration of the outbreak and the probability that it will get 
out of control. However, it will result in the presence of vaccinated animals. This 
problem will have to be managed to minimise the trade effects.      





The exercise appears to have produced plausible outcomes when compared to the 
size and duration of a range of incursions that have occurred previously in 
FMD-free countries. With few exceptions (UK 1967-68 and 2001 and Taiwan 
1997), most of the incursions were relatively small and controlled quickly. 
3.6  Costs of eradication, control and compensation  
Chapter 2 described the stamping out and emergency ring vaccination measures set 
out in the AUSTVETPLAN that would be used to control and eradicate an FMD 
outbreak.  
Significant government and industry resources are required to ‘stamp out’ FMD. 
For example, in the recent UK outbreak which affected over 2 000 properties, total 
government control costs (excluding compensation for animals destroyed) were 
over 1 billion pounds — around $A2.7 billion.  
Australia has not had an acute animal disease outbreak on this scale. The biggest 
outbreak to date was the 1999 Newcastle disease outbreak in chickens in the 
Mangrove Mountain area of New South Wales. Although the disease was confined 
to one area, it took three months to control, involved up to 5 000 people working on 
eradication and is conservatively estimated to have cost governments around $22 
million (excluding compensation). 
If there were an outbreak of FMD in Australia, the control and eradication costs 
would depend primarily on the scale and duration of the outbreak. Estimates of the 
number of regions affected, herds affected and animals slaughtered under each 
scenario for this study are summarised in table  3.1. As in the UK, control and 
eradication of an outbreak in Australia would be a major logistical exercise. For 
example, a large outbreak could entail the slaughter and disposal of about 750 000 
animals from nearly 500 properties. 
Given the two stage process for compensation described in chapter  2, it is not 
straightforward to estimate the value of compensation as it partly depends on the 
timing of eradication in relation to the duration of the outbreak. To simplify the 
analysis, the Commission has estimated the costs of compensation using pre-FMD 
values. Based on the number and species of the animals eradicated under each of the 
scenarios, the Commission estimates the cost of  compensation for the outbreaks to 
range from about $4 million to $68 million (see table 3.2).     
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Table 3.2  Compensation costs for the FMD outbreak scenarios 
Outbreak  Compensationa 
  $m 
3 month outbreak — WA  4 
6 month outbreak — Qld, NT  19 
12 month outbreak — Vic, SA, NSW  41 
12 month outbreak with vaccination — Vic, SA, NSW  68 
a Calculated at pre-FMD-outbreak values. 
Source: PC estimates. 
Control costs 
In principle, the control costs of the outbreak scenarios used in this study could be 
estimated by calculating the cost of each component of the stamping out control 
strategy — slaughter, disposal, disinfection, movement restrictions etc. However, 
the detailed information required is not available, and previous attempts to construct 
such ‘bottom up’ estimates have fallen well short of actual outbreak costs. Instead, 
reliance has been placed on more aggregated estimates of likely control costs (see 
box 3.3). These measures are based on the costs of actual outbreaks, but involve 
significant imprecision. They can yield significantly different results depending on 
the estimation method used. Reflecting the lack of precision, the Commission has 
estimated a range of control costs for each scenario rather than a single value (see 
table 3.3).  
Table 3.3  Estimated eradication and control costs 
Outbreak  Eradication and control costsa 
  $m 
3 month outbreak — WA  20 – 25 
6 month outbreak — Qld, NT  130 – 150 
12 month outbreak — Vic, SA, NSW  360 – 420 
a Estimates have been rounded. 
Source: PC estimates.  
While these estimates are imprecise, they indicate that a significant level of 
resources would be required to control an FMD outbreak. Adding together 
compensation and control costs (both of which are covered by the EADRA), a large 
FMD outbreak could entail costs of over $400 million — an amount well in excess 
of the $112 million threshold for cost sharing established in that agreement.     






Box 3.2  Estimating the costs of eradication and control 
To estimate the control costs for this study, the Commission has drawn on the costs of 
the UK outbreak in 2001 and the costs in Australia of the Newcastle chicken disease 
outbreak at Mangrove Mountain in New South Wales. 
There are a number of ways of extrapolating the costs of the Australian scenarios from 
those of the UK outbreak. For instance, the cost per month of outbreak, cost per 
infected site or cost per animal destroyed in the UK could each be applied to the 
Australian scenarios. However, each of these is an imperfect measure. For example, 
the cost per site suggests an artificially low value because average farms in the UK are 
much smaller and have far fewer livestock than typical Australian farms. 
The Commission considers that the total control cost per animal destroyed is likely to 
provide the closest basis for comparison. The gross cost per animal destroyed in the 
UK was around $A600 per animal. The Commission has adjusted this cost according 
to the composition of the animals destroyed in the UK compared to each of the 
Australian scenarios. For example, in the 6 month scenario, nearly all livestock 
eradicated are cattle, whereas in the UK the majority of animals destroyed were sheep. 
The control costs estimated using this method are tabulated below. 
The costs to government of the Newcastle disease outbreak in chickens can also 
provide an indication of control costs for an FMD outbreak. The stamping out approach 
used to control this outbreak is the same as would be used for an FMD outbreak, and 
includes the costs of quarantine, disposal, decontamination and movement restrictions. 
Discussions with the NSW Department of Agriculture concluded that the control costs 
of $22 million, excluding compensation, could form a base for calculating the costs of 
one Local Disease Control Centre (LDCC) for FMD. The Commission has adjusted this 
figure to account for the volume of livestock that would be disposed of in each of the 
scenarios relative to the Newcastle disease outbreak, and the number of LDCCs in 
each of the outbreak scenarios (one for the 3 month outbreak, three for the 3 month 
outbreak and seven for the 12 month outbreak). The estimated control costs using this 














Cost per animal method 
 Cost per local 
disease control centre 
 $m  $m 
3 month   26  23 
6 month   130  149 
12 month   366  418 
Source: PC estimates.      
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3.7 Impact  of  vaccination   
In addition to epidemiological considerations, the decision to use vaccination as part 
of an FMD control strategy would need to take account of the implications that 
vaccination has for the time it would take Australia to regain FMD-free status and 
recommence trade. The OIE International Animal Health Code for FMD status 
governs the effect of using vaccination on regaining FMD-free status 
internationally. This code states, among other requirements, that: 
When FMD occurs in an FMD free country or zone where vaccination is not practised, 
the following waiting periods are required to regain the disease free status: 
a)  3 months after the last case, where stamping-out and serological surveillance are 
applied; or 
b) 3 months after the slaughter of the last vaccinated animal where stamping-out, 
serological surveillance and emergency vaccination are applied. 
When FMD occurs in an FMD free country or zone where vaccination is practised, the 
following waiting periods are required to regain the disease free status: 
a)  12 months after the last case where stamping-out is applied; or 
b) 2 years after the last case without stamping-out, provided that an effective 
surveillance has been carried out. (OIE, Article 2.1.1.6) 
The high cost to the economy from the loss of access to FMD-free markets means 
that disease control strategies which reduce the waiting period for the re-
establishment of disease-free status are inherently more efficient. The high cost of 
delayed re-entry reflects the higher prices from the sale in FMD-free markets of a 
large proportion of Australian meat production. It also means that a very large 
increase in slaughterings could be justified to achieve an early return of access to 
those FMD-free markets.  
As a result, if vaccination were to be used as part of a control strategy, then 
minimising the overall cost of the FMD outbreak to the community would also 
involve the early slaughter of vaccinated animals rather than letting vaccinated 
animals live and waiting 12 months after the last case is stamped out.  
As noted in section 3.5, the results from the epidemiological modelling undertaken 
by AFFA indicate that using ring vaccination in the control strategy for the 
medium-sized outbreak would be unlikely to reduce the costs of an outbreak. It 
would increase the outbreak’s average duration, and thereby prolong the period 
until access to markets is regained. 
In contrast, ring vaccination offers the prospect of significantly reducing the 
duration of the large outbreak. In addition, it increases the certainty of being able to 
achieve control of the disease, as indicated by the lower variability of the results.     





Thus, in a long outbreak, ring vaccination combined with early slaughter of 
vaccinated animals could result in Australia regaining access to international 
markets more quickly than with stamping out alone. This would be likely to reduce 
the overall cost of an outbreak to the economy. 
There would, however, be some costs associated with achieving those benefits. 
While ring vaccination reduces the number of herds on infected and direct contact 
premises which would need to be stamped-out, it increases the total number of 
herds which would have to be slaughtered before the three month waiting period for 
FMD-free recognition could begin. This would increase significantly (by around 
one-third from 750 000 to 1 050 000) the number of animals that would need to be 
slaughtered as part of the control strategy. Nevertheless, the cost of vaccination and 
the increased slaughterings would be more than offset by the earlier re-entry to 
FMD-free markets and the increased revenue from the sale of product in those more 
profitable overseas markets. An indication of the net benefits of using ring 
vaccination as part of the strategy to control a large outbreak is given in section 6.4.  
The above discussion indicates that there would be a particular size of outbreak 
(between a medium and large outbreak) at which there would be a switchover with 
respect to the use of ring vaccination. This highlights factors that determine the 
magnitude of the additional benefits and costs that ring vaccination could bring to a 
stamping-out strategy. As mentioned, these include significantly reducing the time 
in re-establishing disease-free status, earlier access to the price premiums available 
in FMD-free markets overseas, slaughter and disposal costs, the costs of 
vaccination, the number of animals vaccinated and the available markets, if any are 
available at such a time, for the rapid sale of products from vaccinated animals.  
The conclusion that there are circumstances where ring vaccination as a supplement 
to a stamping out strategy could reduce the total cost of an FMD outbreak, is 
consistent with earlier work by the Bureau of Resource Sciences (Garner, Allen and 
Short 1997a) and other studies. The Bureau work draws attention, among other 
things, to the physical limits to slaughtering and disposing of large numbers of 
animals, the high demands placed on scarce veterinary resources at such times and 
the benefits of focussing the use of them on supervising the stamping out of known 
infections, surveillance and decontamination of infected premises.  
The decision on whether or not to use ring vaccination raises some complex issues, 
apart from the economic issues discussed above. These involve recognition that 
such a decision would have to be made early in an outbreak, that it would involve 
the judgment that the (largely unknown) spread of the disease was outstripping the 
ability of the available resources to identify, stamp-out and decontaminate infected 
premises, and that containment of the disease could be achieved by diverting 
resources from stamping out and decontamination to vaccinating animals within an     
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encircling zone. Also, it would involve decisions on the location and width of 
vaccination zones.  
The work on the use of vaccination also draws attention to the scope for selective 
vaccination to contribute to an efficient control strategy. By targeting high-risk 
enterprises such as intensive piggeries and feedlots, it could reduce the peak 
demand on scarce veterinary resources during an outbreak and provide for a more 
orderly slaughter and disposal of animals.  
In addition and as indicated, blanket vaccination is only ever likely to be part of a 
cost-effective control strategy where the spread of the disease in an area has 
outstripped the ability of specialist veterinary resources to identify, stamp-out and 
decontaminate infected premises.  
New developments 
As mentioned in chapter  2, research work is currently underway to develop 
diagnostic tests which are able to differentiate between animals infected with FMD 
and animals vaccinated against FMD. When developed and recognised 
internationally, such tests would encourage a much wider use of vaccination as part 
of an FMD control strategy. If commercially available, the tests would reduce the 
market-driven need to slaughter quickly all vaccinated animals (or the delay in 
recognition of FMD-free status with retention of vaccinated animals), and hence the 
costs associated with the use of vaccination. In turn, this would increase the benefits 
of using ring vaccination and selective vaccination as part of a stamping-out 
strategy for cost-effective control of FMD. By influencing the supply of FMD-free 
product, it could also reduce the FMD-free market premium.  
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4  Trade impacts of foot and mouth 
disease 
Most effects of a foot and mouth disease outbreak in Australia would be due to the 
trade impacts. 
Australia is a large agricultural exporter. Annual livestock exports constitute 6 per 
cent of total exports by value, or almost $10 billion in 2000-01 (ABARE 2001a). 
The closure of key livestock export markets  — especially premium FMD-free 
markets — would have a marked effect on the domestic economy and rural 
communities, regardless of the outbreak location. Indeed, the significance of the 
impact on trade would be the largest difference between an outbreak in Australia 
and the 2001 outbreak in the UK. As the UK livestock industry is focussed on 
satisfying domestic needs, its export losses totalled only $A350 million — a very 
small portion of the total loss attributable to the outbreak (DEFRA and DCMS 
2002). 
This chapter discusses the trade consequences of an FMD outbreak for Australia — 
what products and markets would be affected, how significant the impact would be 
and how long it would take to regain market share. These responses underpin the 
assumptions used to model the economic effects of an outbreak on the Australian 
economy (see chapter 6 and appendix C for this modelling and its results). 
4.1  Why do export markets close? 
Because FMD is highly contagious, countries that are free from the disease 
generally are fearful of importing meat and other susceptible products from 
FMD-endemic countries. As a consequence, the world market for meat is divided 
into FMD-free and FMD-endemic markets. FMD is endemic throughout the Middle 
East, South America, Asia and parts of Europe (see box 2.1). 
In the event of an FMD outbreak in Australia, countries that are FMD-free would 
immediately ban Australian imports of susceptible agricultural products. In the 
short-term, exports to some FMD-endemic countries are also likely to be affected, 
particularly if the FMD virus strain in those countries differs to that found in 
Australia. Such bans would be consistent with the international agreements     




governing the use of quarantine measures and with the Office International Des 
Epizooties (OIE) Animal Health Code. The Animal Health Code and the role of the 
OIE is described in chapter 2. 
The OIE standards are recognised by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as 
reference international sanitary rules — that is, if a country imposes a ban in line 
with the provisions of the Code, it is protected under the Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
(SPS) Agreement from actions in the WTO. The SPS Agreement allows countries to 
impose necessary regulations and standards to protect human, animal or plant, life 
or health. Member countries of the WTO are encouraged to use international 
standards, guidelines and recommendations, such as the OIE’s Animal Health Code, 
where they exist. However, members may use measures which result in higher 
standards if there is scientific justification. 
As discussed in chapter 3, under the OIE Code, a country which was previously 
FMD-free and where vaccination was not practised, such as Australia, can regain 
disease-free status three months after the last reported case of the disease, if there is 
stamping out and serological surveillance. Should a previously FMD-free country 
choose to vaccinate as an emergency control strategy, the country can regain its 
disease free status three months after slaughter of the last vaccinated animal, if 
stamping out and serological testing is applied. Alternatively, if vaccinated animals 
are not slaughtered, the country must wait 12 months after the last known infection 
has been stamped out. 
The OIE permits a country to ‘zone’ an area as FMD-free. The FMD-free zone must 
be separated from neighbouring infected areas by a physical or geographical barrier, 
or by a surveillance zone, and animal health measures must be introduced which 
prevent entry of the disease. Zoning is discussed further in section 4.5.  
4.2  Which products are affected by trade bans? 
Products that can carry or transmit the FMD virus include fresh meat and meat 
products, milk and milk products, wool, straw and forage, skins and hides, and 
semen and embryos. However, the risk associated with each product differs, as does 
the capacity to treat products to inactivate the virus. The OIE provides guidelines 
for veterinary administrators in considering whether there is a risk with regard to 
FMD in importing particular products from FMD-endemic countries. Table  4.1 
outlines the OIE guidelines for inactivating the FMD virus for some of the more 
commonly traded products.      
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Table 4.1  OIE guidelines for the inactivation of the FMD virus in animal 
products 
Product Guidelines 
Meat  To inactivate the FMD virus present in meat, one of the following 
procedures should be followed: 
1.  Canning – Meat is subject to heat treatment of at least 70°C for 
a minimum of 30 minutes, or an equivalent process that is 
demonstrated to inactivate the FMD virus.  
2.  Thorough cooking – Meat, previously deboned and defatted, can 
be heated to a temperature of 70°C or more for a minimum 30 
minutes, and shall be packed so it cannot be exposed to a 
source of virus.  
3.  Drying after salting – When rigor mortis is complete, the meat 
must be deboned, salted with cooking salt (NaCl) and 
completely dried.  
Milk and cream  
(for human consumption) 
Products must originate from herds or flocks which were not subject 
to any restrictions due to FMD at the time of milk collection and have 
been processed to ensure destruction of the FMD virus in conformity 
with one of the OIE procedures (Article 3.6.2.5): 
1. Ultra-high  temperature  (UHT); 
2. If milk pH <  7.0, simple high temperature – short-term 
pasteurisation (HTST); or 
3.  If milk pH > 7.0, double HTST.    
Necessary precautions must be made to avoid contact with products 
with any potential source of FMD virus.  
Milk powder and milk 
products 
Products must be derived from milk complying with the 
requirements for milk and cream and necessary precautions must 
be made to avoid contact with products with any potential source of 
FMD.  
Wool and hair   Products must be processed to ensure destruction of the FMD virus 
in conformity with one of the OIE procedures (Article 3.6.2.2): 
1. Industrial  washing; 
2.  Chemical depilation by means of slaked lime or sodium sulphide; 
3.  Fumigation in formaldehyde in a sealed chamber for 24 hours; 
4.  Industrial scouring; or 
5.  Storage of wool at 18°C for 4 weeks, or 4°C for 4 months, or 
37°C for 8 days.  
Necessary precautions must be made to avoid contact with products 
with any potential source of FMD virus. 
Straw and forage  Products must be: 
1.  Subject to steam at a minimum temperature of 80°C in a closed 
chamber for at least 10 minutes;  
2.  Subject to formalin fumes in a closed chamber for at least 8 
hours at a minimum temperature of 19°C; or 
3.  Kept in bond for at least 3 months before exportation.  
  
Source: OIE (2001).      




Inactivation processes may impose additional costs, but can provide the opportunity 
for trade to continue. For example, in the case of wool, the FMD virus can be 
deactivated by scouring or storing wool at specified temperatures for given periods 
of time. Clearly, the extent to which trade can continue depends on other countries’ 
willingness to accept inactivation procedures. During the UK outbreak, for example, 
Australia did not allow the import of any UK dairy products, even though some 
were processed to deactivate the virus in accordance with the OIE guidelines. 
The FMD virus can remain infective in the presence of organic matter such as soil 
and manure, or on chemically inert materials such as straw, hair and leather, 
although the risk of spread by these means is very small. Trade in agricultural 
products such as grains, which are not directly affected by the FMD virus, may be 
interrupted, but given the low risk of disease spread, this is likely to be short-term.  
4.3  Effects of market closures 
Experience from previous outbreaks suggests that all agricultural markets will 
initially close after the confirmation of an FMD outbreak until further details of the 
outbreak — the disease strain, location, extent and control mechanisms — are 
known. This was the case during the recent outbreaks in the UK, Ireland, France, 
the Netherlands and Argentina.  
After an initial shut down, the likely consequences for exports will depend, among 
other things, on the extent of the outbreak, the ability to establish control and trade 
zones and the time taken to be readmitted into overseas markets. The consequences 
will also vary between products according to market and product characteristics.  
The key Australian exports likely to be affected and the likely scale of these effects 
are discussed below.  
Beef  
Beef meat 
Australia is the world’s largest beef exporter, supplying over 25 per cent of the 
world beef trade. Over 1  300 kilotonnes (carcase weight), or 60  per cent of 
Australia’s total beef production, is exported annually. Australia also exports almost 
900 000 live cattle a year. Australia’s beef and live cattle exports are valued at 
around $4 500 million per annum (ABARE 2002b).     
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Over 70 per cent of Australia’s beef and live cattle production, by value, is sourced 
from Queensland and New South Wales, Queensland exports over 80 per cent of its 
production and accounts for almost 60  per cent of Australia’s beef exports and 
20 per cent of its live exports by value. On the other hand, production in New South 
Wales and other States is more targeted to the domestic market — both New South 
Wales and Victoria export around 40 per cent of production, while South Australia 
and Western Australia each export around 15 per cent of production. Live cattle 
exports are sourced mostly from Western Australia (40 per cent by value) and the 
Northern Territory (30 per cent by value) (ABS 2002b). 
Figure 4.1 shows Australia’s key export markets for beef and live cattle. Australia 
relies heavily on the FMD-free Japanese and US beef export markets — 45 per cent 
of beef by value (36 per cent by volume) is exported to Japan and 34 per cent to the 
USA (39 per cent by volume). Australia also exports smaller quantities to Korea, 
Canada, South East Asia and Taiwan. Importantly, just 15 per cent of Australia’s 
beef by volume is currently exported to FMD-endemic countries (ABARE 2001). 
More generally, less than 25  per cent of total world beef exports are to 
FMD-endemic countries (USDA 2002). 
In the event of an FMD outbreak, Australia would lose a large portion of its current 
beef export markets, as over 85 per cent of its exports are to FMD-free markets — 
often referred to as the Pacific Basin markets. This includes the high value Japanese 
market. These markets would remain closed for at least three months after the 
disease has been eradicated. Given Australia is a major supplier to the Pacific Basin 
market, exclusion of Australian beef from these markets will raise prices and 
redirect trade.  
FMD-endemic markets — often referred to as the Atlantic Basin markets — may 
provide some opportunity for diversion of product, though at relatively low volumes 
and prices (a price differential of between 25 to 50 per cent could be expected). 
Views differ as to how much extra product could be sold on the Atlantic market  
and on the impact this would have in dispersing prices further. Some previous 
studies, such as Lembitt and Fisher (1992), have assumed that all product could be 
diverted to the Atlantic Basin market. However, the Commission considers that, 
given the large export volumes that would have to be diverted (up to 
1  000  kilotonnes for a 12 month outbreak), and the limited size of alternative 
markets (FMD-endemic markets throughout the world constitute only 
1 300 kilotonnes in total), the scope for a large scale diversion of trade would be 
limited. The experience of Argentina since FMD re-emerged in 2001 reinforces this 
view. 
     




Figure 4.1  Value of beef and live cattle exports by destination, 2000 
Free on board 










































a The OIE recently suspended the Republic of Korea’s status as FMD-free without vaccination after the 
disease appeared on 6 May 2002.  
Sources:  ABARE (2001a); PC estimates. 
Argentina is the world’s fifth largest beef producer and seventh largest beef 
exporter (see figures 4.2 and 4.3). Even though its exports are only one-third of 
Australia’s export volume, Argentina has only been able to divert a relatively small 
proportion of its exports to other markets during periods when they were declared 
FMD-endemic. Box  4.1 examines the extent to which Australian beef can be 
diverted to alternative markets by reference to the Argentine experience.     
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Figure 4.2  World beef production by country, 2000 













Figure 4.3  World beef exports by country, 2000 













Source: USDA (2002). 
At the earliest, FMD-free countries such as Japan, the USA and Canada would not 
resume trade with Australia until it was declared FMD-free by the OIE. 
Subsequently, as discussed below, the ability and extent to which these markets can 
be reclaimed are highly dependent on each market’s specific features — in 
particular, the USA and Japan that together contribute almost 80  per cent of 
Australia’s beef export revenue.      





Box 4.1  Diversion of beef to other markets — the Argentine experience 
The Argentine experience provides insights into the extent to which Australia could 
develop other markets in response to an FMD outbreak.  
Argentina was FMD-endemic for much of the last century until May 1997, when it was 
declared FMD-free without vaccination. However, in March 2001, FMD re-emerged. As 
a consequence: 
•   Argentine exports fell by 54 per cent in 2001 (USDA 2002). 
•   Argentina is now confined to exporting to countries such as Peru, Hong Kong, 
Brazil, Israel and some African countries. 
•   The EU agreed to re-open its market to Argentine beef after it embarked on a 
vaccination program (but this option is not open to Australia, given our 7 000 tonne 
EU quota) (MLA 2002).  
•   The USDA (2001) does not believe Argentina will be able to find new markets until 
the disease is once again eradicated – ‘like Uruguay, Argentina is forced to deal 
with its excess supply through a combination of increased consumption, reduced 
slaughter, and a slight increase in thermo-processed production’. 
•   Over the longer-term and despite production which has generally exceeded that of 
Australia, Argentina’s exports have always been significantly less than Australian 
exports (figures  4.2 and 4.3). Consequently, Argentines consume very high 
quantities of beef domestically — over 65 kilograms per person, per annum.  
 
 
Recovery in the Japanese market is likely to be slow. Approximately two-thirds of 
Australia’s export volume to Japan is high quality, 100 to 300 day feedlot beef, 
grown specifically for Japanese market requirements. Prices in Japan are likely to 
increase, as Australia is a major player in the Pacific Basin market — the CIE 
(2002) estimates retail prices in Japan would rise by 23 per cent if there was an 
FMD outbreak removing Australia from the Japanese market. With large numbers 
of cattle on feed at any given time (currently 11.5 million cattle), the USA would be 
likely to increase sales to this high value market — the USA currently exports only 
10 per cent of its production, and could divert domestic production to premium 
export markets (NASS 2002). 
In addition, given that production of feedlot beef may fall off considerably with the 
loss of this market, Australia may face a supply constraint in the recovery of market 
share for chilled beef in Japan. 
Australian beef exported to the USA is primarily lower grade manufacturing beef. 
Ultimately, regaining market share would depend on US producers’ capacity to fill 
demand. Australia may regain market share relatively quickly, especially if 
Australia’s beef is available at a discounted price, given the strong US demand for     
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manufacturing beef and the potential for some US beef to be diverted to higher 
valued export markets in response to higher prices. The CIE (2002) estimates that 
US retail beef prices will rise by 8 per cent. Re-entry to the US market after an 
FMD outbreak is likely to be more rapid than to the Japanese market.  
Live exports 
As shown in figure 4.1, almost all of Australia’s live cattle exports are destined for 
Asia and the Middle East, including 30 per cent to Indonesia, 27 per cent to Egypt 
and 25 per cent to the Philippines. Of Australia’s live export markets, more than 
two-thirds are FMD-endemic.  
In these countries, there is limited ability to substitute chilled beef for live cattle as 
they have poor distribution systems and limited ability to handle chilled beef. 
Consequently, there is potential for some of the live export trade to resume once the 
strain of virus has been identified and prior to Australia regaining FMD-free status 
(provided that the virus strain is not different  to that existing in endemic markets).  
Sheepmeat 
Australia is the world’s third largest lamb and mutton producer (with annual 
production of around 700 kilotonnes — carcass weight) and the world’s second 
largest exporter after New Zealand. Australia also exports almost 6 million live 
sheep annually (ABARE 2002b). 
Together, Victoria and New South Wales are responsible for (in volume terms) 
60 per cent of Australia’s total lamb and mutton production. These States are also 
large exporters, accounting for over 60 per cent of total lamb exports and 70 per 
cent of total mutton exports. Almost 75 per cent of live sheep exports are shipped 
from Western Australia (ABS 2002b). 
Australia’s exports of sheepmeat were valued at almost $1 200 million in 2000-01 
— consisting of lamb ($500 million), mutton ($420 million) and live sheep 
($260 million) (ABARE 2002b). Each of these markets has distinct characteristics 
and, consequently, an FMD outbreak is likely to have a different effect on each 
product.  
Lamb 
The USA is Australia’s key lamb market, receiving around 40 per cent of lamb 
exports by value.  The EU and Japan are also important markets, accounting for 15 
and 7 per cent of exports respectively (see figure 4.4).     




Figure 4.4  Sheepmeat exports by destination, 2000 
by value, fob 































































Sources: ABARE (2001a); PC estimates.     
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Around three-quarters of Australia’s lamb exports are destined for FMD-free 
markets. These markets would be lost during an outbreak, although recovery may 
be relatively quick, given demand is likely to remain for lamb and given there are 
limited substitute lamb producing countries able to fill our large market share in the 
short to medium term. (Although New Zealand is the largest lamb exporter, its lamb 
production is falling and it is not currently filling its EU quota.) 
There may be some opportunity to recommence trade with FMD-endemic countries, 
although developing new markets in other countries may be difficult in the 
short-term and could involve significant price discounts. 
Mutton 
The demand for mutton is highly price sensitive. As shown in figure 4.4, major 
markets for Australia in 2000-01 included South Africa (12 per cent of exports by 
value), Saudi Arabia (12 per cent), Japan (9 per cent), the USA (8 per cent) and the 
EU (8 per cent).  
Almost half of Australia’s mutton exports is to markets free of FMD. These markets 
would remain closed for the duration of the outbreak. However, there may be some 
opportunity to continue to export to existing FMD-endemic markets such as Saudi 
Arabia, South Africa and parts of Asia, and some other FMD-endemic markets, 
particularly given a price discount.  
Live exports 
Australia is the world’s largest live sheep exporter, exporting almost exclusively to 
the Middle East where FMD is endemic. There are few alternatives to Australian 
supply, particularly since some countries of the Middle East banned product from 
Africa owing to Rift Valley fever.  
Given the limited substitutes and the FMD-endemic status of the Middle East, there 
are good prospects for resuming live sheep exports during an outbreak. However, 
should the FMD strain of Australia differ to that of the Middle East,  resuming trade 
may be more difficult.  
Pigs 
Australia produces around 365 kilotonnes of pigmeat annually of which around 
20 per cent is exported, primarily to Singapore, Japan and Korea. Pigmeat exports 
were worth over $180 million in 2000-01 and have more than doubled since 1998-
99 owing to new market opportunities in Singapore and Japan as a result, in part, of     




an FMD outbreak in Taiwan and a Nippah virus outbreak in Malaysia (ABARE 
2002b). 
New South Wales contributes around 30 per cent of Australian pigmeat production, 
with Queensland and Victoria each producing around 20  per cent. Australian 
exports are mainly from New South Wales (40 per cent), Queensland (30 per cent) 
and Victoria (15 per cent). 
After an initial market closure, Australia’s pigmeat markets would be difficult to 
recapture. In pigmeat, Australia took advantage of other countries’ disease 
outbreaks to capture market share. If there were an FMD outbreak in Australia, 
importing countries would be able to source product easily from other countries, 
such as Canada, which have the capacity to fill our small market share. For 
example, Australia has only a 1 per cent share of the Japanese market. 
Dairy 
Australia produces over 10.5 billion litres of milk per year. Exports of dairy 
products account for around 50 per cent of that production and are valued at over 
$3  billion annually. Australia is the world’s third largest dairy exporter (16  per 
cent), although it contributes only 2 per cent of world milk production (ADC 2001). 
Milk production is concentrated in the south-east corner of Australia, with Victoria 
accounting for over 60 per cent of total output and New South Wales 13 per cent. 
Victoria accounts for over 85 per cent of the value of Australia’s total dairy exports. 
Australia’s key dairy export markets are in Asia, accounting for almost two-thirds 
of exports by value (see table  4.2). Japan imports large volumes of Australian 
cheese (40 per cent), while milk powder is mostly exported to Asia (80 per cent) — 
primarily the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Taiwan and Indonesia. 
As milk can carry the FMD virus, the OIE provides a set of guidelines for the safe 
importation of dairy products from FMD-endemic countries (see table 4.1). In most 
cases, the use of double pasteurised milk, or processing, inactivates the FMD virus, 
although untreatable products such as soft unpasteurised cheese can still carry the 
disease. Untreatable products account for a very small portion of Australia’s dairy 
exports.  
Experience from the FMD outbreak in the UK suggests that, although some markets 
would initially close, the negligible risk of dairy products transmitting FMD and 
pressure on world supply would lead most countries to recommence trade fairly 
quickly. For example, most countries continued trade in dairy products with the UK 
during the 2001 outbreak, including our major Asian trading partners.     
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Table 4.2  Value of Australian dairy exports by region, 2000-01 
$A million, fob  





East Africa  Americas  Other  Total 
Butter/AMFa 73.0 46.9 27.6 53.7 51.4  41.7  2.6   296.9
Cheese  61.2 430.0 160.0 186.7  33.5  69.9  9.4 950.7 
Milk  35.0  28.6 0.7 3.1 1.3  0.6  12.4 81.8 
SMP/BMPb 478.0  139.6  2.6 41.5 15.5  55.3  2.1 734.5 
WMPc  298.5  233.6  4.4 69.8 58.8  38.6  26.2 729.8 
Other  58.0 89.7 10.5  0.4  1.7  86.8  23.8 270.9 
Total  1003.7 968.3 205.8 355.1 162.2  293.0  76.5 3064.6 
a anhydrous milk fat.  b skim milk powder/buttermilk powder.  c wholemilk powder. 
Source: ADC (2001). 
While the trade in dairy products is small worldwide (around half the size of the US 
market), and competitive (for example, New Zealand and Australian products are 
highly substitutable), Australia holds a large market share in several key dairy 
importing countries. Japan sources almost half of its cheese imports from Australia 
and competitors like New Zealand would find it difficult to fill that demand. 
Similarly, Australia supplies a large proportion of the Asian milk powder market 
and is unlikely to lose significant market share in the medium to long-term.  
Overall, Australia is likely to be able to resume most dairy trade relatively soon 
after the initial ban.  
Wool 
Australia produces around 650 kilotonnes of wool annually, although in the past 
five years it has exported on average 800 kilotonnes a year (underpinned by sales 
from the wool stockpile), with a value of over $3.8 billion (ABARE 2002b). Now 
that the wool stockpile has been sold, annual exports are expected to more closely 
reflect production. Australia exports 98 per cent of its wool production and supplies 
85 per cent of the world export market. New South Wales, Victoria and Western 
Australia contribute almost 80 per cent of Australia’s wool exports (ABS 2002b). 
While an FMD outbreak would have some impact on Australia’s wool trade, it is 
likely to be of a relatively short-term nature compared to the impact on livestock 
and meat markets. Australia’s wool export markets would close immediately after 
an outbreak given that wool can carry the FMD virus, but the duration of the closure 
would ultimately depend on the disease strain and Australia’s ability to disinfect     




wool. (The OIE outlines a set of guidelines to disinfect wool including scouring and 
storage (see table 4.1)).  
Only 30 per cent of Australia’s wool is exported in its scoured form, mainly to the 
FMD-free markets of Italy, Germany and France. Scoured wool could be exported 
immediately after an outbreak under the OIE rules, and Australia may have some 
limited capacity to increase its output of scoured wool. During the UK outbreak, 
scoured wool was still accepted by most countries.  
Australia’s key export markets for greasy wool are China, Taiwan and Korea. Given 
these markets are FMD endemic, they may not require wool to have undergone a 
disinfection process (depending on the disease strain). However, during the UK 
outbreak, greasy wool was banned by most countries. Should Australia choose 
storage as a means of disinfection, raw wool could not be exported for at least four 
weeks under the OIE rules.  
Field crops 
Australia produces around 75 million tonnes of field crops a year — including 
grains, oilseeds, cotton, sugar cane, tobacco, wine grapes, fodder and horticulture —
valued at over $18 billion, with exports of almost $15 billion (ABARE 2002b). 
Of total cropping exports, grains and oilseeds contribute almost 50 per cent by value 
— primarily to the Middle East, Asia and Africa.  
Although the FMD virus can remain infective for several weeks in the presence of 
organic matter such as soil, or on chemically inert materials such as straw, crops are 
not directly affected in any way by the virus. Furthermore, the OIE Animal Health 
Code and the AUSVETPLAN do not specify guidelines for the importation of 
grains or other field crops (other than straw or forage), as is the case for animal 
products, except for crops that have been grazed with FMD-infected animals.    
Experience suggests that, given the negligible risk of spreading FMD via grains and 
other crops, and the likely pressure on supply, most countries would open markets 
to imports after an initial short period of disruption to trade. Argentina, for example, 
is the largest wheat exporter despite being declared FMD-endemic. Furthermore, a 
large portion of Australia’s cropping exports are to FMD-endemic countries.      
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4.4 Modelling  assumptions 
The direct effects of an outbreak on production and trade depend importantly on the 
assumptions made about the effects on exports, domestic consumption and 
production for each livestock category. To ensure these are as realistic as possible, 
trade and production assumptions have been generated after consultation with 
industry and stakeholders. (A list of parties that have been consulted and attendees 
at the Commission’s workshop are listed in appendix A.)  
Based on the analysis provided in section 4.3, table 4.3 presents parameters for an 
outbreak of 12 months duration, with no zoning or vaccination, and with Australia 
regaining access to all markets three months after the eradication of the disease as 
specified under the OIE guidelines. Other scenarios have been modelled by making 
appropriate adjustments to the core assumptions and are available on request.  
The Commission acknowledges that there is no single ‘correct’ value for many 
model parameters, but rather there is a range of plausible values. However, in order 
to generate useful and indicative quantitative estimates for policy purposes, point 
estimates have been generated.  
4.5 Zoning  
The principle of zoning was accepted internationally in 1992 when the OIE 
developed new trade and zoning guidelines for FMD and the use of vaccination. 
Zoning was also recognised in the SPS agreement by the Uruguay Round of the 
General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1993. Implementation of these 
guidelines is now under the jurisdiction of the WTO. 
Zoning provides the opportunity for a disease-infected country to continue trade 
with disease-free countries by defining areas within the country as infected and 
disease-free. Under the OIE Code, an FMD-free zone must be sealed off from 
disease-infected zones by tight movement and quarantine controls and an effective 
surveillance and reporting system must be implemented to demonstrate that the 
virus has been contained within the infected zone (see chapter 2). However, the 
amount of surveillance required to demonstrate that an area is disease-free will 
ultimately depend on negotiations with overseas trading partners.  
As noted in chapter 2, zoning has been successfully applied in a number of other 
disease outbreaks throughout the world, including the FMD outbreaks in Italy in 
1993 and Greece in 1994, and the 1995 papaya fruit fly outbreak in Australia (see 
box 4.2).     




Table 4.3 Modelling  assumptions  — 12 month outbreak 
Per cent change from base case 
Period  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Y2  Y3  Y4  Y5  Y6  Y7  Y8  Y9  Y10 
Beef and veal                
Export quantity   -100 -90 -90 -80 -40 -20 -35 -25 -20  -5  0  0  0 
Export price   -50 -50 -50 -50 -30 -10  0 +5 +5  0  0  0  0 
Production held back  40  60  60  50  10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Domestic consumption  -10 +25 +40 +40 +20  +5  0  -2  -2  0  0  0  0 
Domestic price (w’sale)    -50  -50  -50  -50  -30  -10  0  5  5  0  0  0     0 
Live cattle                
Export quantity   -100  -50  -40  -30  -20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0      0 
Export price  -30  -30  -20  -20  -10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0      0 
Lamb                
Export quantity  -100 -80 -70 -60 -40 -20  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Export price  -50 -50 -50 -50 -20 -10 -10  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Production held back  30  30  20  10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Domestic consumption  -10  10  20  15  13 6  -2 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Domestic price (w’sale)  -50  -50  -50  -20  -10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Mutton                
Export quantity  -100   -80  -60  -40  -20  -10  -10 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Export price  -50  -50  -40  -30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Production held back  50  20  43  33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Domestic consumption  -12  -25  -25  -20  -10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Domestic price (w’sale)  -50  -25  -25  -20  -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Live sheep                
Export quantity  -100  -80  -40  -30  -10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Export price  -40  -40  -30  -20  -10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Production held back  50  20  43  33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Pigs                
Export quantity  -100  -100  -100  -100 -60 -60 -60 -50 -50 -40 -20 -10  0 
Export price  na na na na  -10  -10  -10 -5 -5  -10  -10  0 0 
Domestic consumption  +5  +5  -20  -20  -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Domestic price (w’sale)  -60 -60 -50 -50 -20 -10  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Dairy                
Export value   -50  -20  -10  -10  -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Wool                
Export quantity   -50  +20  +20  +10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Export price  -20  -10  -10 -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Field crops                
Export value   -20  +5  +5  +5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
                
Source: PC estimates.  
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Zoning has the potential to substantially reduce the trade losses of an FMD outbreak 
in Australia, as shown in several studies (such as Lembit and Fisher 1992 and Barry 
et al. 1993) as well as in the Commission’s modelling work (see chapter 6 for these 
results). However, to support zoning, additional resources would be required for 
sampling, laboratory testing and to maintain adequate movement controls on 
livestock and products. 
The Commission’s modelling has followed the AUSVETPLAN’s recommendation 
in using State/Territory boundaries when establishing trade zones, as they would 
provide the most acceptable limits and are identified internationally as distinct 
geo-political regions.  
Regional effects of zoning and market closures 
The overall ability to reduce trade losses of an FMD outbreak will ultimately 
depend on where the outbreak is located and how long it takes for the zones to gain 
international acceptance. For example, the ability to zone Queensland as FMD-free 
would significantly reduce Australia’s trade losses as Queensland exports around 
$2 500 million beef annually. On the other hand, production in other States, such as 
South Australia, is more targeted towards the domestic market.  
Regardless of the outbreak scenario, an FMD-free zone for trading could not be 
established overnight. As noted above, a zone would require movement restrictions 
on susceptible animals and their products, and substantial clinical testing of herds. 
For its modelling purposes, the Commission has assumed that zones would take 
three months to establish from detection of the disease.  
Because of the time lags involved in establishing an FMD-free zone, export 
volumes may not recover immediately. However, States that are zoned as FMD-free 
would benefit from continued exports, and in some cases, may face higher demand 
(and receive higher prices for their exports) because of a lack of competition from 
the FMD-infected zone in Australia. The infected zone would not only lose export 
markets, but could also be banned from selling product on some domestic markets 
— a State that is zoned as FMD-free is unlikely to accept product from an 
FMD-endemic state for fear that this would jeopardise its FMD-free status.  
However, States in the FMD-infected zone would also be likely to benefit from a 
zoning policy. With a continuation of Australian product on the world market, it 
would take them less time to rebuild trade once they were declared FMD-free.  
The terms of reference ask the Commission to evaluate the impact of zoning on the 
medium and large outbreak scenarios. This issue is considered below.      





Box 4.2  International experiences with zoning  
FMD in Italy – 1993 
In February 1993, several cases of FMD were confirmed in the Potenza province of 
southern Italy. By March, a small number of cases had also been reported within the 
Verona province in northern Italy. In all, 57 farms were affected.  
Initially, in response to the outbreak, a ban was imposed on the movement of all 
animals and animal products (fresh meat, untreated milk products and reproductive 
materials) to the rest of the EC. However, after visits by EC missions, and once the 
nature of the outbreaks was better understood, national restrictions were replaced by 
restrictions on designated areas in Italy. Zoning was accepted within one month of the 
disease being recognised. These remaining restrictions were progressively lifted as the 
situation became clearer and epidemiological investigations were undertaken. All 
restrictions were repealed in July 1995.   
FMD in Greece – 1994 
In July 1994, the FMD virus was reported in Greece. By March 1995, 95 outbreaks had 
been recorded, all of which could be linked to Lesvos Island and Evros.  
Zoning was effectively implemented after a decision by the Commission of European 
Communities in August 1994 (less than three weeks after the first reported outbreak).  
The Commission sent a mission to Greece to examine the FMD situation and were 
satisfied that Greece had acted in accordance with the Council directives for controlling 
the virus (which included a nationwide serological survey and the establishment of 
approved inspection and certification procedures). Infected areas were identified and 
restricted from exporting live cloven-hoofed animals, fresh meat, untreated milk 
products and reproductive materials to other member States.  
Greece was not declared FMD free until October 1995 — some 15 months after the 
FMD virus was first reported.  
Papaya fruit fly in far north Queensland – 1995 
When Papaya fruit fly was discovered in far north Queensland in 1995, access to 
overseas markets for Australian fruit and vegetables was immediately suspended. 
Losses from export bans were estimated to be over $100 million. 
Given the serious nature of the disease, the outbreak area was immediately 
quarantined and, within 10 days of the initial detection, the Government commenced 
an eradication campaign. Australian quarantine officials were able to quickly 
demonstrate to the satisfaction of export markets that the fly was absent from certain 
areas. Australia also gained acceptance that treatments applied by growers inside the 
quarantine zone were effective. This quick work enabled exports to continue and 
protected the livelihood of local export growers. When the fly had been fully eradicated 
in 1999, Australia negotiated recognition that the area was free from contamination so 
trade could return to normal. 
Sources: Garner et al. (1997b); QDPI (2002) and DFAT (2002). 
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Zoning under scenario 2 
As detailed in chapter  3, scenario  2 involves a six-month outbreak that starts in 
north Queensland and spreads to the Northern Territory. Under this scenario, the 
Commission has modelled New South Wales, Western Australia, South Australia, 
Victoria and Tasmania as FMD-free zones.  
Queensland would suffer large losses from an outbreak, given a large portion of 
Australia’s beef is produced in northern Australia (50 per cent) and most is exported 
(80 per cent). Furthermore, Queensland’s beef would not be able to be sold on the 
domestic market in the States zoned as FMD-free. Producers in other States, such as 
New South Wales, may obtain higher international beef prices as there would be no 
competition in export markets from Queensland and Northern Territory production 
in the FMD-free market.  
The overall impact on certain commodity groups, such as dairy products and live 
sheep, would be significantly less if FMD-free zones could be created. Live sheep, 
for example, are exported almost exclusively by Western Australia (over 75 per 
cent), while Victoria produces over 85 per cent of Australia’s dairy exports. Exports 
from Queensland, which would be affected by the assumed outbreak, represent only 
5 per cent of sheepmeat exports and less than 1 per cent of dairy exports. 
Zoning under scenario 3 
Scenario 3 involves a large outbreak which takes 12 months to contain and spreads 
from southern New South Wales to western Victoria and south east South Australia. 
Under this scenario, it may be possible to zone Western Australia, Northern 
Territory, Queensland and Tasmania as FMD-free. 
Irrespective of zoning, the dairy industry and the sheepmeat industries would be 
adversely affected by an outbreak in south east Australia, given that a large 
proportion of production is sourced from these regions. In contrast, most live cattle 
and sheep exports are sourced from Western Australia, Queensland and the 
Northern Territory. Thus, these States and Territories could potentially continue to 
export large volumes. 
Queensland would benefit from being zoned as FMD-free given that it could 
continue to service some of Australia’s key export markets. The smaller quantities 
of beef that are exported from New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia 
could be sold on the domestic market in these States. Quantitative estimates of the 
impacts of zoning are presented in chapter 6.  
     






     




5  Other economic effects 
The impacts of an FMD outbreak in Australia would arise from two separate 
sources — first, the loss of income from the closure of export markets for many 
Australian livestock products, and second, the control and eradication of the 
disease. Each source will have subsequent effects on livestock production and 
domestic consumption of meat, as well as flow-on effects to a range of industries 
such as tourism, feed providers and transport agents. This chapter describes these 
indirect economic impacts of FMD. 
5.1  Impact on livestock production 
Loss of FMD-free markets would have an immediate impact on saleyard prices. The 
consequential impact of low prices on production would depend on the product, on 
the length of the outbreak and, just as importantly, on producers’ perceptions about 
the duration of low prices. However, the loss of overseas markets would have a 
significantly greater effect on production than would control measures. This is 
because even in the large outbreak, restricted and control areas would comprise only 
a relatively small part of all Australian land devoted to livestock production. 
Immediate impact of an outbreak on production 
Under the short outbreak scenario, it is reasonable to assume that domestic 
producers of beef and sheep would know that the disease had been controlled 
relatively quickly and infer that they would be able to recommence trade with 
FMD-free markets in the not so distant future. In this situation, producers are likely 
to view price falls as temporary and to retain some stock that they would otherwise 
have sent to market in order to ‘ride out’ the outbreak. Consequently, production 
would be likely to fall initially, and then rise above normal levels once the disease is 
controlled and the withheld stock is put onto the market. Importantly, given the 
temporary nature of the price change, the size of breeding herds is likely to remain 
largely unchanged and production is likely to return to normal levels relatively 
quickly.  
In the case of pigs, the ability to hold back production, even in the short term, is 
strictly limited as market-ready animals quickly lose value. During a short outbreak,     




however, product may be stored at the manufacturing stage for later release, 
resulting in a minimal effect on the breeding herd. 
Longer-term impacts on production 
A longer outbreak is likely to have a far more substantial impact on production, 
particularly of beef. 
In the short term, as in the case of the short outbreak, producers might initially hold 
back some stock in the hope of the outbreak ending. However, the ability to hold 
and feed stock — in effect to allow herd sizes to increase — is limited. Thus, if the 
outbreak showed no sign of ending, producers would be forced to dump stock on 
the market. Faced with a prolonged outbreak, and a further period to reclaim lost 
markets when the disease is eradicated, producers would recognise that low prices 
would persist for a considerable time. 
Prolonged low prices would lead to lower levels of production for beef, sheep and 
pigmeat. However, the effect of low prices and lower production on total herd 
numbers is likely to vary by product. 
•   In the case of sheep meat production, the ability to substitute to wool production 
may mean that the size of the breeding herd would not fall significantly. Hence, 
as demand increases after elimination of the disease, it is likely that supply 
would be able to expand relatively quickly to fill that demand. 
•   In the case of pigmeat production, a period of prolonged low prices could render 
some piggeries commercially unviable. This would lead to a significant fall in 
the number of breeding sows. However, the ability to rapidly rebuild pig 
numbers and production levels should also allow supply to expand relatively 
quickly as domestic prices and demand (but not necessarily export demand) 
recover after the outbreak. 
•   In the case of beef, as discussed below, the adverse effects on production and 
herd numbers are likely to be more long term and could constrain recovery in the 
industry. 
Impact of a long outbreak on beef production 
Beyond the initial holdback and consequent dumping of stock on the domestic 
market, farmers are likely to significantly reduce beef production and reduce herd 
sizes. Producers would shift to other activities in an attempt to maintain returns 
although, as noted by Lembit and Fisher (1992), the extent to which this is possible 
would vary by region.     




Farms with mixed enterprises are able to do this [shift production] at moderate cost by 
changing the emphasis of their enterprise mix.  However, farmers who produce 
predominantly beef will suffer much higher costs to switch to alternative enterprises.  
For example … movements into cropping are also likely to require expenditure on 
machinery. In some cases it may not be possible to find viable alternative enterprises 
because of agronomic and climatic constraints. (pp. 84–5) 
Owing to the difficulty of switching quickly to other agricultural products, the 
responsiveness of beef production to price changes is relatively low — studies 
generally find that a 1 per cent fall in the price of beef leads to no more than a 
0.5 per cent decrease in the production of beef in the medium term (Griffith et al. 
2001b). Nevertheless, prolonged low prices that are likely to be associated with a 
long FMD outbreak would cause herd sizes and production of beef to decrease. 
In turn, the reduced size of beef herds is likely to provide a constraint on returning 
to pre-FMD levels of earnings or exports. More specifically, when demand and 
prices eventually recover, producers will not be able to increase supply 
instantaneously. Indeed, the normal response of livestock industries to increased 
prices is to reduce the turn off of young and older female animals in order to build 
up the breeding herds and, thus, increase future production. The lagged supply 
response suggests that the effect on the industry of an extended outbreak is likely to 
persist after market access and demand have returned to normal. Thus, the initial 
losses from low export demand (and low prices in accessible domestic and FMD-
endemic markets) during and immediately after the outbreak would be compounded 
by additional losses arising from supply constraints. Previous studies of the impact 
of FMD in Australia (such as Lembitt and Fisher 1992, Cao et al. 2002 and Dent 
2002) have found that such constraints could persist for a number of years. 
Both demand losses and losses caused by supply constraints in the beef industry 
have been included in the estimates of the economic impact of the outbreaks 
presented in chapter 6. 
Possible additional cull beyond disease eradication 
According to latest estimates, almost seven million animals were destroyed during 
the UK outbreak (DEFRA and DCMS 2002, Annex C). As noted, four million of 
these were attributable to eradication and control measures, while an additional 
three million were slaughtered for animal welfare reasons, such as insufficient feed 
or poor conditions. The Government paid farmers for these additional livestock 
losses through the Livestock Welfare Disposal Scheme (see box 5.1).     





Box 5.1  Livestock Welfare Disposal Scheme  
The Livestock Welfare Disposal Scheme (LWDS) commenced in March 2001 during 
the UK outbreak. It was operated by the Department of Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs. It was a scheme of last resort for farmers whose animals were affected by 
FMD-related movement restrictions and were suffering welfare problems with no 
alternatives to alleviating the problems. 
Eligible farmers transferred ownership of animals to the Rural Payments Agency (RPA) 
for killing on the grounds of animal welfare. The RPA bore all costs, from the collection 
of the animals from farmer through to disposal. 
Total payments under the scheme totalled £210 million and were designed to fund 
relief of genuine animal welfare problems. The LWDS was not intended to provide 









Sources: DEFRA and DCMS (2002).  
 
 
In Australia, it is also likely that movement restrictions would result in some culling 
because of the difficulty of getting feed to stock in the control zone, or because 
moving animals would constitute an undue disease risk. 
However, in contrast to the UK, given the likely loss of export volumes and the 
limited ability of the domestic market to absorb additional product, Australian 
producers outside restricted areas could also be forced to cull livestock. Producers 
could only hold stock for a limited period because of feed constraints. If, as is 
likely, producers could not sell all production (or the prices received were less than 
costs of transport to the saleyard), then they would have no option but to reduce 
herd numbers to sustainable levels. 
Estimating the extent of any cull is very sensitive to assumptions relating to changes 
in domestic consumption, the ability to sell to alternative markets and the ability of 
producers to hold back stock from market. The degree of holdback will, in turn, be 
determined by the availability of feed, which is likely to vary both by region and by 




for disease control 
Numbers slaughtered 
for welfare reasons 
Total  
slaughtered 
Cattle  594 000  169 000  763 000 
Sheep   3 334 000  2 112 000  5 446 000 
Pigs  145 000  287 000  432 000 
Other  4 000  5 000  9 000 
Total  4 077 000  2 573 000  6 650 000 
     




seasonal conditions. Seasonal conditions are particularly important in the short 
term. For instance, during a ‘good’ season, Queensland beef producers may be able 
to withhold a full year’s turn-off from sale, whereas during dry conditions, 
producers may only be able to hold back production for a couple of months.  
Regardless of seasonal conditions, the ability to increase herd size is limited. It is 
very difficult to estimate the number of livestock that would be culled during a long 
outbreak. Even under optimistic assumptions about the ability to holdback stock, it 
is likely to exceed significantly the number eradicated for disease control purposes.  
5.2  Domestic consumer responses 
Although FMD is not a human health problem, this may not initially be recognised 
by all domestic consumers. As a result, the volume of meat products consumed 
(with the exception of chicken meat) is initially likely to fall. Estimating the extent 
of the fall is difficult. The FMD outbreak in the UK does not provide a sound guide 
to changes in consumption, as UK consumers had previously reduced their 
consumption of meat considerably because of BSE or ‘Mad Cow’ disease.  
In Australia, the Commission has modelled an initial decline in the Australian 
consumption of beef, lamb and pork in the order of 10 per cent. 
There are strong reasons to believe, however, that the initial decrease in 
consumption is likely to be relatively short-lived: 
•   Australian consumers have not displayed such adverse consumption responses to 
animal disease outbreaks in the past. For example, consumers did not reduce 
consumption of beef as a result of the anthrax outbreak in Victoria in 1997, or 
the anthrax outbreak in Queensland in January 2002. Nor was there a significant 
reduction in chicken consumption during the Newcastle disease outbreaks in 
1999. 
•   The closure of export markets would lead to large falls in the price of meat — 
up to 50 per cent at the wholesale level and around 30 to 40 per cent or so at the 
retail level. Such price falls would induce a significant rise in consumption.  
The magnitude of the consumption increase would depend on the responsiveness of 
meat demand to changes in its price. As outlined in box 5.2, a 1 per cent change in 
the price of most meat products is likely to lead to approximately a 1  per cent 
change in consumption of that product. While these relationships are usually 
measured over relatively small price and quantity changes, it is likely that a similar 
price and quantity relationship will hold for a much larger reduction in price. For 
example, in the mid 1970s, Australia lost access to the Japanese beef market (for     




political, rather than animal disease reasons) and domestic prices fell by around 
40 per cent (see figure 5.1). This led to a large increase in the quantity of beef 
consumed, also in the order of 40 per cent. 
 
Box 5.2  Responsiveness of consumer demand for meat to changes in 
price  
There has been considerable work undertaken to measure how Australian consumers 
respond to changes in meat prices.  The results are usually reported as elasticities of 
demand: 
•   ‘Own-price’ elasticities of demand indicate the extent to which buyers vary their 
purchases as the price of a product rises and falls.  
•   ‘Cross-price’ elasticities describe how a change in the price of one product, say 
beef, affects the quantity demanded of another substitute product, say chicken.  
While there is a large range in the estimates of own price elasticities of demand for 
beef, typical values tend to be around -1, or a little greater.  This means that a 1 per 
cent increase in the price of beef will lead to a 1 per cent (or slightly greater) fall in 
consumption of beef, and vice versa. 
Lamb consumption appears to be somewhat more sensitive to changes in its price, 
with an estimated own-price elasticity of around -1.3 to -1.5.  
There has been a long-term increase in chicken consumption which may partly be 
attributable to dietary changes, but also to a long-term decline in the price of chicken.  
The own-price elasticity of chicken tends to be lower than that of other meats, around 
-0.3 to -0.6. 
The empirical studies also indicate the extent to which meats can substitute with each 
other. Beef is shown to be a strong substitute for lamb, with a cross-price elasticity of 
around 0.5 — implying a 1 per cent change in the price of beef may lead to a 0.5 per 
cent change in the quantity of lamb consumed. Similarly, pork and chicken can 
substitute for lamb and beef, although the relationships are weaker (cross-price 
elasticities are typically less than 0.25).  
Source: Griffith et al. (2001a). 
 
 
It is likely that there would be a similar response to such a fall in prices today. 
There has been a small decrease in beef consumption and a significant trend 
towards chicken consumption since the 1970s. This has been accompanied by a 
significant fall, of around 50 per cent, in the price of chicken (see figure 5.2). 
Overall consumption of meat is not as price responsive as individual meats. For 
instance, during the period of low beef prices in the 1970s, total meat consumption 
increased from around 100 kg per person to just over 110 kg. This more modest 
increase overall reflects that the much larger increase in beef consumption was 
associated with falls in lamb and mutton consumption.      




Figure 5.1  Beef price and consumption, 1972 to 2001 
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Sources:  ABARE (2001) and ABS (2002a). 
Figure 5.2  Meat prices, 1972 to 2001 
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Source: ABS (2002a). 
The Commission considers that, if the price of red meats fell significantly, there 
would be a significant switch in consumption towards red meats, with total 
domestic meat consumption rising by around 10 per cent to just under 120 kg per 
person. The Commission’s projected impact on consumption arising from the 
12 month outbreak is shown in figure 5.3. A rise in beef and sheep consumption is 
estimated to be partially offset by a decrease in chicken and pig meat consumption 
in the third and fourth quarters of the outbreak. The large fall in pig meat     




consumption is mainly attributable to a decrease in supply. Given that pork 
production is an intensive industry with high variable costs, particularly feed costs, 
low prices could render some pig production uneconomic. 
Figure 5.3  Projected change in meat consumption resulting from the 
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Source: PC estimates. 
5.3  Impacts on other industries 
The economic effects of FMD do not stop at the farmgate. Measures to control and 
eradicate the disease and the closure of export markets would have significant 
effects on other industries. 
Effects on industries that rely on livestock 
Industries upstream and downstream of livestock production, as well as the rural 
retail sector more broadly, would face significant costs if there were an FMD 
outbreak.  
Upstream industries 
Upstream industries that provide inputs to livestock production include feedstock 
suppliers and transporters, machinery suppliers and a range of other agricultural 
services.      




In the first instance, holding back stock on properties would lead to increased hand 
feeding. However, this would only be a short-term response, and the demand for 
feed would fall in all but the shortest of outbreaks as production levels decreased. 
Indeed, many feedlots servicing the export market would face immediate closure, 
which would significantly reduce domestic demand for feed grains. Likewise, falls 
in production would lead to a fall in the demand for other agricultural inputs such as 
farm machinery and fertilisers, as well as transport providers and other service 
providers, although some farmers could switch to producing other commodities.  
Downstream industries 
A range of downstream industries beyond the farmgate would also be significantly 
affected. These include transporters, saleyards, meat processors, and stock and 
station agents, whose activities would be disrupted from movement restrictions and 
from export bans. For example, many export abattoirs would be likely to close 
through lack of demand (although higher domestic demand could provide some 
offset during longer outbreak scenarios). The closure of abattoirs can have severe 
regional impacts.  
Rural retail sector 
An FMD outbreak would present a mixed picture for the retail sector.  
An initial decrease in demand for meat could see volumes and margins of butchers 
squeezed considerably. Retail meat sales by supermarkets would also be affected, 
although reduced spending on meat could partially be offset by greater spending on 
other food items commonly stocked in supermarkets. However, during longer 
outbreaks, the expected recovery and increase in domestic demand could see an 
increase in butchers’ and other meat retailers’ sale volumes. 
More broadly, the rural retail sector would suffer from decreased farm income and 
low regional activity. For example, a reduction in farm income would flow through 
to many businesses in country towns and rural centres, such as suppliers of building 
products, consumer electrical goods and local restaurants. In turn, reduced 
commercial activity would further compound the financial impact on rural 
communities. In the UK, for example, a survey of rural small businesses in the 
North East of England found that 28 per cent of firms suffered a loss of more than 
10 per cent of turnover during the UK FMD outbreak. Those sectors worst affected 
included hospitality, recreation and culture, agricultural based businesses and 
transport, in each of which a majority of firms were suffering. One in six of the 
affected firms reduced their employment due to Foot and Mouth (Bennett et al. 
2001).     




The Commission has estimated these ‘flow-on’ impacts of an FMD outbreak in two 
ways. First, it has used a general equilibrium (GE) model of the Australian economy 
to examine the links between the farm sector and other industries. The results of this 
analysis are presented in chapter  6. Second, in chapter  7, it has examined these 
effects at a regional level. This involves using the GE model not only to estimate 
the impact on regional employment but also to explore in more detail the economic 
links between farming and rural communities. 
Tourism 
It has been estimated that, in the UK, the largest impact from the 2001 FMD 
outbreak was not on the agricultural sector but on tourism. Movement restrictions 
associated with control of the disease led to the closure of many walking paths 
through farming areas which are a key attraction for UK rural tourism. The 
Cumbrian area and Lake District were particularly affected (DEFRA 2001). In 
addition, a broader perception that most of the countryside was closed during the 
outbreak is said to have deterred international visitors who had been planning to 
spend part of their time in London (and other cities) and part of their time in rural 
areas. The total direct cost to the tourism industry is estimated to have been between 
£2.7 and £3.2 billion ($A7.2–$A8.6 billion) (DEFRA and DCMS 2002). 
Movement restrictions to control the disease could have some impact on tourism in 
Australia, but the effect is likely to be significantly less than in the UK. 
First, in Australia, tourist activities and agriculture are not integrated to the same 
extent. There is little reason to expect that major international tourist destinations 
such as capital cities, the Gold Coast, the Barrier Reef or Uluru would be affected 
by an FMD outbreak (although some rural tourism, such as wine growing areas in 
the Barossa Valley in South Australia and the Hunter Valley in New South Wales, 
may be affected). Nor is it likely that major inland national parks would need to be 
closed to prevent the spread of the virus.  
Second, lessons from the UK outbreak should enable Australia to handle an FMD 
outbreak in a way which minimises the collateral damage to tourism and other 
industries. Indeed, a significant amount of damage to the UK tourism industry 
appears to have been unnecessary. As noted by the Report of the Rural Taskforce 
(DEFRA 2001): 
The loss of domestic visitors to the countryside … arose in the first place mainly 
because of the almost complete closure of footpaths, suspension of sports such as 
fishing, cancellation of rural events and closure of many country houses and other 
visitor attractions. It went on much longer than necessary owing to the slowness of 
some local authorities to reopen footpaths and delay in reopening some visitor     




attractions, and because the perception that the countryside was closed continued long 
after it had ceased to be the reality. (p. 23) 
To prevent such costs to tourism in the future, the Rural Taskforce recommended 
greater use of veterinary risk assessment to determine whether closures are 
necessary and proposed that such assessment should ‘take into account the impact 
on walkers and the businesses that cater for them besides the requirements of 
disease control’ (p. 39). 
Thus, Australia’s lower integration of tourism and agriculture, and the lessons from 
the UK outbreak, suggests that an FMD outbreak would impose significantly lower  
costs on the tourism industry in Australia compared to the UK.  
The UK Government has estimated that international tourism receipts fell by 5.9 per 
cent over the period of the 2001 outbreak (DEFRA and DCMS 2002). Australia’s 
lower integration of tourism and agriculture, and the lessons learned from the UK 
outbreak, suggest that an FMD outbreak would impose significantly lower costs on 
the tourism industry in Australia compared to the UK. Nonetheless, it seems 
inevitable that prospective international visitors’ limited knowledge of the effects of 
FMD would have some adverse impact on international tourist numbers. Reflecting 
a lower impact in Australia, the estimates of the cost of the major outbreak as 
presented in chapter 6, include a loss to the tourism industry of 2 per cent of receipts 
(equivalent to around $300 million). 
In relation to domestic tourism, areas in and around the infection would suffer 
substantially. The affected areas and the magnitude of the effects would be highly 
dependent on the location of the outbreak. For this reason, the Commission has not 
attempted to estimate the impact on domestic tourism from the outbreak scenarios 
used in this study which, in geographic terms, are three of an almost infinite number 
of possibilities. Moreover, while particular areas could suffer, there would be a 
diversion of these tourists to other areas, or a diversion of this expenditure to other 
goods and services within the economy. Therefore, in aggregate the net economic 





     








     




6  Quantifying the economic impacts 
Chapters 4 and 5 described the trade responses and consequential effects of an 
outbreak of FMD. This chapter outlines the methodology the Commission has used 
to quantify those effects for each requested FMD outbreak scenarios and presents 
the results. In view of the many assumptions involved, the Commission considers 
that the results should be interpreted as broad orders of magnitude rather than as 
precise calculations. 
6.1  Direct impacts of an FMD outbreak 
The direct economic impacts of an FMD outbreak would primarily consist of the 
cost to governments and industry of control and eradication of the disease (which 
were estimated in chapter  3), and a loss of revenue to affected livestock 
commodities from a fall in export and domestic sales. There would, however, be a 
range of effects throughout the economy and community. 
The Commission has used a trade and production cash-flow model developed for 
this study (see box  6.1) to estimate, for each of the outbreak scenarios, loss of 
revenue from Australia’s export and domestic markets. It has also used the model to 
estimate, for each scenario, the loss of revenue for individual livestock products and 
for each State and the Northern Territory. Key results from the model are discussed 
below. Details are given in appendix C.  
Loss of export revenue from the FMD outbreak scenarios 
As shown in figure 6.1, an FMD outbreak, of any length, would have a dramatic 
impact on the export revenue from affected livestock commodities. The 
Commission estimates that in the year the outbreak occurs, the value of exports 
would be reduced by around $3 000 million for the single point outbreak up to 
$4 700 million under the 12 month scenario. This represents a loss of revenue to all 
activities involved in the production of the commodities for export, including those 
of farmers, saleyard operators, stock and station agents, transporters and meat 
processors.     





Box 6.1  Trade and production model 
The Commission’s trade and production model is a cashflow model designed to 
estimate the changes in production and revenue over a 10 year period that would 
result from an FMD outbreak in Australia. 
The model uses data from the 1999–2000 financial year — the latest year for which 
complete data were available when the study was initiated. While exports and revenue 
for the majority of commodities of relevance to this study increased significantly in 
2000-2001, data for 1999–2000 are very close to the average of the last three years. 
Reflecting the volatility of livestock revenue (for example, beef exports to Japan have 
fallen significantly in 2002) the Commission considers that it is appropriate to use data 
which is representative of the recent past. 
The model consists of two interlinked components: 
Production — ABS livestock production and herd size data are used to project a 10 
year baseline for the model for each livestock product — cattle, sheep, lambs, pigs and 
milk. A zero growth rate has been used for all industries owing to the uncertainty of 
future growth rates and the sensitivity of the model to the growth variables.  
Changes in production caused by an FMD outbreak are then estimated relative to the 
baseline. These changes are dependent on several key variables including: 
•   eradication data, compiled from the results of the epidemiological model for each 
outbreak scenario, which identifies how many animals must be slaughtered to 
control the disease; and 
•   producers’ response to large falls in prices resulting from an FMD outbreak — that 
is, the extent to which producers decide to hold back or dump livestock. 
Seasonality is not incorporated in the model. The annual output for each livestock 
category is assumed to be constant throughout the year. Seasonality is impractical to 
model for each livestock category and, furthermore, has been found to have very little 
effect on the total losses attributable to the disease (ABARE 2002b).  
Demand — ABS export and consumption data for each State for 1999-2000 was used 
to project a 10  year baseline for demand (quantity and price) for each affected 
commodity. Like the production component of the model, the baseline growth rate for 
price and quantity demanded for each livestock product is set at zero.  
In the model, the overall effect on demand depends on changes to domestic and 
export demand. Export demand variables are estimated for the percentage change of 
quantities exported and the price of those products after an outbreak. Likewise, 
proportional changes to price and quantity of domestic consumption resulting from an 
outbreak have also been estimated. These assumptions have been formed after broad 
consultation with industry (see chapter 4).  
Based on these assumptions the model calculates changes in the value of exports and 
domestic consumption relative to the baseline. The model is manually manipulated to 
ensure that any production constraint is reflected in the export losses.  
 
     




While the longer outbreak would involve the highest costs in the first year, a key 
difference between the outbreaks is the length of time it would take to recover to 
pre-FMD export levels. For the small and medium outbreaks, the majority of the 
total losses occur in the first year — 87  per cent for the small outbreak and 
80 per cent for the medium outbreak. By contrast, the first year loss for the large 
outbreak is only 45 per cent of the total revenue loss from exports. The Commission 
estimates that, in this scenario, exports would not recover to baseline levels for up 
to seven years. 
The long recovery time for the 12 month scenario occurs for three reasons.  The 
longer the outbreak: 
•   the longer many export markets remain closed; 
•   the longer the period necessary for overseas demand for Australian products to 
return to previous levels once Australia had been readmitted to markets; and 
•   in the case of beef, the longer it would take for herd numbers and production to 
recover to pre-FMD levels. 
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Source: PC estimates. 
Decrease in livestock revenue from the domestic market 
As discussed in chapter  5, the loss of export markets would also cause a large 
increase in meat supplies on the domestic market and a large fall in domestic prices. 
Even though domestic consumption would increase, industry revenue realised from 
the domestic market would decline in most periods. The annual decrease in revenue     




on the domestic market for each scenario is shown in figure 6.2. The figure shows 
that, although the decrease in revenue from this source is less than export losses, it 
is still significant — $2 000 million to $2 700 million in the first year depending on 
the outbreak scenario.  
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Source: PC estimates. 
It should be noted that the economic effect of a reduction in livestock industry 
revenue on the domestic market is different to a reduction in export revenue. Loss 
of export revenue represents a direct loss of national income. However, the losses 
the industry suffers on the domestic market are primarily a transfer to meat 
consumers from the greater availability of lower priced meats. This would lead to 
an increase in the consumption of other goods and services in the economy and/or 
to increased savings. 
Total direct economic impact of the outbreak scenarios 
Table  6.1 summarises the total loss in revenue to the livestock industry in net 
present value terms (expressing annual losses over time as a single figure and 
obtained using a discount rate of 5  per  cent). For comparative purposes, it also 
contains the compensation and control cost estimates calculated in chapter 3.     




Table 6.1  Direct losses from the FMD outbreak scenarios 
  Livestock industry revenue loss a    Compensation and control costs 
Outbreak Exports  Domestic  Total    Compensation  Control 
 $m  $m  $m    $m  $m 
3 month   3 333  2 373  5 706    4  20 – 25 
6 month   4 611  2 994  7 605    19  130 – 150 
12 month   9 480  3 332  12 812    41  360 – 420 
a Net present value of losses at the wholesale level over the outbreak. 
Source: PC estimates. 
The total cost to livestock industry revenue ranges from over $5 500 million for the 
small outbreak to nearly $13 000 million for an outbreak lasting 12 months.  
As the length of the outbreak increases, export losses increase as a proportion of 
total revenue losses. For instance in the 3 month scenario lost export revenue is 
around 60  per  cent of the total loss, whereas for the 12  month scenario this 
proportion rises to nearly 75 per cent. This would occur because: 
•   the volume of domestic sales would increase significantly during a longer 
outbreak, while export sales would remain depressed for key affected livestock 
products; and  
•   even after demand has recovered on export markets, reduced production capacity 
in Australia (of beef in particular) might not be able to fill that demand. This 
would lead to export levels being below the pre-FMD baseline for a number of 
years. 
Table  6.1 also shows that the compensation and control costs for each of the 
scenarios are smaller than the trade costs but significant in absolute terms. These 
losses represent direct costs to government budgets and additional costs to the 
livestock industry. As noted in chapter 3, for a long outbreak these costs are likely 
to significantly exceed the ceiling of approximately $112 million for shared funding 
by Governments and industry set out in the Emergency Animal Disease Response 
Agreement. 
The relatively modest compensation and control costs, as a proportion of total costs, 
are in contrast to the outbreak in the UK where control and compensation costs 
were more significant. It reflects Australia’s greater reliance than the UK on 
livestock-related exports. 
While the decreases in revenue on the export and domestic markets are indicative of 
the impact FMD would have on the livestock industries, it should be noted that     




revenue losses are not the net economic impacts arising from an outbreak. In 
addition to the benefits to consumers from lower prices for meat identified above, 
losses in revenue to the livestock industry do not capture: 
•   any cost savings to the industry when production is reduced; or 
•   additional revenue that could be generated by switching from meat production to 
other unaffected farm activities such as cropping. 
These effects will offset, to a minor extent, the impact of the revenue losses. They 
are taken into account in the general equilibrium modelling presented in the next 
section. In addition, appendix E uses a partial equilibrium framework to explore net 
changes in economic welfare arising from the outbreaks. For example, it estimates 
that the 12 month outbreak would reduce producer surplus by around $7.5 billion. 
Transfers to consumers would be about $5  billion, resulting in a net economic 
impact of around $2.5 billion.  
Direct revenue losses by product 
An FMD outbreak will not affect all livestock products equally. The beef industry 
accounts for the largest direct revenue loss in each scenario — $2 700 million in the 
3 month scenario rising to over $8 000 million for the 12 month scenario (figure 
6.3). This is because a high proportion of beef production is exported, and importers 
of Australian beef are overwhelmingly FMD-free. 
Figure 6.3  Wholesale revenue losses to the livestock industry by product 
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Source: PC estimates.     




As shown in figure 6.3, the absolute losses from beef relative to other products 
increase with the length of the outbreak. For instance, in the short outbreak, beef 
accounts for 50 per cent of the total revenue loss whereas, in the 12 month outbreak, 
it accounts for over 65 per cent of the decrease in revenue. This occurs because the 
longer beef markets are closed: 
•   the more difficult it is to regain market share in some of those markets; and  
•   the greater the switch in livestock production away from beef and consequent 
fall in herd sizes. This results in supply constraints for some years after demand 
returns to normal. 
Lower losses are estimated for the sheep industry — $960 million for the 3 month 
outbreak rising to $1 600 million for the 12 month outbreak. This partly reflects the 
smaller size of the industry relative to beef, but also reflects: 
•   a greater orientation of sheep meat production for the domestic market than beef 
production — approximately 60 per cent of sheep meat production is consumed 
domestically, compared to around 40 per cent of beef production; and 
•   the assumption that the sheep products would be able to access export markets 
(particularly FMD-endemic markets) sooner than beef products. 
Relative to the size of the industry (production around $1 000 million annually) the 
impact on the pork industry is relatively severe. As discussed in chapter  5, this 
would occur because: 
•   losses in exports would continue for a considerable period; and 
•   the fall in the price of pigmeat on the domestic market would lead to a 
significant contraction in the levels of production. 
As discussed in chapter 4, the effect on the dairy industry under each scenario is 
estimated to be confined to the year the outbreak occurs. This reduces the total 
impact of the outbreaks on that industry. Similarly, the volume of wool exports is 
likely to be disrupted during the first quarter of each outbreak, but would increase in 
the following quarters to clear accumulated stock. However, it is likely there would 
be a loss in revenue ($279 million is projected for each scenario) from lower prices 
associated with the disruption. 
Grains exports are likely to be disrupted during the first quarter of each outbreak, 
but the Commission does not consider there would be an ongoing impact on grain 
exports arising from an FMD outbreak.     




Direct revenue losses by States 
Just as FMD would be uneven in its impact upon different livestock products, it 
would also have uneven State impacts. The industry revenue losses by State are 
illustrated in figure 6.4. 
Figure 6.4  Loss in revenue by State 
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Source:  PC estimates. 
The significant impact on the beef industry is reflected in the breakdown of losses 
by State. As Australia’s major beef producer and exporter, Queensland is more 
affected than other states in absolute terms. Again, reflecting the impact on beef, the 
magnitude of the effect on Queensland relative to other jurisdictions increases as the 
length of the outbreak increases.  
The impact on New South Wales reflects a combination of losses in the beef, sheep 
and pork industry. This is also the case in Victoria, where dairy losses are 
overwhelmingly concentrated. While the losses in Western Australia, South 
Australia, Tasmania, and the Northern Territory appear smaller, relative to the level 
of production in those States they are, nevertheless, significant.1 As discussed later 
in the chapter, establishing FMD-free trade zones could have a significant effect on 
the results for each State. 
                                              
1 The absolute effect on the Northern Territory may be understated in figure 6.4. Cattle bred in the 
Northern Territory are often ‘finished’, slaughtered in, and exported from, Queensland, which 
means that production (as measured by animals slaughtered) and exports, understates the 
importance of the beef industry in the Northern Territory.     




6.2  Indirect and economywide impacts 
To estimate the indirect or flow-on effects of the FMD outbreak scenarios for 
Australia, the Commission has used the MONASH Multi-Regional Forecasting 
(MMRF) model — a computable general equilibrium model of the Australian 
economy (see box  6.2). The MMRF estimates the indicative impacts on the 
Australian economy of direct changes in production and demand (derived from the 
Commission’s trade and production model) that would result from an outbreak, as 
well as employment effects. However, it is important to note that even sophisticated 
modelling techniques cannot capture all the subtle market changes that would result 
from an FMD outbreak in Australia. 
National effect 
The MMRF results confirm that the outbreak scenarios would have a significant 
effect on the Australian economy. For the 12 month outbreak, Australian real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) would, in the first year, decline by around $2 000 million 
— and the total cost of the outbreak is estimated to be between $8 000 million and 
$13 000 million over 10 years.2 This is equivalent to a 1–2 per cent reduction in 
GDP for one year. The contraction in the economy would be most severe in the first 
six years following eradication of the outbreak, with the economy recovering to pre-
outbreak levels eight years after the outbreak is eradicated. The results for the 
6 month outbreak are about half that of the 12 month outbreak (see table 6.2). 
Table 6.2  Impact of the outbreak scenarios on Gross Domestic Product 
Outbreak scenario  Loss in the first year  Total loss a 
 $m  $m 
3 month  900  2 000 – 3 000 
6 month  1 400  3 000 – 5 000 
12 month  2 000  8 000 – 13 000 
a Net present value of losses at the wholesale level over the outbreak. 
Source: PC estimates. 
 
                                              
2 The range for the estimated impact of the outbreak on Australia’s GDP reflects alternative 
assumptions about the extent to which producers and investors in the economy respond to a lower 
Australian dollar (arising from a loss of livestock exports) by increasing exports or investment. 
     





Box 6.2  The Monash Multiregional Forecasting (MMRF) model 
For this study the Centre for Policy Studies at Monash University has configured the 
MMRF model database to classify the economy into 40 industries and 40 commodities, 
of which 7 industries and commodities fall within the agricultural sector. The agricultural 
industries, that are loosely based on geographic and climatic zones, allow the level and 
pattern of agricultural production to vary between zones, with farmers in most zones 
being able to produce multiple commodities (eg farmers in the wheat-sheep zone can 
produce wool, sheep, cereals, meat cattle, dairy cattle and pigs, and other agriculture). 
The database aggregation used also separately identifies the main agricultural-related 
processing and manufacturing industries (eg meat and meat products, agricultural 
machinery) as well as key input supplying industries (eg road and rail transport).  
It is likely that an outbreak of FMD will only be temporary in nature. In keeping with this, 
and given that the model is used to estimate annual changes in behaviour, the 
standard MMRF modelling environment supplied by the Centre for Policy Studies was 
amended to make it more short run in nature. The environment used to estimate the 
possible effects of an outbreak of FMD assumes that:  
•   real wages remain fixed with employment allowed to vary; 
•   investors in industries directly affected by FMD are likely, given the magnitude of the 
direct effects, to be cash constrained after an outbreak of FMD, such that their 
investment decisions are likely to driven by rates of return; 
•   investors in industries not directly affected by FMD perceive that the outbreak will be 
a temporary phenomenon and, therefore, do not alter their investment decisions in 
response to short-term fluctuations in rates of return; and 
•   exports from non-affected industries are less sensitive to changes in their foreign 
currency price than in standard MMRF (the elasticity of demand was reduced from 
-20 to -4 for almost all non-affected commodities); consumers respond to temporary 
changes in income by maintaining the share of each dollar spent on consumption 
fixed (as opposed to the proportion of each dollar saved), so that aggregate 
consumption varies in line with changes in national income (ie the average 
propensity to consume is held fixed); and government debt levels are allowed to 
vary to maintain real government spending (as a result of the absence of debt 
accumulation). 
As the MMRF does not accurately model debt accumulation, changes in real GDP will 
not provide an accurate indication of changes in welfare. The simulations were run in 
dynamic mode and cover a period of 10 years. 
Source: Adams et al. 2000. 
 
     




Industry and employment effects 
Reflecting the direct impacts, the contraction in economic activity would be 
concentrated in the pastoral, livestock and meat processing industries. These 
industries are estimated to contract by between 20 to 40 per cent. Other industries, 
such as poultry and agricultural machinery, are also projected to contract, but by a 
smaller extent. More broadly, reduced consumption in the economy is reflected in 
small reductions in activity in the wholesale trade and retail trade sectors. 
The decrease in activity is estimated to result in a contraction in employment in 
Australia of 0.5  per  cent in the first year of the outbreak. Employment is not 
projected to return to baseline levels until nine years after the outbreak is contained 
(figure 6.5). Reflecting the declines in output, the most adversely affected industries 
are the agricultural, livestock and livestock processing industries. 
Figure 6.5  Change in employment in Australia relative to baseline 



















Source: PC estimates. 
The fall in agricultural exports would be large enough to affect the exchange rate. 
The value of the Australian dollar is estimated to fall by 2.5 per cent in the first year 
of the 12 month outbreak and is projected to remain below pre-FMD levels for 
nine years. The depreciation could be expected, even in the relatively short term, to 
stimulate exports from some other industries. Exports from the mining industry are 
estimated to rise by 2 per cent and exports of some manufacturing industries are 
also projected to increase. 
The Commission had modelled an adverse shock to international tourism, drawing 
on the experience of the recent FMD outbreak in the UK. However, the modelling     




results show a small rise in tourism with the beneficial effects of the depreciation of 
the dollar outweighing the adverse effects on international tourism. While this result 
is sensitive to the modelling assumptions used, it illustrates that the effect on 
international tourism is likely to be less than in the UK. 
State effects 
At the State level, the largest relative decline in economic activity is in Queensland 
reflecting the importance of its livestock industry. Although some jurisdictions are 
projected to experience a rise in activity in the first year after an outbreak, activity 
in all jurisdictions is projected to decline over the total duration of the impact 
(table 6.3).  
Some of the largest effects would be observed at the regional level. The MMRF 
regional modelling results are discussed in the next chapter. 
Table 6.3  Impact of 12 month outbreak on economic activity of States 
 
State 




Total impact relative to 
Gross State Product 
 $m  $m  % 
New South Wales  -351  -1 819  -0.8 
Victoria 205  -566  -0.3 
Queensland  -1 342  -4 181  -3.8 
South Australia  -190  -651  -1.5 
Western Australia  19  -270  -0.4 
Tasmania -20  -103  -0.9 
Northern Territory  -32  -163  -1.9 
a Net present value of the cumulative impacts over the outbreak. 
Source: PC estimates. 
6.3  Estimating the impact of zoning 
The Commission has modelled the direct impact of the 6  month and 12  month 
outbreaks under a zoning policy. As discussed in chapter 4, consistent with current 
policy, zones would be established at State boundaries. For the 6 month scenario, 
FMD is confined to Queensland and the Northern Territory with the rest of 
Australia zoned FMD-free. Under the 12  month scenario, the infected zone 
comprises New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia — the other jurisdictions 
are zoned FMD-free. In each case, the Commission has assumed that it would take 
three months from the time of detection to establish a zone recognised by     




Australia’s trading partners. It has also assumed that the specialist technical 
resources required to conduct the clinical surveillance necessary to establish an 
FMD-free zone would not reduce the resources available to the control effort, and 
hence would not have an adverse effect on the duration of the outbreak. 
Effect of zoning on the direct impact of a 6 month outbreak 
The Commission estimates that establishing an FMD-free zone during the 6 month 
scenario would reduce revenue losses to the livestock industry by over 40 per cent 
or $3  000  million. As shown in figure 6.6, the benefits of zoning would be 
concentrated in the FMD-free zone, which is able to return to international markets 
three months after the detection of FMD in Queensland. For example, in New South 
Wales revenue losses are estimated to fall from around $2 000 million to around 
$500 million. Such losses are incurred in the FMD-free zone primarily because of 
the time it would take to establish the zone. Once the zone is established, prices for 
some commodities (particularly beef) are assumed to increase owing to the absence 
of meat on the world market from Queensland and the Northern Territory. The 
Commission also estimates that there would be a small benefit to industry within the 
infected-zone arising from its ability to regain access to markets quickly because of 
the presence of Australian products from the FMD-free zone in those markets. 
Figure 6.6  Impact of zoning on the 6 month outbreak scenario 






















a Revenue losses expressed as a net present value of the losses over the outbreak. 
Source: PC estimates.     




Effect of zoning on the direct impact of a 12 month outbreak 
For the 12 month scenario, the Commission estimates that establishing an FMD-free 
zone comprising Queensland, Western Australia, Northern Territory and Tasmania 
would reduce the total export and domestic revenue losses to the affected livestock 
industries by two thirds from $12 800 million down to $4 200 million. 
As shown in figure 6.7, in the FMD-free zone a substantial proportion of the 
revenue losses from a 12 month outbreak could be avoided if a zone was established 
after three months. In particular, beef exports from Queensland, live cattle exports 
from the Northern Territory and live sheep exports from Western Australia could 
continue. 
The Commission also estimates that for this outbreak scenario, the infected zone 
would be better off under a zoning policy than without such a policy: 
•   the continuing presence of substantial Australian product from the FMD-free 
zone would make it easier for the infected zone to rebuild markets once it was 
free of the disease; and 
•   the absence of a glut of beef from Queensland in southern States would result in 
less of a domestic price fall in the infected zone and hence lower domestic 
revenue losses. 
Figure 6.7  Impact of zoning on the 12 month outbreak scenario 
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a  Revenue losses expressed as a net present value of the losses over the outbreak. 
Source: PC estimates.     




6.4  Estimating the impact of vaccination 
The terms of reference ask the Commission to estimate the impact of vaccination on 
the 6 month and 12 month scenarios. 
Section 3.7 noted that, based on the epidemiological modelling, emergency ring 
vaccination would be likely to increase the average duration of the 6 month scenario 
and hence, is unlikely to be an appropriate control strategy for an outbreak in 
northern Australia. The Commission has, therefore, not further examined the impact 
of vaccination on the costs of the 6 month outbreak. 
However, the epidemiological modelling found that as part of a control strategy, 
emergency ring vaccination could reduce significantly the length of the long 
outbreak — by around three to five months. Under the assumption that all 
vaccinated animals would be slaughtered, reducing the duration of the outbreak 
would reduce the time Australia would be out of international markets. In turn, this 
would reduce the trade costs of an outbreak. 
Against this benefit, vaccination of animals requires resources. More importantly it 
would involve losses from the slaughter of otherwise healthy animals — 
vaccination would result in the slaughter of an additional 300 000 livestock — and 
increased disposal costs. 
An estimate of the size of the benefits and costs of emergency ring vaccination for 
the 12 month outbreak is provided in table 6.4. As noted previously, revenue losses 
to the affected industries tend to overstate the economic loss to the economy from 
an outbreak. Nevertheless, the savings in revenue to the affected livestock industries 
are substantially larger than the additional costs from vaccination. 
Table 6.4  Impact of emergency ring vaccination on the direct costs of the 
12 month outbreak 
Benefits and costs  Value 
  $m 
Benefit of reduced revenue losses from quicker 
return to markets 
1 000 – 2 500 
   
Cost of vaccination a   6 
Cost of the value of additional livestock slaughtered b  30 
Cost of additional disposal  94 
Total costs  130 
a Cost of vaccination estimated at $10 an animal.  b Under the 12  month scenario, 450 000 animals are 
eradicated directly and 600 000 animals vaccinated. Assumes that all vaccinated animals are slaughtered and 
disposed of in the same way as infected and direct contact herds. 
Source: PC estimates.     




The Commission concludes that, whenever emergency ring vaccination would 
materially shorten the length of an outbreak, it would reduce total costs of that 
outbreak to the economy, and hence be a sensible policy option. 
6.5 Sensitivity  analysis 
The Commission has conducted sensitivity analysis on key assumptions relating to 
the time Australia would be out of FMD-free markets and the level of adverse 
domestic consumer reaction to an FMD outbreak. 
Time out of markets 
As described in chapter  3, the epidemiological modelling shows considerable 
variability in the likely length of a major outbreak — with the possibility of the 
outbreak in some regions lasting longer than 12 months. 
In addition, the Commission has predicated its modelling on regaining access to 
international markets after the period specified in the OIE guidelines (generally 
three months after eradication of the last infected animal). However, countries have 
some flexibility in applying the OIE guidelines. For the recent outbreaks in the UK, 
France and the Netherlands, there has generally been a relatively prompt 
recognition of FMD-free status by most countries. But there are also instances 
where some nations have taken longer than the OIE specified periods to open their 
markets to a country achieving disease-free status after an outbreak. 
To take account of the possibility of a longer outbreak, or a delayed period until 
recognition of FMD-free status, the Commission has estimated the direct trade 
effects of Australia being out of FMD-free markets for two years. This represents a 
further nine months out of markets compared to the 12 month outbreak scenario 
(which would involve 15 months out of FMD-free markets when the three month 
period specified by the OIE to achieve diseases-free status is included). 
As shown in table 6.5, the total loss in revenue to affected livestock industries is 
estimated to be over $14 800 million, compared to around $12 800 million for the 
12 month outbreak. The distribution of the revenue losses among jurisdictions and 
affected commodities is not significantly different to the other outbreak scenarios.     




Table 6.5  Direct revenue losses from a 12 month outbreak and 2 years 
out of markets 
Net present value of revenue loss to the livestock industries
  
   
12 month outbreak 
24 months out 
 of markets 
 $m  $m 
Loss in export revenue  9 480  10 398 
Decrease in revenue from domestic sales  3 332  4 396 
Total revenue loss  12 812  14 794 
Source: PC estimates. 
Figure 6.8 shows the estimated annual losses for the 2 year scenario. Although 
Australia does not trade with FMD-free counties for the whole second year, the 
losses in this period are lower than in the first year because of increasing trade with 
FMD-endemic countries (particularly in sheep meat and live cattle) and higher 
consumption on the domestic market. 
Compared with the 12 month outbreak, a 2 year scenario results in higher revenue 
losses primarily in the second and third years. This reflects both the longer time out 
of markets and time taken to rebuild exports once access is obtained. The small 
increase in the loss in year six compared to year five reflects a supply constraint as 
producers rebuild herds to take advantage of a recovery in export prices. 
Figure 6.8  Annual revenue losses to the livestock industries from 2 years 





















Source: PC estimates.     




Adverse consumer reaction 
The Commission’s estimates of the direct revenue impact of the outbreaks are based 
on: 
•    a projected 10 per cent decline in domestic consumption of beef and lamb in the 
first quarter of an outbreak; and  
•   followed by increases in total meat consumption in subsequent quarters of up to 
10 per cent (comprising increases of up to 40 per cent in beef and lamb, offset 
partially by falls in poultry and pigmeat consumption).  
The Commission has tested the sensitivity of the results to these assumptions by 
modelling both a more positive and more negative consumer reaction. 
The initial 10 per cent fall in consumption is based on a consumer misperception 
that FMD poses a health risk. If no such perception eventuated, consumers would 
respond almost immediately to low prices by increasing consumption. Assuming 
consumption increased by 10  per cent in the first quarter, the modelling shows 
domestic revenue losses would be reduced by around 2 to 3 per cent and the total 
revenue losses by between 1 and 2 per cent. The overall results, therefore, are not 
particularly sensitive to this assumption. 
To determine the impact of a more negative sentiment towards beef and lamb 
during an outbreak (a greater level of consumer misperception) the Commission has 
modelled the situation where, after the first quarter, consumption rises by only half 
the amount projected by the Commission. While the Commission considers that 
such a response would be unlikely, losses on the domestic market would rise by 
between 12 per cent and 20 per cent depending on the length of outbreak, which 
translates to around a 5 per cent total increase in revenue losses for each of the 
outbreaks. 
 
     




7   Regional and farm impacts 
The previous chapter examined the economic costs at the national and state level 
associated with the specified FMD scenarios. This chapter extends the analysis to 
the regional and farm level. More specifically, it considers: 
•   the regions and farm types which could be most affected by an FMD outbreak; 
•   the significance of the economic links between the livestock industry and the 
regional economy; and 
•   the capacity of regions and farmers to cope with the economic losses caused by 
an outbreak. 
The scope for analysing the economic impact on regions, communities and farms is 
dependent on the availability, reliability and consistency of suitable data. To this 
end, the Commission has relied predominantly on the ABS’s 1998 Integrated 
Regional Data Base1 (IRDB98) (ABS 1998), ABARE’s farm survey data (ABARE 
2002a) and the regional results from the MONASH Multi-Regional Forecasting 
(MMRF) model . 
7.1 Regions  most  affected 
Most of the regional analysis in this chapter has been conducted at the Statistical 
Division (SD) level2. There were 66 SDs covering Australia in the 1996 Census. 
The SD level is the smallest regional level for which the MMRF model can 
compute results. 
It is recognised, however, that because of their geographic size, SDs can contain 
smaller areas that are quite different. Accordingly, analysis at the SD level can mask 
smaller regional concentrations of livestock or related activity. Consequently, the 
                                              
1 Most data relating to Statistical Divisions are only available from the Census of Population and 
Housing. IRDB98 includes data from the 1996 Census. The first release of data from the 2001 
census is expected in June 2002.  
2  The ABS defines a statistical division as a relatively homogeneous region characterised by 
identifiable social and economic links between the inhabitants and between the economic units 
within the region, under the unifying influence of one or more major towns or cities 
(ABS 1995, p. 18).     




Commission has supplemented the analysis at the SD level with some analysis at 
the Statistical Local Area (SLA) level.  
The nature of regional economic impacts 
The total economic impact on a region of an FMD outbreak will consist of the direct 
loss of farm income from the regional economic base and any indirect effects on 
regional activities, such as: 
•   changes in demand for local goods and services by livestock farmers and 
families in response to reduced farm receipts — for example, lower demand for 
farm inputs such as stock feed, equipment and transport, and demand for 
household items supplied by local businesses;  
•   changes in the volume of livestock supplied to downstream processing activities; 
and  
•   ‘additional’ impacts on economic activities within and around infected zones, 
including: 
–  higher short-term demand for accommodation and food by emergency 
services personnel; and 
–  reduced productivity from increased travel and transaction times because of 
roadblocks and searches. 
The combined direct and indirect impacts on a region will depend on the particular 
structure of economic activity of that region. Regions which suffer the largest direct 
economic impacts may not necessarily suffer the largest total effects and vice-versa. 
The total effect on SD regions has been estimated using general equilibrium 
modelling through a ‘tops down’ approach. This involved disaggregating the 
national, State and Territory results (chapter 6) down to the SD region level.3 To 
illustrate the contribution of indirect effects, the Commission has examined the 
                                              
3 An alternate approach would be a ‘bottoms-up’ method. This would involve estimating the direct 
loss in farm income for each region and then using these ‘shocks’ in a general equilibrium model 
or applying exogenous multipliers. The Commission has not adopted this approach for a number 
of reasons. First, it does not have reliable estimates of the aggregate loss in regional farm 
incomes. The Commission’s cash flow model does not analyse changes in farm gate returns at the 
SD level, nor is it possible to aggregate up to the SD regional level using the results in section 7.3 
for the average farm as this analysis is based on data for ABARE survey regions. These data 
differ in geographic coverage to SD regions. Second, the MMRF model cannot adequately 
capture the important economy-wide and macroeconomic shocks of an FMD outbreak and, at the 
same time, accommodate exogenous shocks to SD regional outputs. Finally, the use of exogenous 
or independent multipliers, while possibly useful in a partial equilibrium context, would be 
inappropriate for a shock of the size and scope of an FMD outbreak.     




direct dependence of regions on livestock and subsequently, compared these results 
with the estimated total (direct and indirect) impact on regions derived from the 
MMRF model.  
Direct dependence on livestock activity 
A region’s dependence on livestock production is a useful indicator of how it would 
be directly affected by an outbreak. The Commission has measured dependence as 
the proportion of local employment accounted for directly by livestock activities for 
each statistical division (box 7.1). The Commission’s estimates are presented in 
appendix D, table D.1. 
 
Box 7.1  Estimating regional livestock employment 
In the absence of complete data on employment in livestock activities for all statistical 
divisions, the Commission used the following estimation: 
TRLE = (GVRL/GVAR) x ARE, where 
TRLE = total regional livestock employment 
ARE = regional employment in agriculture 
GVRL = gross value of regional livestock 
GVRA = gross value of regional agriculture 
The percentage of total regional employment accounted for by livestock employment 
(SLTRE) is estimated as (TRLE/TRE) x 100, where TRE = total regional employment. 
The main focus of the estimates is not on their precise value, but rather the relative 
regional ranking. An implicit assumption is that the share of livestock employment in 
agriculture in each region is the same as the share of livestock output in the region’s 
agriculture output. In practice, labour intensity will, of course, vary between agricultural 
activities within a region. However, such variation is unlikely to materially affect the 
general pattern of dependence. 
 
 
Livestock employment in Statistical Divisions 
The estimated share of local employment in livestock activity ranged from less than 
1 per cent for the capital city regions to 30 per cent for the Central West region of 
Queensland.  
Figure 7.1 illustrates the pattern of dependence across the SD regions. For the one-
third of regions where dependence was highest, 6 per cent or more of total regional 
employment was in livestock activities, with the majority of these having at least 
10 per cent (table 7.1). For the one-third of regions where dependence was lowest,     






Figure 7.1  Pattern of direct dependence on livestock employment, 1996 
Share of total regional employment accounted for by livestock employment  
 
Source: PC estimates. 
Table 7.1  Regions with highest direct dependence on livestock, 1996 
Livestock employment as a share of total regional employment 
Statistical Division  Estimate    Statistical Division  Estimate 
 %      % 
Central West (Qld)  30    North West (Qld)  9 
Western District (Vic)  20    North Western (NSW)  8 
South West (Qld)  19    Far West (NSW)  8 
Upper Great Southern (WA)  13    South Eastern (NSW)  7 
East Gippsland (Vic)  13    Murrumbidgee (NSW)  7 
Goulburn (Vic)  11    Murray (NSW)  7 
South East (SA)  11    Darling Downs (Qld)  7 
Lower Great Southern (WA)  11    Midlands (WA)  6 
Gippsland (Vic)  10    Northern (NSW)  6 
Southern (Tas)  10       
Source: PC estimates. 
Most dependent third 
Middle third 
Least dependent third     




less than 4  per cent of total regional employment was in livestock activities, 
although for the majority, it was less than 2 per cent, and mainly in the capital cities 
and adjoining regions. 
Relative versus absolute dependence within SD regions 
The scale and scope of socioeconomic impacts on a region depend on the absolute 
number of affected individuals, as well as the proportion of the community affected. 
In this context, it is noted that of the 19 SD regions with the highest relative 
dependence, 10 were ranked in the top one-third in terms of total livestock 
employment (appendix D, table D.1). 
The importance of livestock mix within a SD region 
To further gauge the direct impact of an FMD outbreak on a SD region, it is 
necessary to account for the effects of FMD on the different livestock industries. As 
indicated in chapter 6, beef producers and, hence, predominantly beef producing 
regions, would be more adversely affected than dairy producers and predominantly 
dairy producing regions. For example, the Western District (Vic) had an overall 
dependency of 20 per cent on livestock employment, but includes significant dairy 
cattle and milk production. In contrast, the Darling Downs (Qld) had an overall 
dependency of 7 per cent, but beef cattle farms comprised 68 per cent of ‘specialist’ 
livestock farms and a further 13 per cent were sheep or sheep-beef farms. Thus, the 
difference in the size of the effects on the two regions would not be nearly as great 
as suggested by looking at aggregate livestock dependence alone. 
Livestock employment in Statistical Local Areas  
SDs cover relatively large areas — averaging over 150 000 square kilometres for 
regions outside the capital cities. Hence, analysis at this level can conceal 
considerable variability at the local district level — for example, while the Darling 
Downs SD had an estimated livestock share of employment of 7 per cent, the shares 
for the SLAs within it included Taroom (44 per cent) and Inglewood (36 per cent), 
where beef activity is prevalent, and Stanthorpe (2  per cent), where horticulture 
predominates.  
The relative dependence on livestock employment at the SLA level is summarised 
in table  7.2. It excludes around 600 SLAs in the capital cities and a further 82 
covering Wollongong, Newcastle, Gold Coast, Townsville and Cairns where 
livestock employment is insignificant. The table shows that, in 1996, 60 SLAs (out 
of 620 non-metropolitan areas for which complete data were available) had more     




than 30 per cent of their total employment directly involved in livestock activities. 
A further 56 SLAs had a livestock employment share of between 20 and 29 per 
cent. Thirty-five (30 per cent) of these 116 highest dependent SLAs were located in 
Queensland and 26 (22 per cent) in NSW. Importantly, some of the 116 highly 
dependent SLAs were in SDs with relatively low dependency — for example, 
Merriwa SLA had a livestock employment dependency share of 30 per cent, even 
though the Hunter SD region within which it is located had an overall livestock 
employment share of less than 3 per cent.  
Table 7.2  Dependence on livestock employment, by SLA, 1996 
Non-capital city areas 



























%  no. no. no. no. no. no. no.  no.  % 
             
50  or  more  2 0 5 3 1 0 0  11  2 
40–49  1 3 3 0 3 0 0  10  2 
30–39  8 4  17 6 4 0 0  39  6 
20–29  15  12  10 6 8 5 0  56  9 
10–19  42 18 24 19 25  8  0  136  22 
under  10  64 66 72 62 65 20 19  368  59 
Total  132 103 131  96 106  33  19  620  100 
Incomplete 
data c 
1  21 9 2 0 2 8  44   
a Excludes 9 SLAs covering Wollongong and Newcastle.  b Excludes 73 SLAs covering the Gold Coast, 
Townsville and Cairns.  c Examination of the incomplete data suggests there may be up to four SLAs in 
Victoria and one in NT in the top two categories. The remainder of SLAs with incomplete data appear to be in 
the lower categories. 
Source: PC estimates. 
Dependence of country towns on livestock farmers’ expenditure 
Expenditure by farm families in country towns across Australia is an important 
source of income for many regional businesses. Local service industries like retail 
and wholesale trade, transport and storage, finance and machinery repairs are all 
affected by farmers’ spending patterns. The fortunes of these non-farm businesses 
may also have implications for off-farm employment opportunities of farm families.  
An ABARE survey of farmer expenditure patterns revealed that a relatively low 
proportion of total farm expenditure was spent in small towns (box 7.2). However, 
many of these towns are likely to be highly dependent on this spending because     




they generally do not have a large services or industry base. Regional centres, whilst 
attracting more farm expenditure in aggregate, usually have a more diversified base. 
 
Box 7.2  Where farmers spend their income 
Farmers’ expenditure can be divided into three components: 
•   household items — for example, food, clothing, furniture, entertainment, school fees 
and holidays; 
•   farm inputs — that is, non-capital farm inputs such as fertiliser, fodder, seed, 
chemicals, fuel, plant hire and repairs; and 
•   capital items — that is, high value items of plant and machinery.  
Based on a 1998-99 ABARE survey of broadacre farmer expenditure, it was estimated 
that towns with more than 20 000 people attracted over half of the expenditure of a 
broadacre farmer (Levantis 2001). Towns with fewer than 1 000 people and towns with 
between 1  000 and 2  000 people each attracted less than 10  per cent of farmers’ 
expenditure.  
The survey also showed that the proportion of farm expenditure spent on each of the 
three categories — household items, farm inputs and capital items — varied according 
to town size. Thus, in towns with less than 1 000 people, about 15 per cent of total 
farm expenditure was on household items and almost 80 per cent on farm inputs. In 
contrast, in towns with over 50 000 people, around 35 per cent of farmers’ expenditure 
was on household items, with a similar proportion on farm inputs. The remainder 
(30 per cent) was on capital items. 
Source: Levantis (2001). 
 
 
The sharp reduction in livestock cash receipts from an FMD outbreak is likely to 
result in a decrease in discretionary expenditure by farmers on household items and 
on farm inputs such as fertiliser and fencing materials. Reductions in discretionary 
expenditure are likely to be more significant for small towns. On the other hand, 
deferred expenditure on major capital items will primarily impact on suppliers 
located in larger centres. 
Estimated total effect on regions  
The MMRF model (described in chapter 6) provides for the indirect effects of an 
FMD outbreak to be incorporated with the direct effects to give, by region, the total 
effects over time of an outbreak. The regional impact of the 12 month scenario has 
been estimated, year by year, over a 10 year period from the beginning of the     




outbreak for 57 regions.4 Details of the first year effect and of the cumulative effect 
over the 10 years for all regions are given in appendix D, table D.2. 
Figure 7.2 illustrates the pattern of regional impacts according to the cumulative 
effect on the value of output over the 10 years. The most adversely affected regions, 
where the cumulative effect over 10 years is greater than 3  per cent of current 
output, occur predominantly in inland regions where the livestock industries are 
relatively important contributors to the regional economies. (At the national level, 
real gross domestic product is estimated to be about 1.2 per cent lower over the 10 
years — almost one-third of regions are less affected than this.) 
The 10 regions estimated to be the most adversely affected over the 10 year period 
are listed in table 7.3. The most affected region is estimated to be South West (Qld), 
for which the cumulative loss in the region’s value of output over the 10 year period 
is equivalent to almost 20 per cent of the current annual output.  
Table 7.3  Estimated effect of the 12 month FMD scenario, 10 most 
adversely affected regions 
Reduction in regional value of output as a proportion of current annual output 
 Cumulative  reduction 
over 10 years 
Reduction  
after one year 
 %  % 
South West (Qld)  -19.6  -6.6 
Central West (Qld)  -13.2  -4.5 
Darling Downs (Qld)  -7.8  -2.9 
Fitzroy (Qld)  -6.7  -2.4 
Kimberley (WA)  -6.7  -2.3 
North West (Qld)  -6.2  -2.2 
Wheatbelt (WA)a -5.0  -2.2 
Lower Great Southern (WA)  -4.7  -2.1 
South East (SA)  -4.5  -1.8 
Wide Bay-Burnett (Qld)  -4.5  -1.6 
a The wheatbelt region is an amalgam of the Upper Great Southern and Midlands statistical divisions. 
Source: MMRF model estimates. 
                                              
4 The MMRF model recognises 57 regions compared with the 58 statistical divisions (SDs) used 
elsewhere in the regional analysis. The regions in the MMRF model match 53 of the SDs. The 
variations are explained in appendix D, table D.2.     




Figure 7.2  Estimated effect of the 12 month FMD scenario, regional pattern 
of cumulative reductions in the value of output over 10 years 
 
 
Source: MMRF model estimates. 
Also listed in the table are the estimated reductions in regional output after the first 
year. As indicated, the cumulative effect over the 10 year period is some two to 
three times the first year effect for those regions.  
More generally, the regional pattern of impacts in the first year confirms the earlier 
analysis relating to livestock dependence (see table 7.1). Eleven of the 19 regions 
with the highest relative dependence on livestock employment were in the top one-
third of regions estimated to suffer the largest reduction in the value of output in the 
first year. In six of the remaining eight high livestock-dependent regions, the 
relatively high incidence of dairy activity moderated the losses in the first year. 
Not all regions are estimated to be adversely affected. The adjustment of the 
economy to the loss of meat exports produces a slight depreciation in the exchange 
rate which, in turn, leads to some expansion of other export and import replacement 
industries. Regions dependent on those other industries, such as the Pilbara in 
Least affected third 
Most affected third 
Middle third     




Western Australia which has a relatively high dependence on the mining industry, 
could experience an expansion of output. In total, seven regions are estimated to 
have a net expansion in output over the 10 year period, although, in each case, the 
cumulative increase is estimated to be less than 1 per cent of current output.  
As expected, the estimated effect on employment of the 12 month FMD scenario is 
closely linked with the effect on output. Thus, the one-third of regions which are 
estimated to experience the largest proportional reductions in employment are the 
regions that are estimated to experience the largest cumulative reduction in output. 
South West (Qld) and Central West (Qld) are estimated to suffer the largest 
proportional reductions in employment in the first year — around 15 per cent, each. 
This equates to around 2 200 and 1 030 persons, respectively. Over the next nine 
years, employment levels in both regions gradually recover. However, over the 
period, employment levels are lower on average by about 500 and 250 persons, 
respectively. 
Australia-wide, employment is estimated to decline by around 44 000 persons in the 
first year, or about 0.5 per cent. Brisbane suffers the largest absolute reduction in 
employment in the first year — around 9  300 persons, or 1.3  per cent of its 
workforce. Moreton (Qld) and Darling Downs (Qld) experience the next largest 
declines in the first year — around 4 500 persons, respectively.  
7.2  The ability of regions to cope with an outbreak 
The ability of a region and community to cope with the economic ‘shock’ from an 
FMD outbreak depends on a multitude of economic and social factors. Although a 
broad generalisation, a community performing well economically and having low 
levels of ‘social disadvantage’ is likely to cope better and recover more quickly 
from an outbreak than an economically and socially disadvantaged region. 
There is no simple measure of ability to cope, in part, because ‘ability to cope’ has 
many dimensions — for example, it could be the capacity of displaced workers to 
quickly find new employment and/or it could refer to the attitude, morale and social 
cohesiveness of the community. 
Notwithstanding this complexity, regions can be compared on the basis of a number 
of socio-economic measures and matched with those identified as likely to be most 
affected by the 12 month FMD outbreak scenario.      





Numerous socioeconomic variables have been used in social impact studies, 
particularly of resource and infrastructure developments (box 7.3). In this study, the 
Commission has profiled the SD regions according to the following three measures: 
recent employment growth; the unemployment rate for persons aged 15 years and 
over; and the ABS Index of Relative Socio-Economic Disadvantage5: 
Profiles for all regions are presented in appendix D, table D.1. The national ranking 
of the 10 regions estimated to be most affected by the 12 month FMD scenario is 
given in table 7.4.  
Table 7.4 Rankinga of socioeconomic variables for regions estimated to 
be most adversely affected by the 12 month FMD scenario 
Regions with largest cumulative 





Index of social 
disadvantage 
 rank  rank  rank 
1. South West (Qld)  45  3  45 
2. Central West (Qld)  49  9  40 
3. Darling Downs (Qld)  23  17  29 
4. Fitzroy (Qld)  18  31  38 
5. Kimberley (WA)  3  6  57 
6. North West (Qld)  32  4  52 
7. Upper Great Southern (WA)  38  1  10 
8. Midlands (WA)  5  11  32 
9. Lower Great Southern (WA)  20  21  27 
10. South East (SA)  42  10  37 
a A ranking of 1 (out of 58) is used for the highest employment growth, the lowest unemployment rate and 
the least relative socioeconomic disadvantage.  
Source: PC estimates. 
                                              
5 The use of such profiling to examine capacity to cope is subject to a number of qualifications. 
First, it cannot be concluded that a region has a high or low capacity to adjust by examining a 
single socioeconomic variable. As noted above, capacity to cope has many dimensions. Thus, it is 
necessary to examine a number of variables together to form an overall picture. Second, there is 
not necessarily a clear-cut relationship between a socioeconomic variable and capacity to cope, 
though some positive or negative relationship may emerge on average over large samples. For 
example, a low unemployment rate may not always indicate a high capacity to adjust. Third, 
because capacity to cope is a multi-dimensional issue, the importance of each variable could be 
different for each region. A technique such as principal components analysis may be required to 
disentangle the relative importance of the variables. Finally, it is not likely that capacity to cope 
can be measured in absolute terms by reference to socioeconomic variables. Rather, it may only 
be possible to compare the relative capacity as between regions, or over time for a single region.      





Box 7.3  Variables used in social impact analysis  
A variety of socioeconomic variables have been used in social impact analysis, 
primarily of resource and infrastructure developments (see, for example, Bowles 1981, 
Hindmarsh et al. 1988 and Burdge 1994). By measuring or predicting changes in the 
socioeconomic variables, as a consequence of a development, some indication of the 
scope and scale of the social impacts may be gained. Looked at another way, it may 
be hypothesised that the socioeconomic variables which have the greatest bearing on 
the scale and scope of the social impacts are the variables which indicate a 
community’s capacity to cope with the shock. While there is no consensus as to which 
socioeconomic variables best measure social impacts (nor the capacity to cope), such 
variables could include the: 
•   growth or decline in regional output, employment and population; 
•   unemployment rate; 
•   degree of structural change from ‘declining’ industries to ‘expanding’ industries; 
•   median income relative to the national average; 
•   educational and skill profile of inhabitants; 
•   extent of housing ownership; 
•   ratio of ‘younger’ population to ‘older’ population; 
•   age of agricultural owner-operators and agricultural workers; 
•   degree of remoteness; and 
•   frequency and scale of ‘shocks’. 
The ABS Index of Relative Social Disadvantage incorporates income levels, 
unemployment, educational qualifications, housing ownership and occupational skills. 
A number of these variables, and others, have been compared for regions of Australia 
(Haberkorn et al. 2000). 
 
 
Employment growth 1986 to 1996 
Regions which are growing are likely to provide greater opportunities for displaced 
workers. On the other hand, it needs to be recognised that regional employment 
growth could be mainly in industries which require different skills to those 
possessed by displaced livestock workers. 
For Australia, employment growth averaged around 1.6 per cent a year between 
1986 and 1996. At the regional level, employment growth ranged from a decline of 
2.2 per cent a year in the Pilbara (WA) to an average increase of 6.1 per cent a year 
in Moreton (Qld).      




Of the 10 regions estimated to be most affected by the 12 month FMD scenario, 
only two of these (both in Western Australia) had above average employment 
growth. This is reflected in the relatively low rankings in table 7.4. 
Unemployment rate 
Putting aside the issue of skill requirements, it is also important to recognise that 
high employment growth in itself is not a sufficient measure of a region’s relative 
capacity to absorb displaced workers, since regions with high employment growth 
could also have high unemployment. For example, areas in south-east Queensland 
have experienced relatively high employment growth, but have also had relatively 
high unemployment rates. Generally, however, regions with relatively high 
unemployment rates are likely to have less capacity to absorb displaced workers. 
At the regional level, unemployment rates in 1996 ranged from 4.3 per cent for the 
Upper Great Southern (WA) region to 14.9 per cent for Wide Bay-Burnett (Qld). 
One-third of regions had rates of 11  per cent and above. For Australia, the 
unemployment rate was 9.2  per cent in 1996. While the national rate of 
unemployment has reduced substantially since then, more recent data at the 
statistical division level are not readily available and it is believed that the regional 
pattern of unemployment remains similar to 1996. 
All 10 of the regions estimated to be most affected by the 12 month FMD scenario 
had below average unemployment rates. This is reflected in the relative high 
rankings in table 7.4. 
ABS Index of Relative Socio-Economic Disadvantage 
Other things being equal, a region which is relatively socially disadvantaged may 
find it more difficult to cope with adverse economic events, such as a ‘shock’ of the 
size induced by an FMD outbreak.  
The ABS has developed an index, with an average standardised at 1 000, of several 
census variables to represent the relative socioeconomic standing of regions (see, 
catalogue 2039.0). The lower the index value, the greater is the relative 
disadvantage. Areas with the greatest relative disadvantage have high proportions of 
low income families, unemployed people, people without educational qualifications, 
households renting public housing and people in low skilled occupations. 
In 1996, the average index values for non-metropolitan regions and metropolitan 
regions were 972 and 1 021, respectively. Index values for remote areas tended to     




be lower than the non-metropolitan average, although some mining regions had 
higher values. 
Of the 10 regions estimated to be most affected by the 12 month FMD scenario, 
nine of these had an index of relative social disadvantage below the Australian 
standard, with five of these below the non-metropolitan standard. This is reflected 
by the relative low rankings in table 7.4. 
Overall comparison of regions and socioeconomic conditions  
Overall, the 10 regions that could be most affected by an outbreak would not be in a 
strong socioeconomic position to absorb major shocks. Although these regions had 
below average unemployment rates a majority had below average employment 
growth and index of social conditions. 
7.3 Farm  level  impacts 
At the farm level, the initial or direct impact of an FMD outbreak would be a loss of 
livestock receipts. For farms outside the control area, the extent of the initial loss 
would depend on: 
•   the dependence of the farm and farm family on livestock activities; 
•   the mix of livestock activities, as beef, sheep, pigs and dairy activities would be 
affected differently (see chapter 6); and 
•   the timing of the closure of export markets compared with the ‘normal’ or 
‘planned’ pattern of sales — this is more of an issue for short outbreaks than for 
long outbreaks. 
The capacity of farm enterprises to cope with a downturn in livestock receipts 
depends, among other things, on their ability to avoid and defer expenditures, the 
capacity to diversify into other activities and the underlying financial strength of the 
farm enterprise, such as the debt-equity ratio. These circumstances differ widely 
between farms.  
To illustrate the effect on farmers, the Commission has estimated the initial impact 
of an FMD outbreak on the ‘average’ farm, the characteristics of which have been 
determined by ABARE using farm level data (box 7.4). Separate profiles of average 
farms are available for: 
•   seven different farm industry types — wheat and crops, mixed livestock and 
crops, sheep, beef, sheep-beef, all broadacre and dairy;     




•   the six States and the Northern Territory; 
•   32 broadacre survey regions; 
•   three agricultural zones — the high rainfall, wheat-sheep and pastoral; and 
•   four farm sizes, based on the value of production. 
Cross tabulations are also available between certain of these categories. For the 
purposes of this study, the Commission has focussed on the differences in impact 
between farm industry types, States and farm sizes.  
 
Box 7.4  Profile of the ‘average’ broadacre farm 
ABARE’s AgSurf database (ABARE 2002a) summarises data from its annual 
Australian Agriculture and Grazing Industries Survey (AAGIS). From this, the 
Commission has calculated the following averages for the years 1997-98 to 1999-00 
for the average broadacre farm: 
 $    $ 
Annual farm net cash  50 191    Total  annual  cash 
receipts 
224 736 
Annual family income  41 350    including sales of:    
of which: off-farm 
income 
19 122    •   Sheep 19  288 
incl: off-farm wages  9 655    •   Beef cattle  53 945 
     •   Livestock transfers  3 187 
Debt 171  605    •   Other livestock  1 458 
Equity  1 133 501    •   Wool 29  845 
Liquid assets  71 112  •   Wheat   52 982 
In interpreting the estimated impacts of an FMD outbreak on the ‘average’ farm, it 
should be noted that there is considerable variability around these averages. For 
example, in the period surveyed, over 20 per cent of broadacre farms had no debt. On 
the other hand, almost 70 per cent of broadacre farms had less than average farm net 
cash income. 
Source: PC estimates based on ABARE (2002a). 
 
 
Estimates of the initial impact on farm cash receipts 
The Commission has confined its analysis to the initial impact on livestock cash 
receipts in the first year following an outbreak. It has not sought to estimate changes     




in farm costs or account for farmer decisions about hold back, stocking rates and 
diversification. 
The initial impact on farm cash receipts for the average farm has been estimated by 
assuming that, in the absence of FMD, receipts would have been the same as 
average annual receipts during the period 1997-98 to 1999-00. Receipts from the 
sale of beef cattle, sheep, other livestock and outward transfers of livestock in the 
first year after an outbreak have been estimated by reducing the base value by the 
estimated percentage reduction in total export and domestic returns attributable to 
FMD. Sales of dairy cattle, dairy products, wool and grains have been excluded. 
Caution is required in interpreting the results, not only because of the simplifying 
assumptions, but also because the outcomes for individual farms could vary 
significantly from those estimated for the average farm. 
Initial impact on cash receipts for different types of farms 
The profile of different types of broadacre farms and the estimated losses in farm 
cash receipts is shown in table 7.5.  
The profiles reveal quite a different pattern of reliance on livestock, for example: 
•   the average broadacre farm had average total annual cash receipts of around 
$225  000 over the 1997-98 to 1999-00 period, of which livestock receipts 
accounted for about $78 000 or 35 per cent, with beef sales representing almost 
70 per cent of this; 
•   the average beef farm had average total annual cash receipts of around $160 000, 
of which livestock receipts accounted for about $141 000 or 88 per cent, with 
beef sales representing around 90 per cent of this; and  
•   the average wheat and other crops farm had average total annual cash receipts of 
around $396 000, of which livestock receipts accounted for about $44 000 or 
11 per  cent, with beef sales representing around half of this. 
These differences in livestock receipts result in considerable differences in 
estimated financial outcomes between farms as a result of an FMD outbreak. For 
the 12 month FMD outbreak scenario, cash receipts for the average broadacre farm 
is estimated to decline, in the first year, by about $58 000 compared with the pre-
FMD level. This represents about one-quarter of the total annual cash receipts of the 
average broadacre farm.      




Table 7.5  Profile of farm cash receipts and the estimated initial impact of 
the FMD scenario, by broadacre farm type 
Average per farm 
  Average 1997-98 to 1999-00   












Estimated loss of 
farm cash receipts 
12 month outbreak 
  no.  $ $ $ $  %
All broadacre  69 730  50 191  77 878  224 736  58 200  26
Wheat & crops  14 362  104 109  43 777  395 945  30 900  8
Mixed livestock & crops  17 489  54 153  61 472  244 989  43 000  18
Sheep  11 929  21 763  48 754  145 180  32 300  22
Beef  17 416  34 868  141 175  160 496  112 500  70
Sheep-beef  8 452  23 351  79 553  137 329  59 400  43
a Farm net cash income is measured as total cash receipts less total cash costs. Cash receipts include sales 
of products and other revenue such as rebates, insurance claims and government assistance payments. Cash 
costs includes payments for materials and services and other cash costs such as livestock purchases, lease 
payments and interest. It excludes capital and household expenditures (see ABARE 2001b, pp. 44–6). 
Source: PC estimates based on ABARE (2002a).  
In contrast, the initial impact of the 12 month outbreak scenario on cash receipts in 
the first year for the average beef farm is about double ($112 500) the broadacre 
average. In absolute terms, the fall in receipts is least in the case of the average 
wheat and other crops farm, with an initial reduction of about half the broadacre 
average ($30 900). In proportionate terms, the loss for the average beef farm is 
around 70 per cent of total farm receipts, compared with around 26 per cent for the 
average broadacre farm. (The average, excluding beef farms, is around 16 per cent.) 
Although not shown in the table, the estimated impact on the average broadacre 
farm in the case of the 3 month and 6 month outbreak scenarios is a decline in first 
year cash receipts of around $40 000 and $48 000, respectively. As noted above, the 
‘normal’ timing of sales relative to the specific months during which export markets 
are closed as a result of an FMD outbreak of 3 or 6  months duration would 
influence the outcome for any particular farm. As the Commission’s estimates 
assume ‘normal’ sales will be adversely affected to the full extent, they can be 
considered upper limits. 
The estimated impact for the 3 and 6 month scenarios on the different farm types 
follows the pattern at the broadacre level. That is, losses under the 3 month scenario 
are about 70  per cent of the losses under the 12  month scenario while, for the 
6 month scenario, the impact is about 83 per cent of the 12 month scenario.     




Initial impact on cash receipts for farms in the States and Northern Territory 
The estimated initial impact from the 12 month FMD outbreak scenario on cash 
receipts in the first year for the average broadacre farm in each State and the 
Northern Territory is shown in table 7.6. In absolute terms, the impact for both the 
Northern Territory ($647 400) and Queensland ($127 500) is significantly above the 
national average of about $58 000. This reflects the much larger size of properties 
and also the greater dependence on beef.  
Table 7.6  Profile of farm cash receipts and estimated initial impact of the 
12 month FMD scenario, by State and Northern Territory 
Average per broadacre farm 
  Average 1997-98 to 1999-00   












Estimated loss of farm 
cash receipts
12 month outbreak
  no. $ $ $ $ %
Australia  69 730  50 191  77 878  224 736  58 200  26
NSW  23 206  46 943  67 677  212 318  49 800  23
Vic  15 810  27 518  48 302  140 365  34 300  24
Qld  11 549  53 785  160 902  243 419  127 500  52
SA  8 479  60 524  49 489  217 189  34 600  16
WA  9 185  82 779  60 879  379 458  42 300  11
Tas  1 300  30 468  72 887  151 874  55 300  36
NT 201  185  017  810 012  902 756  647 400  72
a Farm net cash income is measured as total cash receipts less total cash costs. Cash receipts include sales 
of products and other revenue such as rebates, insurance claims and government assistance payments. Cash 
costs includes payments for materials and services and other cash costs such as livestock purchases, lease 
payments and interest. It excludes capital and household expenditures (see ABARE 2001b, pp. 44–6). 
Source: PC estimates based on ABARE (2002a). 
In proportionate terms, the average broadacre farm in the Northern Territory is 
estimated to suffer the greatest impact, with total farm receipts falling by 72 per 
cent. Queensland and Tasmania are the other States where the proportionate fall is 
greater than the national average of 26 per cent. The share of total farm receipts 
accounted for by livestock receipts is higher in these States and Territory. 
Initial impact on cash receipts for different size farms 
The estimated initial impact on cash receipts, in the first year, for different size 
broadacre farms, is shown in table 7.7.     




While, as expected, the absolute impact is greater for the larger farms, the smaller 
farms suffer more in relative terms. This is because a greater proportion of total 
receipts on smaller farms are accounted for by livestock receipts. For example, for 
the average broadacre farm earning less than $100  000 in total cash receipts, 
livestock receipts accounted for 54 per cent, while the average broadacre farm in the 
largest category derived only 27 per cent from livestock receipts. Two-thirds of all 
broadacre farms in Australia were in the two smallest categories.  
Table 7.7  Profile of farm cash receipts and estimated initial impact of 
FMD, by broadacre farm size 
Average per farm 
  Average 1997-98 to 1999-00   
 
 













Estimated loss of farm 
cash receipts
12 month outbreak
 no.  $  $  $  $  %
All farms  69 730  50 191  77 878  224 736  58 200  26
< $100 000  32 414  3 453  29 108  53 560  21 900  41
$100 000 – $200 000  14 670  30 012  56 979  146 818  41 400  28
$200 001 – $400 000  12 527  72 039  84 969  287 476  61 600  21
> $400 000  9 318  194 925  199 491  746 726  149 700  20
a Farm size is measured as annual cash receipts plus build-up in trading stocks.  b Farm net cash income is 
measured as total cash receipts less total cash costs. Cash receipts include sales of products and other 
revenue such as rebates, insurance claims and government assistance payments. Cash costs includes 
payments for materials and services and other cash costs such as livestock purchases, lease payments and 
interest. It excludes capital and household expenditures (see ABARE 2001b, pp. 44–6). 
Source: PC estimates based on ABARE (2002a). 
Financial strength of farms and capacity to cope 
The ability of farm enterprises and farm families to cope with the impact of an FMD 
outbreak on farm cash receipts depends on the capacity to draw from other sources 
of finance and income and to adjust (discretionary) farm and household 
expenditure.  
The main sources of cash in lieu of livestock receipts are debt financing, liquid 
assets and off-farm income. Diversified enterprises may be able to bring forward 
some sales, but this would be at the expense of future receipts. Revenue from 
diversifying into activities would only be available in the medium to longer term, 
and would generally involve increased operating costs and some establishment 
costs.     




Rather than seek ways of replacing the loss of livestock receipts, some farmers may 
decide to exit. However, any short-term decline in property value may constrain the 
option of exit. 
Comparison of farm debt and family income across farm types 
The financial strength of different farm types and the associated farm family is 
profiled in table 7.8. 
Debt and equity 
The average debt level for broadacre farms was about $172 000 over the period 
1997-98 to 1999-00, or over three times the average annual net cash income for 
broadacre farms. The average equity was over $1 million and the average debt to 
equity ratio was around 20 per cent. Many broadacre farms were better placed than 
this — more than half of broadacre farms had debt to equity ratios of less than 
12  per   cent, including more than one-fifth which were debt free. At the other 
extreme, around 7 per cent of farms had debt to equity ratios of over 65 per cent.  
The farm type estimated to suffer the largest impact on cash receipts from an FMD 
outbreak — beef — had the lowest average level of debt (around $114 000) and a 
debt-equity ratio slightly less than the broadacre average. The farm type estimated 
to suffer the least impact on cash receipts from an FMD outbreak — wheat and 
other crops — had the highest average level of debt (around $255 000) and the 
highest debt to equity ratio (31 per cent). 
Overall, this broad profile suggests that a number of broadacre farms have equity 
holdings which could permit increased borrowing, if necessary, although debt-
equity positions would be set-back. For example, assuming no change in the capital 
value, the debt to equity ratio of the average broadacre farm would increase from 
around 20 to 27 per cent if the level of debt was extended in the first year to fully 
cover the estimated impact on cash receipts of a 12 month outbreak. For those farms 
with debt to equity ratios significantly higher than the average and/or experiencing 
cash flow reductions much greater than the average, farm long-term viability could 
become more precarious. 
  
 
Table 7.8  Profile of debt and income, by farm type 
Average per farm 
  Average 1997-98 to 1999-00   






























  $  % $ $  % $ $  $ 
All broadacre  171 605  20 71  112  19 122  51  41 350  50 191  58 200 
             
Wheat and other crops  254 988  31 81  087  17 126  50  65 071  104 109  30 900 
Mixed livestock and crops  203 176  18 63  600  15 091  58  39 088  54 154  43 100 
Sheep 140  917  20 62  203  18 017  56  26 730  21 763  32 300 
Beef 114  053  19 71  900  26 329  45  41 251  34 868  112 500 
Sheep-beef 126  366  18 79  474  17 729  47  27 577  23 351  59 400 
a Farm liquid assets are defined as assets owned by the farm enterprise which can be readily converted to cash (such as savings bank deposits and shares). It 
excludes real estate, life assurance policies and other farms or businesses. b Off-farm income is defined as income of the owner manager and spouse from wages, 
other businesses, investment and social welfare payments. c Total family income is the family share of farm cash income (less depreciation) plus off-farm income. 
The family share of farm cash income is the ownership share of the owner manager, spouse and dependent children.  
Source: PC estimates based on ABARE (2002a).     




In practice, the option of extending debt depends upon the attitude of finance 
providers (such as banks), particularly their perception of long-term viability. In this 
context, any decline in property values in the short term because of an FMD 
outbreak will increase existing debt-equity ratios. However, in principle, anticipated 
long-term cash flow and debt servicing capability should be more important to 
prospective lenders. 
Farm family income and liquid assets  
The income of farm families comes from both farm and non-farm sources. Annual 
family income for the average broadacre farm was $41 350 for the period 1997-98 
to 1999-00. Annual off-farm income averaged about $19 100, or about 46 per cent 
of total family income.  
The impact of an FMD outbreak on farm family income depends upon the split 
between farm and off-farm sources and the extent to which an outbreak adversely 
affects these two sources. Total family annual income varies significantly between 
farm types, ranging from about $26  700 for sheep farms to about $65  000 for 
wheat-crops farms. However, off-farm income is very similar across the farm types 
— in the range $15 000 to $18 000, except for beef (about $26 000) — suggesting 
that most of the variation in family income is due to differences in farm 
performance. Thus, beef farm families are likely to be the most exposed to an FMD 
outbreak because beef enterprises are estimated to be affected most in terms of cash 
receipts. 
About half of off-farm income is earned from wages. Whether this income is at risk 
during an outbreak of FMD would depend upon the regional flow-on effects to non-
livestock industries from which wages are drawn and whether employment is on a 
permanent or temporary basis. An FMD outbreak could reduce some local job 
opportunities — for example, a decline in business could force local suppliers of 
farm inputs to lay-off staff. On the other hand, employment opportunities in some 
other activities could rise, especially in the infected regions. For example, in the 
UK, farm families in the infected zones were offered payment to assist with 
eradication and control, while the short-term influx of emergency personnel may 
stimulate additional employment in accommodation and food supply activities. In 
uninfected regions, such short-term opportunities do not arise and increased 
employment opportunities may only emerge over the longer-term — for example, 
the exchange rate is estimated to depreciate slightly under the 12  month FMD 
scenario, and this may increase employment in local export and import competing 
activities.     




To the extent that family cash income from the farm enterprise and off-farm 
employment is insufficient to meet needs, families may have to draw upon reserve 
assets. Assets owned by the farm such as savings bank deposits and shares averaged 
about $71 000 a year for the period 1997-98 to 1999-00 for the average broadacre 
farm. There was little variation across farm types.      
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8 Social  impacts 
The previous chapters have focussed on outlining the economic impacts of an FMD 
outbreak. This chapter outlines the social impacts.   
At the individual and family level, the social impacts could range from strains on 
family relationships that are normally associated with adverse events and loss, 
through to severe mental disorders. At the community level, the impacts could 
range from a breakdown of normal community activities in the midst of quarantine 
and movement restrictions, to the changes in interpersonal relationships affecting 
the longer-term cohesion of the community.   
Social impacts are, by their nature, difficult to quantify, even when the scope and 
scale of an FMD outbreak and the necessary control measures are known. However, 
evidence from previous livestock disease outbreaks, and natural and other disasters 
suggests that there would be significant social impacts. In outlining and discussing 
these impacts, the Commission has drawn on evidence from previous experiences, 
in particular: 
•   the 1999 Newcastle Disease outbreak in the Mangrove Mountain area of NSW;   
•   the mid to late 1990s outbreak of Ovine Johne’s Disease (OJD) in south east 
Australia;  
•   the 1997 outbreak of anthrax in Victoria; and   
•   the outbreak of FMD in the UK during 2001.   
A summary of these outbreaks is provided in appendix B.   
While many social impacts would flow from the pervasive effects associated with 
the loss of export market revenue, others would result directly from the measures 
undertaken to control the spread of FMD within Australia and its elimination. As 
indicated in chapter  2, those control measures would divide the population and 
country into three areas, namely:   
1.  restricted areas: These would be areas containing all properties with known 
infections, properties that had contact with them either directly or indirectly 
through transfer of personnel, animals, etc and properties within a buffer zone 
around infected properties, whether or not they were involved in livestock 
production. The people on these properties would be directly affected by strict     




quarantine restrictions which would apply until all susceptible animals and 
animal products were destroyed, infected properties decontaminated and there 
was no longer any evidence of the disease. The number of people in such areas is 
not likely to be large, but the control measures are likely to have significant 
effects on them and on those involved in applying the quarantine measures;  
2.  control areas: In these areas, people would be affected by movement restrictions 
designed to control the movement of susceptible livestock and by 
epidemiological surveillance undertaken to confirm the disease–free status of 
flocks and herds within them. Until the restricted areas are more accurately 
delineated, the number of people initially affected could be quite large. The 
movement controls would mainly affect livestock producers and others involved 
in the transport of livestock and livestock products, but all travel into and out of 
the area would be affected. However, the effect on individuals would be small 
relative to quarantine measures; and   
3.  balance of Australia: Most people in the remainder of Australia would be largely 
unaffected by FMD control measures. However, in the first instance, all people 
involved in the livestock industries would be directly affected by the trade 
effects of the disease. To some extent, those in the related upstream input supply 
and downstream processing industries would also be affected. As outlined in 
chapter 3, the loss of export markets which would accompany an outbreak of 
FMD would sharply lower livestock prices and have pervasive effects on the 
livestock industries in all regions of Australia. This would be a distinguishing 
feature of an FMD outbreak relative to other disease outbreaks that have 
occurred previously in Australia. It would also be a distinguishing feature of an 
FMD outbreak in Australia relative to many other countries where there is less 
dependence on FMD-free export markets.  
The next section outlines the impact of lower livestock prices and FMD control 
measures on different groups in the community. This is followed in the second 
section by an outline of factors influencing individual responses and mental health 
effects.   
8.1  Lower livestock prices and FMD control measures 
The social impacts of lower livestock prices and FMD control measures vary 
between groups in the community. Livestock producers are clearly the most 
affected by the fall in livestock prices. The FMD control measures also affect a 
wider range of groups, including: farm families; other businesses; and the personnel 
implementing the control policy and delivering support. The functioning of local 
communities would also be impacted by the control measures and, more generally, 
uncertainty would be pervasive (box 8.1).       
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An indication of the social impacts on each of these groups follows.   
 
Box 8.1  Uncertainty in an FMD outbreak   
Uncertainty increases stresses and impedes an individual’s ability to cope with 
traumatic events. Uncertainty was pervasive in the OJD outbreak:   
Uncertainty about the disease, uncertainty about diagnosis and uncertainty about the future 
are all factors that make OJD distressing. One witness described it as ‘living on the knife’s 
edge’. The situation is particularly difficult for those under suspicion and surveillance. It is 
also stressful for those restocking. Farmers fear that, ‘If we missed the signs of OJD the first 
time, how can we guarantee that we will not miss them again and start the whole cycle all 
over?’.  (ENRC 2000, p. 249)   
In an FMD outbreak, uncertainty would relate to:   
•   market effects — eg, how long will markets be closed and how reflective of next 
seasons prices are current prices;   
•   income effects — eg, the availability of short-term cash flow and the duration of 
expected impacts on cash flow from market closures;  
•   scientific aspects of the disease — eg, how it started, how it spreads, the possibility 
of recurrence, the role of livestock farmers in the initial outbreak, and the role of 
livestock farmers and public authorities in the spread and elimination of the disease; 
and   
•   governmental effects — eg, the timing and extent of Government financial 
assistance and the effectiveness and consistency of policy interventions designed to 
control the spread of the disease.   
Uncertainty would be highest early in the outbreak prior to knowledge about the extent 
of the outbreak and control measures being established.   
 
 
Impact of lower prices on livestock producers 
An indication of the impact of lower livestock prices on farm cash receipts and of 
the financial capacity of farmers to withstand adverse short-term events has been 
provided in chapter  7. The available information suggests that there would be 
significant financial impacts for all livestock producers. The size of the impact 
would call into question the continued viability of some farmers. This is particularly 
likely to be the case where an FMD outbreak exacerbates existing longer-term 
trends.   
For some producers, the financial impacts will be ameliorated by compensation. 
The AUSVETPLAN provides for compensation for farmers whose livestock are 
slaughtered for control purposes. A similar policy applies in the UK. In reviewing 
the recent UK FMD outbreak, the Haskins Committee found that farmers whose     




stock were eradicated and who received compensation were often in a better 
financial position than those farmers with healthy herds, but who were unable to 
trade. It said:  
For those who have lost their stock, there has been an emotional as well as an economic 
impact — though the latter has been mitigated by the Government’s compensation 
scheme ... They are using the [compensation] for a variety of purposes — to restock, to 
modernise assets, and to reduce stretched balance sheets. They have also been paid for 
the lengthy clean-up of their premises after the disease.  
The essential restriction on livestock movements has created problems for those 
livestock farms in affected areas which were not culled-out. Economically, those 
farmers who have not lost their stock, but are unable to move them for sale or to other 
grassland, have probably suffered more — and their situation is now precarious as the 
winter approaches. (Haskins 2001, pp. 5–6)  
For farmers whose livestock are slaughtered, the compensation arrangements would 
not offset all the additional costs incurred, nor the other social impacts. 
Doubts concerning the continued viability of farming operations would increase 
demands for financial advice, and farm advisory and agricultural counselling 
services. The lower property prices would most likely occur concurrently with the 
lower livestock prices, which would add to the difficulty of those contemplating 
leaving agriculture.   
Impact of control measures on farm families  
Farm families in the restricted area would have their everyday lives severely 
affected by the quarantine measures imposed to contain FMD. All travel from the 
restricted area would involve passing through quarantine barriers. The measures 
would effectively separate them from the balance of the community until there was 
no longer any sign of the disease. If the infection was discovered on their property, 
or if there had been contact with infected animals or premises, all of the farm 
family’s susceptible livestock would be destroyed. This would be followed by 
extensive decontamination procedures.   
Previous studies of disease outbreaks have highlighted the social impacts of control 
measures resulting from the nature of the livestock eradication; the loss of control 
experienced; and any associated stigma and loss of sense of purpose.       
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Nature of livestock eradication  
Eradication involves the elimination of herds and flocks which farm families have 
established and improved over many years. As reported to the Northumberland Foot 
and Mouth Inquiry about the recent UK FMD outbreak:  
The Foot and Mouth outbreak was a traumatic time for farmers. Farming is generally a 
family business, which has been passed from father to son for generations. Because of 
this crisis, many farmers have lost all their lives’ work. Farmers and their families were 
devastated when they were told that their animals were to be slaughtered. (Dower 2001, 
p. 85)  
Witnessing the destruction of livestock could add to the distress for some. As 
reported to the Victorian Parliamentary inquiry into the control of OJD: 
The most shattering time of all was when the lambs that were too young to go to 
slaughter had to be destroyed on the farm. The [Victorian Department of Natural 
Resources and Environment] arranged for a dead stock removalist to come and destroy 
them and cart them away. We were horrified to see them herded into a small pen and 
then shot. There was blood everywhere and the poor lambs were climbing over the 
dead ones stacked five deep. It was heartbreaking to see our sheep treated in such a 
way. We could hear the lambs bleating even after leaving the sheep yards, no longer 
able to watch. (ENRC 2000, p. 244)  
In its review of the UK FMD outbreak, the Northumberland Foot and Mouth 
Inquiry was given evidence indicating that the manner in which the decision to 
eradicate was taken sometimes added to farmer distress:  
The distress was increased by the way that decisions were made, the uncertainties 
involved and (for some farmers) the sense that their sacrifice of animals was 
unnecessary … There were cases when farmers were coerced into allowing a cull 
before test results came through, they were told that if they resisted the farm would be 
declared an “Infected Premises” and their neighbours would then be culled too … To 
many farmers it was heartbreaking to have their animals culled. Most would agree that 
if infection was present, this had to be done, but to discover afterwards that there was 
no infection made it a doubly cruel blow. (Dower 2001, p. 86)  
Loss of control 
Adding to the distress for farmers in the restricted areas would be the loss of control 
of operations on their farm. Decisions would be made about their livestock and 
property with little, if any, consultation with them. In addition to feelings of anxiety 
and grief, personal lack of control can lead to feelings of hopelessness, anger, 
frustration and injustice, often directed at individuals and institutions implementing 
the control strategy. For example, as the Victorian Parliamentary inquiry into the 
control of OJD reported:       




I was really feeling as if I had got on top of the worst things that have ever happened to 
me in my 45 years on the farm — that was the drought and the flood and the sickness 
— and then came OJD. I found that was the most stressful thing in my life — not the 
OJD but the monster that was handling it and what it had turned into. It was like big 
brother telling you that you were under his control, and I could not handle that. I had 
had enough. (ENRC 2000, p. 247)  
This suggests that the manner with which authorities approach control can have a 
significant impact on the stress it creates.   
Stigma and loss of sense of purpose   
Some of the effects of FMD on farmers and their families would be of an intangible 
and personal nature. For example, the Victorian Parliamentary Committee found 
that a common theme in the testimonials to the OJD inquiry was the ensuing sense 
of personal failure, the sense of isolation (for example, either self-initiated social 
withdrawal or withdrawal in response to community tensions), the sense of injustice 
(usually related to eradication and financial compensation issues), some loss of 
reputation and/or the loss of identity and dignity. For example, it reported that:  
A powerful theme to emerge from the transcripts was the profound sense of stigma 
associated with identification of farmers who test positive to OJD or who are ‘suspect’ 
and put ‘under surveillance’ for the disease. One farmer spoke of feeling like a “leper”, 
another “a criminal” and another a sense of being put under “house arrest”. (ENRC 
2000, p. 246)  
Farmers and farming families identify themselves strongly with their farms. In some 
cases these farms have been in the family for generations. As one community 
counsellor said, the loss of their flocks or quarantine can destroy ‘The meaning in 
people’s lives — people who have put their whole lives into the development of their 
flocks and so on, their whole purpose of being and living’. (ENRC 2000, p. 247)  
A normally jovial friend of mine said it was embarrassing to go into town as people 
would take a wide berth around him as though he had the disease. (ENRC 2000, p. 261)  
Impacts of control measures on other businesses   
The financial stresses from an FMD outbreak would be felt by many others as 
farmers responded to an FMD outbreak by reducing investments and expenditures. 
In relation to the UK outbreak of FMD, the Institute of Rural Health’s survey of 
service providers, undertaken roughly two months after the initial outbreak, found 
that:  
•   the situation is having a health impact not only on farmers and their families, but 
other rural businesses and the staff that are dealing with practicalities of the 
situation; and       
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•   for non-farming businesses the majority of enquires are for advice related to a loss 
of income and this is causing stress. (Deaville and Jones 2001, p. 8)  
It considered that:  
For non-farming small businesses … This includes worries about existing debts, 
preventing debt, meeting mortgage and other loan repayments. (Deaville and Jones 
2001, p. 3)  
Later, the Haskins Committee reported that:  
The agricultural service industries, including transport, engineering and supply, have 
been hit hard by the outbreak, but they, too, have found short-term work opportunities 
in cleaning up premises on behalf of the Government.  
The tourist trade, after the dreadful experience of the spring and early summer, have 
benefited from a recovery in business during the past three months, except, of course, 
for those in areas where visitor movements are still restricted.  
The substantial influx of government employees has boosted parts of the local hotel and 
restaurant trade.  
As a result, unemployment levels in the county remain low, and there appears to have 
been no significant increases in social security claims. (Haskins 2001, p. 6)  
The effects on the Australian tourism industry could be relatively minor. It is not as 
integrated with the agricultural industries as occurs in the UK.  However, the 
location of any outbreak and its associated control measures in relation to the 
normal movement of people to popular destinations would be influential to any 
associated social, as well as economic impacts (see section 5.3).  
An associated downturn in many rural and regional businesses would create 
adjustment difficulties similar to those faced by farmers. This could increase 
demands on existing social welfare programs and agencies.   
Impacts of control measures on those implementing the control 
strategy and delivering support   
In an FMD outbreak, the demands on emergency service personnel (for example, 
veterinarians, police, etc) and others responding to the outbreak would be driven by 
the needs of the control strategy. Reflecting the need to move quickly to control the 
spread of the disease, much of this would be associated with implementing 
movement controls, setting up quarantine barriers and eradication work of known 
and suspected infected flocks and herds.  
In reporting on the conduct of the UK FMD outbreak, the Institute of Rural Health 
observed that:     




These agencies [Farming Unions, the Country Landowners Association, the Royal 
Agricultural Benevolent Institution and veterinary surgeons] have noted that staff are 
working very long hours often 7 days per week (and in many cases have been doing so 
for the last 8 weeks). Office staff in one veterinary practice are regularly working 8am 
to 6:30pm, 7 days per week. (Deaville and Jones 2001, p. 3)  
… there are real concerns regarding the work pressure on staff such as veterinary 
surgeons, farming union officials and others involved in tackling this situation. Long 
hours combined with very stressful situations and responsibilities is having an impact 
which may become more evident once the immediate situation is over. (Deaville and 
Jones 2001, p. 8)   
In a submission to the Victorian OJD inquiry, the Victorian Department of Natural 
Resources and Environment highlighted the pressures on its staff. It said:  
The enormity of the responsibility for delivering bad news and terminating farm 
enterprises, has had an effect … A major issue for staff was the loss of esteem and 
respect of farm families and communities. That extended in some cases to the loss of 
professional relationships or personal friendships that had existed for decades. (ENRC 
2000, pp. 253–4)  
The Department noted that people implementing or enforcing the control strategy 
may have limited ability to control outcomes, and may experience intensely 
emotional situations when carrying out their responsibilities:  
Another issue was the shared trauma and emotional pain of implementing policy, of 
repeatedly observing the affects such as anxiety, tears, depression, anger, the disruption 
of family and neighbourly relations, witnessing and/or conducting the mass destruction 
of lambs on some farms was an added stress … The stress has resulted from the 
conflicting pressures of attempting to implement policy and at the same time minimise 
the damage to farm enterprises. (ENRC 2000, pp. 253–4) 
Indeed, the Institute of Rural Health’s survey found that staff of agencies offering 
practical support were inevitably required to offer emotional support:  
While some farmers are contacting helplines such as the Community Advice and 
Listening Line and the Samaritans it appears that it is the agencies offering practical 
information and support … that are receiving the most calls and are then finding 
themselves offering emotional support. (Deaville and Jones 2001, p. 6)  
In the event of an outbreak, added financial stress would be placed on many 
volunteer organisations in the vicinity of the outbreak. In addition, their capacity to 
hold functions to raise money, at a time when there would be increased demand for 
their services, would be restricted.      
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Impacts on families  
An FMD outbreak would increase stress on both parents and children. For example, 
in their consultancy report to the Victorian Parliamentary inquiry into the control of 
OJD, Hood and Seedsman observed that:  
… we see families splitting up, people not allowed on their properties for fear of 
spreading OJD, attempted suicides, children singled out at school and families having 
uncertain times. (Hood and Seedsman 2000, p. 15)  
Previous disease outbreaks indicate that the aspects of an FMD outbreak most likely 
to disrupt the lives of children living on infected properties could be:   
•   the process of eradication (possibly including pet animals);   
•   quarantine and movement restrictions which interrupt normal activities (for 
example, reduced attendance at school or reduced participation in recreational 
activities with other children);   
•   potential conflict with other children, especially where those children reflect 
parental conflict in the community (for example, where infected farmers are 
blamed for the outbreak and the impacts on the rest of the community); and 
•   parental stresses.   
For other children, the cancellation of recreational activities and parental stresses 
could be the most prominent sources of disruption.  
FMD control measures could disrupt learning, even where schools are not formally 
closed. During the UK FMD outbreak, for example, few schools were closed, but 
during the height of the outbreak farmers’ children often stayed away from school 
as children themselves, their parents and teachers were all anxious to avoid the risk 
of spreading the disease. The effects of stresses on children were often witnessed by 
teachers. For example, the Northumberland Foot and Mouth Inquiry reported that:  
Teaching staff were expressing concerns about the emotional trauma and stress the 
children were experiencing as a result of Foot and Mouth Disease … Teachers were 
concerned by what children had witnessed … some had experienced the trauma of 
having their pet animals culled, the social isolation of families and the high levels of 
stress that the adults were experiencing. In one school, children were burying the toy 
farm animals in the sand tray. … 
I think for all the children who were affected it was the level of anxiety, the bad 
dreams, the nightmares, the need for physical comfort, a hand to hold, reassurance. 
They became more clingy. Some needed to talk, some would not talk, their insecurity 
was evident and it affected their ability to learn. (Dower 2001, p. 99)      




In comparative studies of children following the Ash Wednesday Bushfires, the 
Mental Health Research and Evaluation Centre of the South Australian Health 
Commission reported that: 
There were nearly twice as many children with major problems 8 months after the fire 
in contrast to the 2 month study when no gross effect on behaviour could be shown. … 
in the 2  month study, the children’s disturbances appeared to manifest as physical 
symptoms such as headache and abdominal pain. There was little understanding of the 
psychological relevance of these symptoms.  
… Most of the children who had significant problems at 8  months after the fire 
continued to have them 2 years later. The teachers were generally unable to identify 
these children, although their psychological difficulties were a major source of 
absenteeism from school. … Thus many of the problems do not simply resolve with 
time. 
… The psychological impact of the disaster on the child’s parents was the strongest 
predictor of problems in the children. Post-traumatic disorder in the parent, present in 
32 per cent two years after, has substantial adverse effects upon the child, emphasising 
the importance and early detection and treatment of disaster related psychological 
morbidity in adults. (Clayer et al. 1985, pp. 31–2)   
For children, particularly, it appears that the effects of the control measures could 
persist long after the disease has been eliminated.  
Impacts on communities   
Types of impacts   
The controls associated with an FMD outbreak could result in significant 
disruptions to community activities in and around the restricted areas. For example, 
in previous disease outbreaks the disruptions included:  
•   cancellation of recreational activities;  
•   increase in travel times and frustration;  
•   delays in the provision of care and other services provided in-home;  
•   reductions in normal social interactions; and  
•   impacts on the quality, quantity and timeliness of the provision of education, 
health, child care and other services.  
Such disruptions could create new divisions and alliances within communities and 
exacerbate old tensions. In the OJD and Newcastle Disease outbreaks, new or 
increased tensions were evidenced between:  
•   infected farmers and other farmers;      
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•   farmers and others in the community; and  
•   those exercising government policy, farmers and the remainder of the 
community.  
The conflict and tensions could have many dimensions and be pervasive. For 
example, in reporting on the control of OJD, the Victorian Parliamentary inquiry 
observed that:  
The hostility and suspicion to which some farmers were subjected because of OJD has 
impacted on other community members and their families. The Committee was given 
anecdotal evidence of children being harassed at school because their parents’ sheep 
had OJD. (ENRC 2000, p. 252)  
It reported a witness as stating that:   
The large number of my cases have been about depression and anxiety for the future. It 
does not only concern farmers; it concerns other business people in the community. As 
you would appreciate, anxiety in families reaches down to the children, which in turn 
reaches out into the schools. (ENRC 2000, p. 253)  
Discussions with the NSW Farmers Federation and Chicken Growers Council 
Limited elicited the view that, even though the effects of the Newcastle Disease 
outbreak could be small compared to an FMD outbreak, the impacts on the 
Mangrove Mountain community were substantial. For example:   
•   movement restrictions made movements of other products (such as citrus) more 
difficult, causing friction amongst farmer groups;  
•   there were conspiracy theories within the community and a degree of paranoia. 
Actions such as confiscating chicken sandwiches from kids at school bus 
checkpoints fuelled these emotions;  
•   farmer’s kids were bullied at school and spat on in the playground; and  
•   the outbreak left significant divisions within the community. Two years later the 
Government is still assisting with efforts to ‘heal’ community divisions. 
Many examples of this type of conflict were reported by the NSW Department of 
Community Services:   
Why should chicken farmers who appear to be wealthy, get special assistance when the 
rest have to suffer? … The farming community has for years lived with natural 
disasters which destroy weeks/years of work and income and yet when it happens to 
chicken growers it is somehow so much more of a disaster. Welcome to the real world, 
why don’t we all get this support when it hails? (NSW Department of Community 
Services 2000, p. 40)  
When the Mangrove Mountain community was surveyed and asked about the 
biggest impacts on the community, two main themes emerged: firstly, the     




importance of the financial impact on those directly affected, and the flow-on of the 
impact to other businesses and individuals in the local area; and, secondly, the 
development of divisions within the community.   
The Victorian Parliamentary inquiry reported that:   
One farmer summed up the effects of the Victorian OJD Control Program on his 
community, and the consequences of the loss of social cohesion, “With regard to the 
social impacts of the strategies implemented from December 1996 I can only say that 
there would be no other issue that has virtually destroyed the unity of our rural 
community [in East Gippsland]. Families have been shamed and farming groups and 
regions bitterly divided … Without social cohesion communities become unworkable 
and fail”.  (ENRC 2000, p. 261) 
Factors underlying conflict   
The effects of an outbreak on individuals, both lasting and transitional, could put 
strains on community relationships, particularly where there are pre-existing 
tensions. Some conflict following major traumatic events is not unexpected and is 
part of the psychological processes which individuals and communities go through 
in response to the event (box 8.2).  
There can be tension between pre-existing and emerging relationships and 
institutions as recovery from the traumatic event requires adaptation to the ‘new 
reality’. Conflict is abetted by a lack of understanding of the event and its causes, 
uncertainty for the future, and a reduced sense of control over one’s life. The 
observed divisiveness in the OJD and Newcastle Disease outbreaks may also be the 
result of a lack of understanding of the diseases and their effects. For example, the 
Victorian Parliamentary inquiry reported that:  
In some districts the Victorian OJD Control Program has caused social division. This 
has been, in part, because of different attitudes to destocking. As staff of the 
Department of Natural Resources and Environment said, “Those who had experienced 
clinical effects of the disease … were more prepared than those who had not [to 
eradicate] because the latter group could not yet see the impact of the disease on the 
viability of their sheep enterprise. This led to affected producers having had two 
distinct but opposite views, each valid [for them]”.  (ENRC 2000, p. 260)       
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Box 8.2  Community responses to natural disasters   
Impact phase. The network of relations and bonds that exist before the disaster, provide the 
infrastructure for absorbing and responding to warnings. The first effect is an intensification 
of [existing] bonds … When the disaster strikes, however, this usually gives way to simple 
survival … The relationships that existed before, disappear momentarily … this moment of 
impact involves a generalised suspension of bonds, or in other words, there is a short period 
in which a process of de-bonding occurs.   
Response phase. Almost immediately, however, the community fabric reasserts itself … as 
soon as de-bonding is experienced, the response is a massive drive to re-establish bonds … 
Because everyone has been through the same experience, they all have something in 
common that they previously did not have. Intense camaraderie develops … It has been 
variously described as euphoria, a high or honeymoon phase … Unfortunately this does not 
take account of pre-disaster history, where many people neither liked, respected nor cared 
for each other … [the honeymoon phase lasts for a short period of time before] the natural 
requirement for all human groups to structure themselves as a set of complex sub-systems 
asserts itself. This can be called a process of differentiation since it involves the break-up of 
the previously undifferentiated group.     
Recovery phase. The process of differentiation indicates the onset of the recovery phase 
proper. The community is no longer functioning on an emergency basis. It is often a period 
of turmoil and confusion … the pre-disaster community structures naturally reassert 
themselves … However, the situation is radically changed by the disaster. Every element of 
the community is challenged with the task of adaptation to the new circumstances. Some will 
be well-suited, others not. A variety of new tensions will rise.   
People bond more closely to those who have had similar experiences and feel somewhat 
alienated from those who have not … The need for people to differentiate from each other is 
served by negative emotions such as anger, envy, resentment, competition, and these can 
all be seen in the post-disaster community … However, these feelings serve the essential 
purpose of differentiation leading to reorganisation of community structures.   
Source:  Wraith and Gordon 1988. 
 
 
It also reported that inadequate consultation appeared to have contributed to a 
culture of blame:   
Lack of, or inadequate, consultation with most of those affected, while a few were more 
thoroughly consulted, has added to this source of division … The ‘culture of blame’ 
described earlier as affecting individuals also has an impact on communities. It affects 
the trust and goodwill between people that has been shown to be particularly important 
to communities. (ENRC 2000, p. 261)   
Similarly, in the UK FMD outbreak the Institute of Rural Health reported that:   
Interviewees expressed a concern related to the ‘blame culture’ that is emerging. There 
appears to be increased conflict within the farming community but also between 
farming and non-farming organisations affected by this situation. (Deaville and Jones 
2001, p. 4)       




Positive community impacts   
While the significant negative community impacts have been highlighted, there is 
also evidence from previous outbreaks of communities being strengthened. For 
example, respondents to the survey of the Mangrove Mountain area following the 
Newcastle Disease outbreak indicated a range of positive impacts, such as:   
For one thing I think it brought the community closer, people were just amazing at how 
they helped … [The outbreak caused total] disruption to normal life and a general 
feeling of apprehension, however since this was generally universal it tended to bring 
people together through discussion.  (NSW Department of Community Services 2000, 
p. 42)  
In the UK FMD outbreak it was also observed that: 
The whole rural community became involved in the crisis, sharing its impact and 
striving to help those who were suffering. (Dower 2001, p. 7)   
There is some evidence that the outbreaks provided the opportunity for needed 
changes to institutions, improvements in public sector service delivery, and 
improvements in regulatory and industry policies.   
Cumulative effects   
Some rural communities face significant long-term challenges from technological 
change, the movement of people to regional centres and cities, and other factors. An 
FMD outbreak could accentuate those challenges, for example, by triggering 
population threshold effects (where a further small reduction in population makes 
the provision of certain services at pre-FMD levels unsustainable). As observed by 
the Cumbria FMD Strategy Group in relation to the UK FMD outbreak:  
Marginal rural services such as village shops, post offices, filling stations and some 
pubs are threatened with closure. Once gone, the businesses will not be restarted and 
this will accelerate the existing trend in the decline of rural services. (Carr 2001, p. 77)  
However, just as individuals can respond very differently to a similar set of adverse 
circumstances, so too can communities. Thus, predictions of wide ranging adverse 
social impacts on all affected communities, made on the basis of traditional 
indicators such as loss of income and rates of unemployment, need to be treated 
with caution. In practice, there is likely to be significant variation in social 
outcomes between affected communities.       
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8.2  Factors influencing individual responses and 
mental health effects  
The discussion thus far has highlighted a large range of social outcomes 
experienced during previous outbreaks. To understand the widely different 
responses of individuals to similar pressures requires an understanding of the 
underlying psychological processes involved. 
Psychological processes 
An outline of the psychological processes involved in responding to an adverse 
event, such as FMD, is illustrated in figure 8.1. These include pressure from a range 
of factors (stressors) in addition to the financial impact. While individuals can 
respond very differently to similar sources of stress, the vast majority of people 
respond adaptively to the everyday stresses of normal life, and when necessary, to 
significant adverse events.  
Figure 8.1  Stresses and welfare impacts  
 
Stressors
Outbreak characteristics - duration, impact ratio, threat, terror and horror, 
unexpectedness, cumulative effects, and cultural and symbolic.  
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Box 8.3 considers the stresses which would be created by an FMD outbreak based 
on characteristics commonly used by psychologists to examine the potential of 
major adverse events to cause disruption and harm. 
 
Box 8.3 Stresses  created  by  FMD 
Psychologists have identified a number of aspects of adverse events that contribute to 
the level of trauma created by such events:   
•   duration: a long duration, such as for an extensive FMD outbreak, prolongs the 
stresses involved, akin to some periods of enduring drought;   
•   terror and horror: these add to the stresses arising from livestock slaughter and 
disposal;  
•   impact ratio: the impact ratio has been used to refer to the proportion of a given 
population affected. The trade effects of an FMD outbreak would cause it to have a 
high impact ratio on the livestock industries, especially the beef industry. For 
farmers whose livestock are slaughtered for eradication and control purposes, 
compensation would act to reduce the severity of the stresses otherwise involved. 
Movement restrictions extend significantly the number of people affected by the 
control strategy;  
•   threat: upon detection of the disease in Australia, stresses from this source would 
be widespread. However, it would be amenable to reduction with dissemination of 
knowledge about the disease and its distribution;  
•   unexpectedness: notwithstanding the efforts of governments to prevent and prepare 
for such an eventuality, an outbreak of FMD would have a high unexpectedness 
factor, especially for those whose herds are identified as being infected; and  
•   cultural and symbolic aspects: this refers to the stresses caused by the disruption to 
family and community participation, and to personal losses of a non-tangible nature, 
such as loss of personally bred bloodlines and pets.  
 
 
Notwithstanding the stresses from an FMD outbreak, any impairments to individual 
emotional, cognitive, and physical states and behavioural functioning are likely to 
be short lived and involve relatively minor costs. However, in the face of the added 
pressures (financial and other) from an outbreak, there is likely to be an increase in 
the proportion of people struggling to cope and experiencing trauma. Trauma 
responses that result in recognisable mental conditions would be more long lasting 
and costly to treat.  
The prevalence of recognisable mental disorders in the community is given in 
table  8.1, based on the study, The burden of disease and injury in Australia, 
(Mathers et al. 1999). The study used data from the ABS National Survey of Mental 
Health and Wellbeing 1997 (MHS-97), the National Drug Strategy Household 
Survey 1998, and reviews of epidemiological studies. The data indicate that, during     
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1996, some one in six adults exhibited sufficient symptoms for the diagnosis of a 
mental disorder.  
Table 8.1  Prevalence of mental disorders in Australia, 1996  
Per cent of adult persons  
Anxiety disorders a -       Substance-use disorders -  
Generalised anxiety disorder  1.6  Alcohol dependence/ harmful use  4.0 
Post-traumatic stress disorder  0.5  Heroin or polydrug dependence 
and harmful use 
0.2 
Agoraphobia  0.4  Sedative dependence/abuse  0.1 
Obsessive-compulsive disorder  0.2  Cannabis dependence/abuse  0.9 
Panic disorder  0.7  Other drug dependence/abuse  0.2 
Social phobia  1.6  sub-total 5.4 
Separation anxiety disorder  0.6  Affective (or mood) disorders -      
sub-total 5.6 Depression b  2.9 
Other disorders -     Bipolar affective disorder  0.7 
Schizophrenia  0.4  sub-total 3.6 
Childhood conditions  1.1    
Other disorders  0.7  Total mental disorders  16.7 
sub-total 2.1     
      
a People with dysthymia or experiencing major depressive episode in 1996. b People experiencing 
symptomatic episodes in 1996.   
Source: Mathers et al. 1999, annex table D. 
The study also utilised information on the severity distribution of many of the 
disorders presented in the table. For example, of those persons included in the 
prevalence statistics for depression, 9 per cent had no associated disability, 57 per 
cent mild disability, 21 per cent moderate disability and 14 per cent severe 
disability.  
Mental health effects  
As stresses increase, so does the possibility of maladaptive responses. The primary 
categories associated with an FMD outbreak would be anxiety disorders, affective 
disorders and substance-use disorders (box 8.4). Anxiety disorders are characterised 
by feelings of tension, distress or nervousness, whereas affective disorders are 
characterised by a mood disturbance.      





Box 8.4  Mental health problems and mental disorders  
Mental health problems and mental disorders refer to the spectrum of cognitive, emotional 
and behavioural disorders that interfere with the lives and productivity of people at school, at 
work and at home, and impact upon their interpersonal relationships. (DHAC and AIHW 
1999, p. 7)  
A mental disorder implies ‘the existence of a clinically recognisable set of symptoms or 
behaviour associated in most cases with distress and with interference with personal 
functions’ (WHO 1992, cited in DHAC and AIHW 1999, p. 7). Mental health problems 
refer to common mental complaints and symptoms in response to normal life stresses.  
Acute stress disorder — involves intense fear, helplessness, and/or horror often 
resulting from a traumatic event. The response to the traumatic event will usually be 
managed by the body’s psychological defences against stress, with responses to the 
event generally not lasting more than a month. Persistent stress can result in anxiety.  
General anxiety disorder — involves excessive anxiety and worry occurring more often 
than not for at least a six month period, difficulty in controlling the worry, and a range of 
other symptoms. The anxiety, worry, or physical symptoms cause clinically significant 
distress or impairment in social, occupational or other important areas of functioning.  
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) — involves a person being exposed to a 
traumatic event where the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an 
event that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the 
physical integrity of self or others. In addition, the person’s response involved intense 
fear, helplessness and/or horror. PTSD involves responses to a traumatic event which 
are so severe that they overwhelm the body’s defence mechanisms leading to 
permanent changes to a person’s physical and psychological responses to stresses.  
Major depressive disorder — is one of a number of affective or mood disorders. 
Depressive disorders are a group of symptoms that reflects a sad mood exceeding 
normal sadness or grief. Biochemical changes in the brain lead to major symptoms of 
depression, such as negative thoughts, moods and behaviours, accompanied by 
changes in bodily functions (for example, sleeping and eating).  
 
Evidence from previous livestock disease outbreaks  
Information provided earlier cites instances of anger, grief, hopelessness and of 
other signs of stress. There is the perception, held by many of the people involved, 
that these types of feelings and effects were pervasive. ‘Normal’ responses were 
widely observed.  
There is also anecdotal evidence of trauma. Hood and Seedsman (2000) undertook a 
review of the evidence received by the Victorian Parliamentary Committee inquiry 
into the control of OJD. Farmers and woolgrowers accounted for approximately 
60  per cent of the submissions. The effects of OJD were found to produce 
significant levels of trauma:      
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The evidence clearly identifies that the majority of farmers and communities associated 
with OJD have experienced major trauma. This trauma has emerged from the impact of 
the program on their individual and community lives … Experiences of depression are 
reported by both farmers and professionals working within their communities. (Hood 
and Seedsman 2000, p. 18)  
There is also qualitative evidence of people experiencing long recovery processes, 
suggesting more severe initial impacts:  
The evidence received by the Committee about the Victorian OJD Control Program 
was distressing. Even where the direct impact on farmers and their families occurred a 
number of years ago, the anguish caused by the financial and especially the social 
impacts of the Program is still evident today. (ENRC 2000, p. 283)  
The social impact from FMD has had an equally devastating effect, with calls to the 
farm crisis network increasing twenty-fold. Isolation from community life in infected 
areas had been severe … Many families and communities are in need of support and 
help and will be so for a considerable time to come. (Dower 2001, p. 87) 
The survey of those people living in the Mangrove Mountain area at the time of the 
Newcastle Disease outbreak provides some indicative data on impacts (table 8.2). 
The most significant data relate to the overall effect of Newcastle Disease on 
people’s lives and a lack of support for a high percentage of those people affected.  
Table 8.2 Survey
a of the mental health impact on the Mangrove Mountain 
community  
Question Responses 
10.1 Unable  to  work 
 
 
3 respondents were unable to work (1 indicated for three months, 
1 for six months, and 1 did not indicate the period of time). Of 
chicken farmer respondents, 15 indicated they were unable to 
work for periods ranging from three to eight months. 90% of 
survey respondents did not answer this question.  
10.8  Overall effect on life 
 
For non-chicken farmers, 12% indicated Newcastle Disease 
affected their lives a lot, 10% somewhat affected, 35% were 
affected very little and 43% affected not at all. For chicken 
farmers, 88% indicated their lives had been affected a lot, and 
12% said their lives had been affected somewhat.    
18  I have family etc to 
support me while I 
recover from the 
outbreak  
70% of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that they 
had support while they recovered. 20% of respondents disagreed 
and 10% strongly disagreed. 72% of survey respondents did not 
answer this question. 
19  How long do you  
think it will take for  
you to recover from  
the outbreak?  
69% of respondents to this question indicated 2 years or more 
before they recovered, 20% indicated 1-2 years and 11% 
indicated within twelve months. 75% of survey respondents did 
not answer this question. 
    
a Based on 184 survey responses (including 25 of 70 chicken farmers affected).  
Source:  NSW Department of Community Services 2000.      




The transcripts of the OJD inquiry provided some evidence of thoughts of suicide 
and suicide attempts:   
Reports of both suicidal ideation and suicide events are evident in the hearing 
materials.  Whilst OJD is not described as being the sole causative factor the program is 
seen to have been a significant stressor impacting on individual’s sense of 
hopelessness. (Hood and Seedsman 2000, p. 19)   
Table 8.3 provides information on the health effects of the 1974 Brisbane floods 
and the 1983 Ash Wednesday bushfires.   
Table 8.3  The health effects of selected Australian natural disasters  
Outbreak study  Key findings 
Abrahams et al. (1976)  Study of the 1974 Brisbane flood found that the number of visits 
to general practitioners, hospitals and specialists were all 
significantly increased for flooded persons in the year following 
the flood.  Persistent psychological symptoms, which included 
irritability, nervous tension and depressed mood, predominated 
in those seeking medical care.   
Chamberlain et al. (1981)   14 months after the 1974 Brisbane flood, 23 per cent of 
respondents to the survey indicated they had not recovered 
from the effects of the flood.   
McFarlane, AC, Policansky, SK 
and Irwin, C (1987), and 
McFarlane, AC, Clayer, JF and 
Bookless, CL (1997) 
Lasting and significant morbidity associated with the 1983 Ash 
Wednesday bushfires.  Doubling of psychiatric morbidity in 
adults and children as a result of the disaster.  Child responses 
were closely dependent on parental interpretation of disaster. 
A high rate of continued symptoms twenty months after event.   
Clayer JR, Bookless-Pratz, C  
and McFarlane, AC (1985)  
28 fatalities resulted from the 1983 Ash Wednesday bushfires. 
Of a range of conditions, the prevalence of mental illness, 
alcoholism and drug problems increased the most.  Survey 
responses indicated bushfires had a significant effect upon the 
mental health of approximately 30% of the affected population.
. 
10% of respondents with pre-existing conditions reported an 
increase in the severity of those conditions.    
While many of the impacts considered in this chapter cannot be costed in the 
normal manner, the impacts would clearly be significant. In some cases, they could 
be a reflection of the economic losses. In other words, a larger outbreak, producing 
larger economic losses, would also be expected to generate larger social impacts. 
The impacts would entail costs well beyond the length of the outbreak for the 
individuals and communities concerned, and indirectly for governments through the 
health and welfare systems.      




9 Environmental  impacts 
Eradication and control of FMD potentially has a number of adverse impacts on the 
environment, primarily associated with the disposal of animal carcasses. Other 
environmental impacts could arise from: 
•   the disposal of other livestock products (such as milk); 
•   widespread use of disinfectants to decontaminate infected properties; and  
•   a reduction in on-farm environmental improvement measures such as soil 
conservation, tree planting and salinity reduction arising from decreases in farm 
cash flow. 
9.1 Carcass  disposal 
During an outbreak of FMD, there is a potential conflict between the need to 
dispose of infected animals urgently and doing so in a way that does not raise undue 
animal welfare issues or create long lasting environmental problems. 
Options for carcass disposal include: burial; pyre burning; rendering (boiling); and, 
potentially, a range of composting and incineration methods. The first three 
methods were those most widely used in the UK outbreak and are also likely to be 
the most widely used if there were an outbreak in Australia. The AUSTVETPLAN 
endorses burial as the preferred method, but also allows for burning or rendering. A 
number of the other methods require further research and refinement before they 
could be widely applied. 
Burial 
Burial can take place either on farm or at mass burial sites. In each case it involves 
digging large pits, at least five metres deep, and covering carcasses with sufficient 
soil to prevent wild animal incursions (as specified in the AUSVETPLAN). 
The greatest potential environmental concern with burial is contamination of 
surface and ground water by leachates from the disposal pit. In the UK, there were 
212 reported water pollution incidents, most minor, of which 24  per cent were 
related to carcass burial (Environment Agency 2001). In some cases, animals     




subsequently were dug up after burial because they had initially been buried too 
close to a water table or spring (The Countryside Agency 2001). The necessity of 
disposing of large numbers of animals rapidly meant that possible environmental 
impacts did not initially figure high in decision making: 
The extremities of the emergency decreed that operational needs had to be met and 
little advance consultation or reference to stakeholders and environmental bodies could 
be made if the objective of preventing a public health or animal health disaster due to 
failure to dispose of carcasses was to be avoided. (Trevelyan 2002, p. 4) 
Intially mass burial sites in the UK were large holes in the ground, but were: 
successively engineered with increasingly sophisticated liners and leachate collection 
systems to minimise risk to groundwater. (Trevelyan 2002, p. 4) 
The Commission understands that some burial and pyre sites have required 
significant subsequent remediation work to meet environmental standards. 
However, monitoring of burial sites in the UK, to date, has found that there is no 
ongoing affect from FMD disposals on water sources used for public or private 
supply (although two private water supplies were temporarily affected during the 
outbreak) (PHLS 2001 and Environment Agency 2001). Indeed, ‘any environmental 
impacts have been short-term and localised; much smaller than the day-to-day 
impacts of current farming practises’ (Environment Agency 2001). 
The UK experience indicates that burial would not be suitable in some areas where 
there is a high water table or aquifers close to the surface. However, in other areas, 
with appropriate monitoring, burial would have a minimal impact on the 
environment. 
The Mangrove Mountain Newcastle disease outbreak in Australia necessitated the 
burial of over 1.5 million chickens. Protecting the water table from possible 
contamination was a high priority. As at sites in the UK, a monitoring program is 
now in place to ensure there is no unexpected impact on the local environment. 
The NSW Government is coordinating a project, funded jointly with Animal Health 
Australia, to develop a decision-making framework for determining the appropriate 
means of carcass disposal during animal emergencies. This work will significantly 
advance Australia’s preparedness to deal with disposal issues in a way which 
minimises environmental costs. One outcome will be an update of the disposal 
procedures contained within the AUSVETPLAN. For example, in relation to burial, 
one of the project’s findings is that the current pit specifications in the 
AUSTVETPLAN proved unsuitable for use in the UK and it is unlikely that they 
would be approved by State environmental agencies. Using designs developed 
during the UK outbreak would be more likely to meet environmental specifications.     




Experience from the UK also suggests that the improved designs of disposal pits 
involve greater expenditure. They are not only more costly to build, but require 
long-term monitoring. Thus, whatever form burial takes, it would involve long-term 
costs to ensure the adverse impacts on the environment are minimised. 
Burning 
Burning options are also possible under the AUSTVETPLAN, and include on-farm 
burning and mass pyre burning. From an environmental perspective, burning can 
raise concerns about visual pollution and emissions (particularly of dioxins). During 
the UK outbreak, the Department of Health issued guidelines that pyres should not 
be used without offering alternative accommodation to anyone living within 
four kilometres of a pyre site. That said, monitoring in the UK has not shown any 
ongoing air quality deterioration and concentrations of dioxins in soil samples close 
to pyres are within the range previously found in the rural environment.  
The Northumberland Foot and Mouth Inquiry concluded that the impacts of pyre 
burning were mostly of a short-term nature which will mainly be reversed over the 
longer term (Northumberland City Council 2002). However, during the outbreak, 
some ash was buried without authorisation and further risk assessments of ground 
water and private water supplies has led to the removal of ash from 20 sites in 
Wales due to unacceptable risks to the environment (Environment Agency 2001). 
Rendering 
Rendering is the third disposal option that was widely used in the UK. Rendering 
involves cooking ground-up carcasses in large boilers under pressure for a certain 
period of time. Trevelyan (2002), notes that rendering is a relatively 
environmentally benign form of disposal: 
Tallow (fat), meat and bone meal and steam [which is condensed] are the end products 
of the process. [The tallow produced by rendering can be burned to generate steam to 
heat the cookers.] Meat and bone meal can be incinerated to produce heat and 
electricity. The process therefore involves a degree of recycling and energy recovery. 
(p. 3) 
For this reason rendering was the preferred disposal method in the UK. However, 
rendering capacity in the UK was limited to around 15 000 tonnes a week (not all of 
which was available for FMD disposal), whereas at the outbreak’s peak FMD 
required the disposal of around 70 000 tonnes (Trevelyan 2002, p.14). Australia 
would face similar capacity constraints and, like the UK, would be forced to rely on 
alternative methods.     





Given the different impact of each of the disposal options, and the outbreak-specific 
nature of these impacts, the Commission has not attempted to cost the likely 
environmental impact of an FMD outbreak. However, to date, the UK appears to 
have avoided significant environmental problems.  
The key to avoiding potential problems is good preparation. Given the lessons from 
the UK and the considerable work on carcass disposal that is being coordinated by 
New South Wales for a possible Australian outbreak, the Commission considers 
that significant environmental problems could be avoided if there were an outbreak 
in Australia. However, achieving such outcomes would involve significant ongoing 
monitoring and remediation costs by government. 
9.2 Other  impacts 
On a smaller scale, the disposal of other animal products could, in some instances, 
cause environmental concerns. For example, the dairy industry has drawn the 
Commission’s attention to the problem of disposing of milk during the standstill 
period when an outbreak first occurs. During the standstill period regular milk 
collections from farms are unlikely to occur. The necessity of continuing to milk 
herds and the limited storage capacity on dairy farms could force farmers to dispose 
of milk on farms. 
There might also be some impacts on the environment or on emergency workers 
from the large scale use of disinfectants to decontaminate properties. During the 
Newcastle disease outbreak at Mangrove Mountain around 14  million litres of 
disinfectant were used on the 70 farms affected. Good preparation may be the key to 
overcoming any effects that might occur from use of disinfectants. For example, 
citric acid is an effective disinfectant for FMD and would have potentially less 
environmental effects than a range of other disinfectants commonly used. 
Finally, large reductions in farm incomes owing to the loss of export markets may 
indirectly have an impact on the environment. On-farm expenditure on soil 
conservation, salinity reduction or general environmental preservation may be 
reduced as farmers face increased financial pressure and seek to reduce shorter term 
‘discretionary’ expenditures. 
     









     
     








     




A  Conduct of the research paper 
This appendix outlines the report process and lists the organisations which have 
participated to date. Although the project is a commissioned research report rather 
than a traditional public inquiry, consultation with, and feedback from, industry and 
government stakeholders has formed an important part of this study.  
The Commission held a number of informal discussions with relevant bodies in 
Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide and Brisbane, and via teleconferences, 
with Western Australia, Northern Territory and Tasmania. The purpose of these 
visits was to gain a greater understanding of the issues involved in determining both 
the economic and social impacts of an FMD outbreak in Australia. A list of the 
organisations consulted by the Commission are provided below. 
In March 2002, the Commission held a workshop as part of the consultation 
process. The workshop aimed to provide a forum for the Commission to expose its 
methodology and assumptions for determining the trade and production effects of 
an FMD outbreak, and to provide some preliminary results for comment. Attendees 
at the workshop are listed in table A.1. 
The Commission’s trade and production modelling were reviewed by an external 
referee, Professor Ron Duncan. A copy of the referee’s comments is provided in 
section A.1. 
Meetings with individuals and organisations 
Informal discussions were held with the following interested parties. 
Australian Capital Territory 
•   Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry - Australia 
•   Animal Health Australia 
•   Australian Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics (ABARE) 
•   Australian Cattle Council 
•   Australian Pork Limited 
•   Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service 
•   Bureau of Rural Sciences 
•   Centre for International Economics     




•   Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
•   Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
•   Government Epidemiologists – AFFA 
•   Sheep Meat Council of Australia 
•   Wool Corporation of Australia (now Wool Producers) 
New South Wales 
•   Australian Chicken Growers Council 
•   Australian Chicken Meat Federation 
•   Australian Lot Feeders Association 
•   Australian Poultry Industries Association 
•   Meat and Livestock Australia 
•   National Meat Association of Australia 
•   NSW Farmers Federation 
•   NSW Government 
•   Wool Innovation 
Victoria 
•   Australian Dairy Industry Council 
•   Australian Dairy Council 
•   Australian Farmers Federation 
•   Australian Quarantine Inspection Service 
•   Bill Sykes (Consultant) 
•   Dairy Technical Services 
•   Dairy Research and Development Corporation 
•   Emergency Services 
•   Environment Protection Authority 
•   Murray Goulburn 
•   Premiers Department 
•   United Dairyfarmers of Victoria (UDV) 
•   Victorian Government 
South Australia 
•   Department of Human Services 
•   Premiers Department 
•   South Australian Government 
•   State Emergency Services     




Table A.1 Attendees  at  workshop 
Attendees  Department or organisation 
Dr Roger Mauldon  Chairman for workshop 
Dr Peter Thornber  Animal Health Australia 
Dr David Chaffey  Association of Cattle Veterinarians 
Mr Nico Klijn  Australian Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics 
Mr Ali Abdalla  Australian Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics 
Mr Bill Sykes  Australian Dairy Industry Council 
Mr Peter Hetherington  Australian Meat Council 
Mr Chris Ambler  Australian Pork Limited 
Dr John Plant  Australian Sheep Veterinary Society 
Dr Kevin Doyle  Australian Veterinary Association 
Mr Scott Williams  Australian Wool Innovation 
Mr David Cunningham  Bureau of Rural Sciences 
Mr Stefan Fabiansson  Bureau of Rural Sciences 
Mr Michael Hartmann  Cattle Council of Australia 
Mr Tony Bryce  Centrelink 
Mr David Ingham  Dept of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry – Australia 
Mr Habibur Rahman  Dept of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry – Australia 
Ms Virginia Perkins  Dept of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry – Australia 
Mr Rob Newman  Dept of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry – Australia 
Mr Mike MacNamara  Dept of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry – Australia 
Mr Colin MacGregor  Dept of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry – Australia 
Mr Graeme Garner  Dept of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry – Australia 
Ms Kylie Oakes-Ati  Dept of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Mr Philip Buckle  Dept of Human Services – Vic 
Mr Dick Rubira  Dept of Natural Resources and Environment 
Mr Bruce Stewart  Dept of Premier and Cabinet – Qld 
Ms Mandy Wallace  Dept of Premier and Cabinet – SA 
Dr John Switala  Dept of Primary Industries – Qld 
Mr Rod Gobbey  Dept of Primary Industries, Water and Environment – Tas 
Ms Dorothy Terwiel  Dept of Prime Minister and Cabinet – Commonwealth 
Mr Andrew Coghlin  Emergency Management Australia 
Mr Trevor Roche  Emergency Management Australia 
Mr Peter Koob  Emergency Management Australia 
Mr Matthew Munro  Grains Council 
Mr Terry Larkin  JT Larkin & Associates 
Mr Bruce Standen  Livecorp 
Mr David Skerman  Meat and Livestock Australia 
Mr Peter Weeks  Meat and Livestock Australia 
Prof Ron Duncan  National Centre for Development Studies – ANU 
Mr Bruce Christie  NSW Agriculture – Menangle 
Mr Kevin Cooper  NSW Agriculture – Menangle 
Mr Scott Hansen  Sheepmeat Council of Australia 
     




A.1  Report of the referee 
   Crawford  Building 
 Ellery  Crescent 
  The Australian National University, 
 ACT  0200 
 






Re: Foot and Mouth Disease Study – Review Report 
 
I have carefully reviewed the assumptions underlying the Productivity Commission’s (PC) 
trade and production model developed to estimate the production and revenue impacts of 
the three foot and mouth disease (FMD) outbreak scenarios. My review was carried out 
during the time the modelling was being undertaken. Suggestions that I made during 
discussions with PC staff were incorporated in the study. 
 
Given the period of time available in which to carry out the study, it is obvious that 
development of a full behavioural model of the livestock industries and markets involved 
could not be undertaken. The “cash-flow” approach adopted, involving adjustments in 
order to achieve convergence between supply and demand, appears to be a sensible 
“second best” technique for estimating the likely magnitudes of the impact of the FMD 
scenarios on industry revenues and livestock numbers. 
 
I have reviewed the various assumptions made about herd inventory impacts, as well as the 
various demand and supply elasticities. These all appear consistent with my understanding 
of the production and demand characteristics for these industries. 
 
In summary, I believe that the PC’s modelling work provides defensible estimates of the 






(Prof) Ron Duncan 
Director 
Asia Pacific School of Economics 
and Management 
     





B  Description of previous disease 
outbreaks 
This appendix outlines the history of four recent disease outbreaks. These are: the 
mid to late 1990s outbreak of Ovine Johne’s Disease (OJD) in south east Australia; 
the 1999 outbreak of Newcastle disease in New South Wales; the FMD outbreak in 
the UK during 2001; and the 1997 outbreak of anthrax in Victoria.   
B.1  Ovine Johne’s disease in south east Australia   
Johne’s disease is a slow-developing, infectious disease that affects a wide range of 
animals. In Australia it has been found in cattle, sheep, goats, deer, alpaca and 
Llama. The disease is caused by bacteria that live in the animal’s intestines 
damaging the gut and impairing the absorption of nutrients. The result is wasting 
and, ultimately, death of the infected animal. The bacteria can survive outside of 
host animals for several months. The disease is not currently curable.  
While cross-infection between animals species can occur, different strains of the 
bacteria usually infect only selected animal species. The strain of bacteria which 
mainly affects cattle, goats, camelids and deer in Australia is known as Bovine 
Johne’s disease. The sheep strain of the bacteria, which also affects goats, is OJD.  
OJD was first diagnosed in Australia on the NSW Central Tablelands in 1980, with 
few infections reported elsewhere in Australia until late 1995. A large scale 
outbreak of OJD began in East Gippsland in December 1995. While many more 
flocks were infected at the time in New South Wales than in Victoria, Victoria 
adopted an aggressive two-year eradication strategy seeking to eliminate the disease 
before it became endemic.  
A control program was devised and put into place. It involved quarantining all 
properties with infected animals, eradicating all sheep and related animals from the 
properties and paying compensation to the affected producers for the animals 
destroyed. The program included comprehensive investigation of flocks linked to 
the infected sheep, including blood testing and quarantining of flocks suspected of 
carrying infection. After the inception of the Victorian OJD Control Program, OJD     
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was later found elsewhere in East Gippsland, southern and central Gippsland, and 
central Victoria, with isolated pockets elsewhere in the State.  
In late 1999, the Victorian Government announced a moratorium on the destocking 
and compensation elements of the program, pending an inquiry into the program 
and its impacts, and consideration of alternative approaches to the management of 
the disease. The inquiry report was a comprehensive review of the economic and 
social impacts of the OJD outbreak. The findings of the report provide an important 
input into the consideration of the social impacts of FMD undertaken in chapter 8.  
By early 2000, 1 287 flocks had been investigated, with 175 infected flocks detected 
across the State (table B.1). Most of the infected flocks had been destroyed or were 
in the process of being destroyed. By the end of 2000, 863 flocks (about 1.0 per cent 
of Australian flocks) were detected as infected with OJD between 1996 and 2000, 
with the disease concentrated in south-eastern Australia and mainly in New South 
Wales. Prior to 1996, 224 flocks had been detected, bringing the total number of 
infected flocks since 1980 to 1 087 flocks, or 1.3 per cent of Australian flocks.  
Table B.1  Cumulative number of known infected flocks between 1996 and 
2000  
31 December each year  
  Cumulative number of infected flocks recorded   Total flocks 
State  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  2000 
NSW 158  226a 440 499 598  31  875 
Vic 33  66a  97 175 204  30  000 
SA  0  1 20 31 35  8  500 
Tas  6  8 19 21 23  2  050 
ACT  0 0 2 2 2 85 
Qld  0 0 0 0 0  3  215 
WA  0 0 0 0 1  8  727 
Total  197 301 578 728 863  84  362 
a Data as at 31 January 1998.  
Source: Sergeant (2001), cited in AUSVET Animal Health Services 2001.   
At 30 September 2001, 689 flocks were still classified as infected across Australia 
that had not been destroyed. In addition to identified infected flocks, a further 3 673 
flocks (4.4 per cent of Australian flocks) were under investigation as either suspect 
or under surveillance flocks.   
OJD has not been eradicated. In addition to state policies, a National Ovine Johne’s 
Disease Control and Evaluation Program was established in 1998. This program is 
managed by Animal Health Australia and is funded by industry and Commonwealth 
and State Governments. The program seeks to identify infected flocks, put     





restrictions on movements from infected flocks and flocks suspected of infection, 
undertake relevant research and trails, and manage a zoning policy which requires 
testing of flocks trading to higher status zones. The aim of the program is to 
recommend the optimal method of dealing with OJD in Australia.  
Additional information on Johne’s disease can be obtained from Animal Health 
Australia’s web site at http://www.aahc.com.au/jd/.  
B.2  Newcastle disease in the Mangrove Mountain area, 
NSW 
Newcastle disease is a highly contagious, generalised viral disease of domestic 
poultry, cage and aviary birds and wild birds. Clinically, the effects of the disease 
ranges from showing no symptoms to a rapidly fatal condition characterised by 
gastrointestinal, respiratory and/or nervous signs. The disease has the potential to 
damage significantly the export, import and domestic trade in poultry, other birds 
and their products. An outbreak in chickens may be so severe that almost all of an 
affected flock die within 72 hours without noticeable signs.  
Overseas experience has shown that Newcastle disease can spread very rapidly and 
can be carried over long distances by transport of contaminated materials, such as, 
bird cages, pallets etc. As it is very easily transmitted, strict control of movement of 
anything that may have become contaminated with the virus and immediate 
imposition of tightly controlled quarantine on all places suspected of being infected, 
is essential to a successful eradication program.  
Newcastle disease has serious effects on the international trade of animals and 
animal products. It is subject to the Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan (or 
AUSVETPLAN). Under AUSVETPLAN, the present policy is to eradicate the 
disease as soon as it is confirmed.  This involves the immediate isolation of infected 
birds, followed as rapidly as possible by slaughter and sanitary disposal of 
carcasses. It also involves control or destruction of other animals or birds that could 
transmit the disease, as well as through cleaning and decontamination of the 
infected sites.  
AUSVETPLAN requires that all farms on which infection is either known or 
suspected be quarantined. This places severe restrictions on the movement of people 
and goods from the properties. For example, no one, including the owners, their 
friends and staff, can leave quarantined premises without changing clothes and 
footwear. Also, service vehicles on the premises at the time quarantine is imposed 
must be disinfected as they leave the premises.      
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On 1  April  1999, an outbreak of the virulent form of Newcastle disease was 
confirmed in the Mangrove Mountain area of New South Wales. In accordance with 
AUSVETPLAN, strict quarantine measures were instigated. By 13 May 1999, on 
the 30 commercial poultry farms in the Restricted Area some 1.9 million meat 
chickens, 13  000 laying hens, 5  000 ducks, 3  000 meat pigeons, 60  000 started 
pullets, 17 ostriches and over 2  000 domestic birds had been slaughtered. For 
roughly 40 other chicken farmers in the Control Area, meat chickens were 
processed as they reached market age, but restrictions disallowed the introduction of 
new chickens into the area for growing.  
The NSW Department of Community Services undertook a project to assess the 
impact of the disease on the community. The project culminated in the report 
Mangrove Mountain Disaster Recovery Project, Final Impact Report. Included in 
the report were the results of a survey sent to the people who lived in the Mangrove 
Mountain area during the outbreak. The survey provides one of the few sources of 
data available on the social impacts of livestock disease outbreaks.  
B.3  Foot and mouth disease in the UK  
On 19 February 2001, a routine inspection at an abattoir in Essex uncovered highly 
suspicious signs of FMD, which were subsequently confirmed. The source of the 
infection was traced to Northumberland. Shortly thereafter, further cases were 
found across England, Wales and Scotland. Also, a small number of cases were 
detected in Northern Ireland and continental Europe.  
The last outbreak of FMD had been in 1967-68. It had lead to the destruction of 
roughly 434 000 animals. From 1951 to 1967, the UK had suffered 17 occurrences 
of FMD, averaging about 225 outbreaks (farms affected) per year. There were only 
two years with no recorded outbreaks of foot-and-mouth during this period. Most 
were rapidly contained, but in the early 1950s there was also a substantial epidemic. 
Periods of freedom from foot-and-mouth outbreaks before 1967 were measured in 
months not years. At the time, the disease was endemic throughout Europe.  
In response to the 2001 outbreak, the UK Government introduced measures to seek 
to control the spread of the disease and eradicate the disease as soon as possible. A 
ban on meat and live animal exports was imposed on 21 February, followed by the 
introduction of restrictions on the movement of animals on 23 February. A total ban 
on livestock movement was in place for ten days. On 27 February, local authorities 
were given additional powers to close public rights of way.  
Over the following 11 months, 2  030 cases of FMD were confirmed with over 
4 million animals slaughtered (roughly 595 000 head of cattle, 3.3 million sheep,     





142  000 pigs and 4  000 other animals). On 22 January 2002, the Office 
International des Epizooties restored the UK’s international FMD-free status.  
A large number of survey, research and inquiry reports have been prepared on the 
impacts of the outbreak. Some of these provide useful insights into the social 
impacts, and are utilised in chapter 8. In addition, a number of forthcoming reports 
are likely to contain information useful in considering the potential social impacts 
of FMD in Australia, including:  
•   a second report by the Institute of Rural Health to the National Assembly for 
Wales. This report is a follow-up to their May 2001 report and is intended to 
provide information on whether the many health concerns expressed by service 
providers in the Institute’s 2001 survey have eventuated. The report is expected 
to be released in July 2002;  
•   a report by the UK National Audit Office into the handling of the FMD outbreak 
by government departments and other agencies. It will address a range of 
questions, including the cost of the outbreak in terms of both public expenditure 
and wider economic and environmental costs. The report is expected to be 
released in the middle of 2002; and 
•   the report of the independent UK inquiry into the lessons to be learned from the 
foot and mouth disease outbreak of 2001. The final inquiry report is expected to 
be completed by mid-2002.  
It became evident at an early stage that the measures to control the spread of the 
disease were having a major impact industries other than livestock farming, 
principally countryside recreation and inbound overseas tourism. Subsequent 
analyses have shown that the effects on those industries had a greater effect on the 
economy than the effect of FMD on the livestock industries. Analysis has also 
shown that there was a wide range of impacts related to the health and wellbeing of 
individuals, families and communities.  
B.4  Anthrax outbreak in Victoria  
Anthrax has been recognised in Australia for over 150 years as a cause of sudden 
death in farm animals, particularly sheep and cattle. Animals die within a few hours 
to a few days. The spore-forming bacteria, Bacillus anthracis, which causes the 
disease, was probably introduced into Australia by contaminated fertiliser imported 
from the Indian sub-continent.  
There have been many outbreaks of anthrax in Victoria and New South Wales that 
were localised and quickly controlled. In 1997, an outbreak of anthrax in Victoria     
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was detected concentrated in the vicinity of Tatura. This outbreak was different than 
earlier ones as it occurred almost simultaneously on a number of unconnected 
properties, and it involved many more properties than previously. The outbreak 
lasted 62 days with 84 properties confirmed as infected. Vaccinations totalled 
78 663 cattle and 2 653 sheep on 631 farms.  
As the disease is ineradicable, the control strategy was to limit the occurrence of the 
disease to a defined area (eg by establishing a buffer zone), prevent the occurrence 
of further infections within and without of the control area (eg by complementing 
vaccination with antibiotic therapy); and minimise the impact of the disease, 
particularly by employing sound hygiene practices.  
One human was infected in the outbreak. A knackery worker became infected from 
contact with an infected carcass and developed the cutaneous (or skin) form of the 
disease. The worker was treated for 11 days at the Goulburn Valley Hospital and 
was discharged fully recovered.  
The Victorian Department of Natural Resources and Environment undertook a 
review of the response to the outbreak by the Department. The review highlighted 
the role of information in responding effectively to the outbreak, and in meeting the 
needs of industry, the media and the broader community.  
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C Revenue  losses  to the livestock 
industries for each outbreak scenario 
The following tables provide a breakdown by jurisdiction and by product of the 
export and domestic revenue losses to the livestock industries for the 3  month, 
6 month and 12 month FMD outbreak scenarios. 
  
 
Table C.1  Revenue losses to the livestock industries for the 3 month outbreak 
Net present value of revenue losses at wholesale level 
Products NSW  Vic  Qld  WA  SA  Tas  NT  Aust 
  $m $m $m $m $m $m $m  $m 
E x p o r t   L o s s e s            
Beef -421  -26  -1 212  -94  -18  -52  -61  -1 882 
Sheepmeat -76  -117  -14  -126  -64  0  0  -398 
Pigmeat -127  -107  -149  -27  0  0  0  -410 
Others -98  -400  -29  -63  -45  -10  0  -643 
Total -721  -649  -1 403  -309  -128  -62  -61  -3 333 
                 
Domestic 
Losses 
               
Beef -394  -290  -132  -64  -73  -35  -11  -999 
Sheepmeat -257  -53  -31  -89  -103  -30  0  -563 
Pigmeat -271  -142  -212  -106  -69  -10  -1  -812 
Others 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Total -922  -484  -376  -258  -246  -75  -12  -2 373 
                 
Total Revenue 
Losses 
               
Beef -814  -316  -1 344  -158  -91  -87  -72  -2 881 
Sheepmeat -333  -170  -45  -214  -168  -30  0  -960 
Pigmeat -398  -249  -361  -133  -70  -10  -1  -1 222 
Others -98  -400  -29  -63  -45  -10  0  -643 
Total -1  643  -1 134  -1 779  -568  -373  -136  -73  -5 706 
Source: PC estimates 
  
 
Table C.2  Revenue losses to the livestock industries for the 6 month outbreak 
Net present value of revenue losses at wholesale level 
Products NSW  Vic  Qld  WA  SA  Tas  NT  Aust 
  $m $m $m $m $m $m $m  $m 
E x p o r t   L o s s e s            
Beef -697  -42  -1 992  -132  -29  -85  -77  -3 054 
Sheepmeat -98  -152  -17  -142  -84  0  0  -494 
Pigmeat -130  -110  -153  -28  0  0  0  -420 
Others -98  -400  -29  -63  -45  -10  0  -643 
Total -1  022  -704  -2 190  -365  -158  -95  -77  -4 611 
                 
Domestic 
Losses 
               
Beef -602  -445  -81  -96  -119  -45  -13  -1 402 
Sheepmeat -272  -73  -26  -100  -117  -30  0  -618 
Pigmeat -322  -183  -264  -119  -73  -11  -3  -974 
Others 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Total -1  196  -701  -371  -315  -309  -86  -16  -2 994 
                 
Total Revenue 
Losses 
               
Beef -1  298  -488  -2 073  -228  -148  -130  -90  -4 455 
Sheepmeat -370  -225  -43  -242  -201  -31  0  -1 112 
Pigmeat -452  -293  -416  -147  -73  -11  -3  -1 394 
Others -98  -400  -29  -63  -45  -10  0  -643 
Total -2  218  -1 405  -2 561  -680  -467  -181  -93  -7 605 
Source: PC estimates  
 
Table C.3  Revenue losses to the livestock industries for the 12 month outbreak 
Net present value of revenue losses at the wholesale level 
Products NSW  Vic  Qld  WA  SA  Tas  NT  Aust 
  $m $m $m $m $m $m $m  $m 
E x p o r t   L o s s e s            
Beef  -1 578  -95  -4 486  -256  -63  -192  -131  -6 801 
Sheepmeat  -255  -366  -47  -299  -192  -1  0  -1 161 
Pigmeat  -191  -162  -225  -41  0  0  0  -620 
Others  -92  -631  -38  -69  -52  -17  0  -899 
Total  -2 114  -1 249  -4 793  -662  -306  -209  -131  -9 480 
                 
Domestic 
Losses 
               
Beef  -240  -10  -22  -70  -86  -31  0  -460 
Sheepmeat  -763  -637  -15  -128  -183  -58  -14  -1 798 
Pigmeat  -354  -200  -288  -131  -85  -12  -3  -1 074 
Others  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Total  -1 357  -848  -326  -329  -354  -101  -17  -3 332 
                 
Total Revenue 
Losses 
               
Beef  -1 818  -105  -4 508  -326  -149  -223  -131  -7 261 
Sheepmeat  -1 018  -1 004  -63  -426  -375  -59  -14  -2 959 
Pigmeat  -545  -362  -513  -173  -86  -12  -3  -1 694 
Others  -90  -626  -36  -66  -50  -16  0  -899 
Total  -3 472  -2 097  -5 120  -991  -660  -309  -148  -12 812 
Source: PC estimates     
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D  Regional and farm analysis 
Table D.1  Livestock dependency and socioeconomic profile of statistical 
divisions 
 Estimated  livestock 
employment 


















 % no.  % % per year index 
New South Wales     
  Sydney  0.2 4 020  7.4 1.4 1027 
  Hunter  2.4 5 010  11.3 1.5 970 
  Illawarra  1.4 1 890  11.7 1.7 979 
  Richmond-Tweed  3.9 2 690  15.1 3.6 960 
  Mid-North Coast  4.8 4 080  16.6 2.6 947 
  Northern  6.0 4 190  10.4 0.0 978 
  North Western  7.7 3 540  10.3 0.7 952 
  Central West  5.9 4 080  8.8 0.8 982 
  South Eastern  7.0 5 560  8.9 2.0 1004 
  Murrumbidgee  7.1 4 400  7.7 0.9 989 
  Murray  7.5 3 440  8.7 0.6 994 
  Far West  7.8 670  13.5 -1.6 919 
     
Victoria     
  Melbourne  0.3 3 930  9.1 1.0 1025 
  Barwon  3.1 2 800  11.3 1.1 995 
  Western District  20.1 8 130  8.8 -0.3 1001 
  Central Highlands  3.7 1 830  11.5 1.0 989 
  Wimmera  5.9 1 240  7.2 -0.5 1005 
  Mallee  5.1 1 770  8.1 0.2 983 
  Loddon  4.5 2 590  11.8 1.4 998 
  Goulburn  10.6 7 790  8.6 1.1 992 
  Ovens-Murray  5.7 2 330  8.2 1.6 1007 
  East Gippsland  12.8 3 700  11.9 0.2 985 
  Gippsland  10.0 5 500  12.3 -0.6 983 
     
Queensland     
  Brisbane  0.6 3 680  8.8 3.0 1010 
  Moreton  1.7 4 250  12.9 6.1 979 
  Wide Bay-Burnett  5.7 4 420  14.9 2.7 926 
  Darling Downs  6.6 5 330  7.6 1.4 982 
  South West  19.4 2 430  6.3 -0.2 960 
   
      (continued  on  next  page)     




Table D.1  continued 
 Estimated  livestock 
employment 


















 %   no. % % per year index
  Fitzroy  4.0  3 060 9.1 1.6 972
  Central West  29.9  1 820 6.6 -0.5 969
  Mackay  1.8  1 030 7.7 2.7 984
  Northern  0.8  690 8.7 1.9 981
  Far North  1.5  1 490 8.1 4.8 978
  North West  9.4  1 710 6.0 0.9 940
   
South Australia   
  Adelaide  0.3  1 220 10.6 0.5 991
  Outer Adelaide  5.7  2 350 8.9 2.2 1002
  Yorke and Lower North  4.0  600 11.0 -0.8 958
  Murray Lands  5.3  1 450 9.0 0.3 939
  South East  11.3  3 040 6.9 0.2 977
  Eyre  4.4  570 10.4 -0.9 964
  Northern  3.2  1 030 13.1 -1.2 936
   
Western Australia   
  Perth  0.5  2 740 8.3 2.6 1020
  South West  5.1  3 270 9.4 3.2 965
  Lower Great Southern  11.1  2 250 7.9 1.5 982
  Upper Great Southern  12.7  1 170 4.3 0.6 1005
  Midlands  6.1  1 370 6.7 3.3 980
  South Eastern  2.7  780 5.9 1.8 981
  Central  4.4  1 210 8.8 -2.2 960
  Pilbara  2.3  500 5.4 -0.6 995
  Kimberley  4.6  620 5.8 3.7 913
   
Tasmania   
  Greater Hobart  0.5  370 9.7 0.7 1001
  Southern  10.1  1 250 12.5 1.1 942
  Northern  4.5  2 280 11.3 0.7 966
  Mersey-Lyell  4.6  1 860 12.4 -0.5 945
   
Northern Territory   
  Darwin  < 1.0  < 360 7.7 1027
  NT – Balance  < 5.0  < 2 070 7.2 } 2.0 909
   
Australian Capital Territory   
  Canberra  0.2  260 7.3 1091
  ACT – Balance  5.1  10 8.3 } 1.3 1038
a Persons 15 years and over. b ABS Index of Relative Social Disadvantage. A lower index value means a 
greater disadvantage (see ABS Cat. no. 2039.0 for further details).  
Sources:  ABS  (Integrated Regional Database 1998, Cat. no. 1353.0), PC (1999),  ABS (1996 Census of 
Population and Housing: Socioeconomic Indexes For Areas, unpublished data) and PC estimates.     




Table D.2  Impact of the 12 month FMD scenario on regional output and 
employment  
MMRF model regions a 
Change in value of regional output    Change in employment   
Region  First year  Cumulative 10 years    First year 
  %  % of current 
output 
$m persons  % 
New South Wales           
  Sydney  0.24  0.07  60 4  240  0.24 
  Hunter  0.04  -0.36  -48 0  0.00 
  Illawarra  0.28  0.21  18 560  0.34 
  Richmond-Tweed  -0.58  -1.62  -75 -860  -1.14 
  Mid-North Coast  -0.55  -1.59  -88 -980  -1.03 
  Northern  -1.51  -3.57  -199 -2  380  -2.69 
  North Western  -1.55  -4.02  -165 -1  750  -3.18 
  Central West  -1.41  -3.47  -176 -2  000  -2.56 
  South Eastern  -1.02  -2.59  -133 -1  540  -1.85 
  Murrumbidgee  -1.02  -2.45  -117 -1  430  -2.00 
  Murray  -1.21  -3.19  -127 -1  380  -2.55 
  Far West  -0.73  -2.62  -54 -390  -3.13 
          
Victoria         
  Melbourne  0.44  0.29  189 7  020  0.51 
  Barwon  0.09  -0.37  -25 70  0.06 
  Western District  -1.17  -2.91  -99 -1  150  -2.12 
  Central Highlands  -0.04  -0.62  -27 -110  -0.14 
  Wimmera  -1.07  -2.75  -62 -700  -2.42 
  Mallee  -0.44  -1.38  -40 -410  -0.92 
  Loddon  -0.41  -1.47  -81 -730  -0.72 
  Goulburn  -0.58  -1.73  -87 -920  -1.04 
  Ovens-Murray  -0.27  -1.06  -36 -310  -0.55 
  East Gippsland  -0.11  -0.55  -16 -140  -0.38 
  Gippsland  -0.32  -1.11  -68 -630  -0.69 
          
Queensland         
  Brisbane  -0.64  -2.36  -676 -9  330  -1.25 
  Moreton  -1.08  -3.42  -317 -4  540  -1.89 
  Wide Bay-Burnett  -1.56  -4.50  -168 -2  250  -2.84 
  Darling Downs  -2.92  -7.77  -345 -4  590  -5.00 
  South West  -6.64  -19.55  -270 -2  220  -15.39 
  Fitzroy  -2.37  -6.71  -296 -3  200  -3.75 
  Central West  -4.45  -13.23  -129 -1  030  -15.66 
  Mackay  -0.26  -1.22  -39 -490  -0.87 
          (continued on next page) 
     




Table D.2  continued 
Change in value of regional output    Change in employment   
 
Region  First year  Cumulative 10 years    First year 
  %  % of current 
output 
$m persons  % 
  Northern  -0.97  -3.02  -131 -1  740  -1.86 
  Far North  -0.41  -1.59  -68 -930  -1.01 
  North West  -2.16  -6.22  -115 -840  -4.25 
          
South Australia          
  Adelaide  -0.03  -0.60  -126 -1  020  -0.16 
  Outer Adelaide  -1.19  -3.22  -72 -1  080  -2.04 
  Yorke and Lower North  -1.31  -3.17  -39 -660  -3.09 
  Murray Lands  -1.20  -3.12  -52 -810  -2.32 
  South East  -1.84  -4.51  -72 -1  140  -3.38 
  Eyre  -1.21  -3.00  -34 -560  -3.03 
  Northern  -1.21  -3.57  -74 -950  -2.16 
          
Western Australia          
  Perth  0.50  0.68  184 2  610  0.54 
  Peel   -0.02  -0.33  -4 -30  -0.20 
  South West   -0.34  -1.02  -29 -260  -0.69 
  Lower Great Southern  -2.07  -4.65  -67 -650  -3.92 
  Wheat-belt   -2.21  -5.03  -120 -1  060  -4.32 
  Goldfields-Esperance     0.19  0.06  2 70  0.28 
  Gascoyne   -0.77  -2.23  -15 -120  -2.36 
  Midwest   -0.90  -2.73  -49 -340  -1.85 
  Pilbara  0.47  0.65  13 160  0.85 
  Kimberley  -2.32  -6.71  -72 -440  -4.17 
          
Tasmania          
  Greater Hobart  0.16  -0.06  -2 60  0.07 
  Southern  -0.48  -1.69  -14 -140  -0.99 
  Northern  -0.38  -1.43  -35 -360  -0.64 
  Mersey-Lyell  -0.36  -1.30  -26 -280  -0.63 
          
Northern Territory  -0.36 -1.87  -83 -410  -0.55 
          
Australian Capital 
Territory 
0.17 0.22  21 380  0.25 
a The regions identified by the MMRF model differ from the Statistical Divisions in a number of cases. In 
Western Australia, the South West SD has been split into Peel and South West, the Central SD has been split 
into Gascoyne and Midwest; the Upper Great Southern SD and the Midlands SD have been combined into 
Wheat-belt, and the South Eastern SD has been renamed Goldfields-Esperance. In addition, there is one 
region covering each of the Territories.  
Source: MMRF model estimates.     






E  Economic welfare effects on 
consumers and producers 
This appendix presents a partial equilibrium analysis of the welfare effects on 
consumers and producers of a potential FMD outbreak in Australia. Partial 
equilibrium analysis allows an assessment (under certain assumptions) of the net 
economic impact of policies or events that lead to changes in price and levels of 
production. Key to such analysis are the concepts of consumer and producer 
surplus. 
The consumer surplus from the purchase of any quantity of a product is the 
difference, in expenditure, between the amount which the consumer pays for the 
product and the maximum amount which the consumer would be prepared to pay 
rather than do entirely without the product. 
For a group of consumers, this can be understood by observing that at a given price, 
a certain quantity of a product will be sold in the market. If the price falls, more of 
the product is sold, and both the original and new customers who purchase at the 
new lower price are better off. The original consumers, who had been willing to pay 
the higher price, have gained a consumer surplus equivalent to the difference 
between the old and new price.  
Producer surplus is analogous to consumer surplus. It is the difference between the 
amount producers’ receive for a commodity and the minimum amount they would 
accept to produce it. 
E.1  The welfare changes due to an FMD outbreak 
Consumer surplus 
In an FMD outbreak the quantity of meat supplied to the domestic market would 
increase as producers would divert meat to the domestic market which can no 
longer be sold in some export markets. The increase in quantity supplied would lead 
to a decline in the price of livestock products. Once consumers realise that FMD     




does not affect meat quality, consumer surplus would increase because of the 
increased quantities of meat available at the lower price. 
The change in consumer surplus associated with an FMD outbreak is illustrated in 
figure E.1. Initially P is the price consumers pay and Q is the quantity demanded by 
consumers and consumer surplus is defined as the area enclosed by XCP. When 
price falls to P1 and quantity increases to Q1, consumer surplus increases by the area 
PCEP1. 










Quantity o  
  
Producer surplus 
The change in producer surplus arising from an FMD outbreak can also be 
illustrated diagrammatically. In figure E.2, P is the price charged by producers and 
Q is the quantity supplied by producers. The supply curve represents the amount of 
product producers would be willing to produce at different prices for the product. 
Producer surplus is defined as the area between the price line and the supply curve 
— initially, the triangle area enclosed by PAO. 
     


















An FMD outbreak would reduce producer surplus. The closure of many export 
markets would reduce the prices farmers receive and limit the quantity they could 
sell. Some of the product meant for export will be diverted to the domestic market. 
The resulting oversupply of meat in the domestic market would lead to price falls, 
thus reducing returns to production in the market. 
In figure E.2, producers are faced with the lower price, P1 and, after adjustment, 
would sell a lower quantity Q1. The producer surplus under the new price and 
quantity demanded is the area enclosed by P1BO. Producer surplus has declined by 
the area PABP1. The actual loss of revenue experienced by producers would be 
PAQO – P1BQ1O, which is considerably greater than the loss of producer surplus. 
E.2  Net welfare effect of an FMD outbreak 
The net welfare effect for the community, by this analysis, is the sum of the change 
in consumer and producer surpluses. 
Figure E.3 combines the change in consumer and producer surpluses into a single 
diagram. Area PHMP1 is equivalent to the change in consumer surplus in figure E.1. 
Area PKNP1 is equivalent to the change in producer surplus in figure E.2. 
     

























In figure E.3, the price for meat is initially at P and Qd is consumed locally and  
QT – Qd is exported. In an FMD outbreak, export markets are significantly reduced 
and some products diverted from the export to the local market. With the increase in 
domestic supply, prices would fall, At price P1, producers would divert Qd1 – Qd of 
production from the export to the local market. The level of exports will decline by 
QT – QT1. The FMD outbreak equilibrium would be at a price of P1 with Qd1 
consumed in the local market and QT1 – Qd1 exported. 
The loss in producer surplus is the area enclosed by PKNP1. The increase in 
consumer surplus is the area PHMP1. This increase in consumer surplus represents a 
transfer from producers to domestic consumers. The area IJNM represents a transfer 
from producers to foreign consumers which is regarded as a loss in Australian 
welfare. The areas enclosed by HIM and JKN are losses in producer surplus that are 
not transferred to other parties. 
The net welfare effect of an FMD outbreak (the change in producer surplus less the 
change in consumer surplus) is represented by the area HKNM. 
The Commission has used its trade and production model to estimate the size of the 
welfare effects of an outbreak lasting 12 months. It estimates that, in net present 
value terms:     






•    the loss in producer surplus would be in the order of $7.5 billion; 
•   the gain in consumer surplus would be in the order of $5 billion; and 
•   the net welfare loss would be around $2.5 billion. 
The estimated welfare losses are significantly lower than the revenue losses to the 
livestock industry set out chapter 6. Estimates of revenue losses tend to overstate 
the welfare cost because they do not take account of the transfers to consumers or 
the ability to redirect resources saved from reducing livestock production to other 
activities.  
However, the estimated loss in producer surplus could understate the welfare costs 
arising from an FMD outbreak. While the partial equilibrium analysis provides a 
convenient before and after comparison, it does not capture the costs of adjustment 
from one equilibrium to another. For example, in the case of an FMD outbreak, a 
sudden reduction in livestock industry returns and production is not likely to lead 
immediately to a full redirection of resources to other activities, as is assumed in the 
analysis. Therefore, the estimate of the net welfare loss should be interpreted as a 
lower bound to the welfare effect of an FMD outbreak. 
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